

The Maoist Enemy: China's Challenge in 1960s East Germany

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Abstract

This article examines the challenge of Chinese communism in East Germany in the 1960s. It shows how the Sino–Soviet Split and the Chinese Cultural Revolution endangered the public transcripts of East German state socialism by undermining its organizing metaphors and principles. Chinese cadres used their East Berlin embassy as a stage, showcase and megaphone for their dissenting vision of communism throughout the decade, winning some support from elderly communists, young anti-authoritarians and students from the Global South. Studying the East German campaign against what was known as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ sheds light on the transnational traffic of actors and ideas within the Second World in the turbulent decade of the 1960s. The official and vernacular response to the Maoist challenge suggests that East German ideology was constituted by a double demarcation in the 1960s, against Western social democracy and capitalism to its right and Chinese communism to its left.

Keywords

1960s, China, Cold War, East Germany, internationalism, socialism

Just before 1 a.m. on a February night in 1967, two agents of the East German security service (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit; MfS*, or Stasi) arrived at the Chinese embassy in East Berlin, out of uniform and on foot. In a prearranged provocation, they began hurling rocks at the guardhouse, luring out the on-duty police officer in chase.¹ As the officer left the embassy unguarded, an unmarked truck pulled up with its tailgate down to cover the license plate, carrying 40 more

1 Butzlaff. Die Behörde für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (hereafter MfS), HA XX, 11125, 20.

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plainclothes Stasi men, armed with tire irons and wooden sticks.² Chinese embassy employees rushed out of the building as the Stasi agents destroyed and dismantled the glass display cases in front of the embassy, carting them away in the truck. The Chinese were prepared. Within minutes of the truck's arrival, they were shooting 8 mm film of the scene from the embassy balcony and taking photographs with high-powered flashes in the front yard. Chinese embassy workers shouted at the Stasi agents: 'Your government will answer for this! This is your socialist democracy! Rowdies! Russian methods! Fascists!' As the attackers left without a word, one Chinese diplomat shouted after them: 'You are afraid of a few pictures. But they are the truth!'³

China fought with the countries of the Soviet bloc, often violently, over the right to interpret the truth of socialism in the 1960s. On display in the vitrines had been a portrait of Mao Zedong alongside photographs of a clash from the previous month in Moscow when Soviet police had beaten Chinese students demonstrating at Lenin's mausoleum. The scene in East Berlin echoed one in Moscow from two weeks earlier when 'Soviet citizens,' according to the Soviet news agency, used electric saws and axes to remove display cases from the Chinese embassy.⁴ In his protest to the East German foreign office, the Chinese charge d'affaires called the action a grave infringement of diplomatic norms that 'unmasked the grisly countenance' of the GDR as the 'minions of the Soviet revisionists.'⁵

The Sino-Soviet split was a geopolitical and diplomatic struggle often governed by *Realpolitik* concerns, but it was also a struggle for *Deutungshoheit*, or sovereignty of interpretation, of the nature of communism itself.⁶ Through the accusatory interpellation – 'This is your socialist democracy!' – the Chinese forced their antagonists to either agree with, ignore, or refute the claim. By reconstructing the stations of the Chinese challenge in one communist state, East Germany, this article reads the Split as an interrogative process that brought the East German state's own scripts of self-understanding to light. The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) insisted, in Dominic Boyer's words, on maintaining a centralized monopoly on 'hermeneutic power' in East Germany.⁷ By definition, the Chinese attempt to fill the signifier of socialism with alternative content was an existential threat.

2 HA XX/2. Information. 14 February 1967. MfS, HA XX/2, 11125, 11–14.

3 Fuchs. 15 February 1967, MfS, HA XX/2, 11125, 34; For the Chinese protest see Document 54 in W. Meissner (ed.), *Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur: eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin 1995), 166–7.

4 'Chinese embassy accuses Russians of beating aides,' *New York Times* (4 February 1967).

5 R. Berthold. 14 February 1967. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter PA AA) C 1058/73.

6 Sergey Radchenko refers to the Split as a 'struggle between claimants to absolute truth.' S. Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967* (Washington, D.C. 2009), 206; The editors of a recent volume on the 'socialist sixties' argue that 'the place of China deserves more attention' as 'the Sino-Soviet rift created two poles of allegiance for aspiring socialist states.' A.E. Gorsuch and D. Koenker, 'Introduction: The Socialist 1960s in Global Perspective,' in A.E. Gorsuch and D. Koenker (eds) *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Bloomington, IN 2013), 16.

7 Boyer defines hermeneutic power as 'the power to cultivate order in epistemic processes, to rationalize interpretive and representational practices (in this case) to a political ideology, and, subsequently,

The Sino–Soviet Split endangered the public transcript in East Germany by undermining the organizing metaphors and principles of communist state sovereignty.⁸ The Chinese sought sites of vulnerability in East German ideology and targeted the heart of state legitimacy with their rhetoric. They outflanked the party from the left. Where the official script read that the relationship between East Germany and the Soviet Union was one of ‘friendship’ and ‘brotherhood,’ the Chinese recast it as a relationship of colonizer and colonized. Whereas the SED saw peace as the ultimate goal of communism, the Chinese saw it as disloyalty to the still-colonized and developing world, which they claimed could only be liberated through violent revolution. Whereas the SED dictated public restraint and maintained narrow channels for information, the Chinese performed radical, disruptive gestures, using their East Berlin embassy as a stage, showcase and megaphone for their dissenting vision of communism. After the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the summer of 1966, even the principle of democratic centralism came under attack, as loyalty to party leadership was condemned as bureaucratic rigidity and a betrayal of the ‘right to rebel.’⁹

Drawing on previously unused archival sources, this article documents the East German encounter with the internationally mobilized Chinese communism of the 1960s. It begins with an overview of Sino–East German relations in the 1950s and the domestic effects of the Sino–Soviet Split in the early 1960s. It then follows the efforts taken by East German authorities to sever conduits to the Chinese message. Measures extended from censoring and intercepting Chinese literature to infiltrating sympathetic student groups and, in at least two cases, using covert security forces to attack and destroy display cases at the Chinese embassy. At the height of the conflict, Chinese officials were accusing the East German authorities of murder, while hundreds of East German youth were visiting the Chinese embassy each month. The Chinese Cultural Revolution threw both the authority of the East German state to maintain order and its domestic monopoly on the language of socialism into question.

Historians have emphasized the relative moderation of the East German response to the Chinese challenge in comparison to the Soviet Union. The main

to define, institutionalize, and reproduce the parameters of legitimate and illegitimate knowledge.’ D. Boyer, ‘Censorship as a Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural Logic of Media Control in the German Democratic Republic,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45, 3 (2003), 522; Andreas Glaeser writes similarly that the goal of the SED was to create a ‘countrywide monolithic intentionality.’ A. Glaeser, *Political Epistemics: the Secret Police, the Opposition, and the End of East German Socialism* (Chicago, IL 2011), 61.

8 On the notion of public transcripts see J.C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT 1990); For an example of its use in relation to the GDR see J. Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945–1990* (New York, NY 2009), 13.

9 On the adoption of the principle of democratic centralism in East Germany see D. Spilker, *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany Patriotism and Propaganda, 1945–1953* (New York, NY 2006), 165; On its rejection during the Cultural Revolution in China see F.C. Teiwes and W. Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972–1976* (Armonk, NY 2007), 609.

scholarly discussion has been about why the SED took this stance. Was there a genuine attraction within the East German leadership to the Chinese position? What was the precise role of the Soviet Union in monitoring and controlling the Sino–East German relationship?¹⁰ The focus has been on official state actors, specifically the SED leadership, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese, with the latter mostly derived through secondary or printed sources. Alongside two impressive document collections, Claudie Gardet’s 700-page study provides the most thorough overview of East German–Chinese relations to date.¹¹ Recent work has turned attention to cultural diplomacy, especially film co-productions, seeking sites of convergence and divergence in the social and political imaginaries of the two communist states.¹²

This article shifts the gaze primarily to non-state actors. It highlights the motivations of the small number of individuals, including students from the global South, that were attracted to the Chinese interpretation of communism and the occasionally drastic efforts used by the authorities to police them. Looking at these relationships reveals that the apparent moderation of the East German leadership was, in fact, highly conditional and based on a particular culture and practice of internationalism. Even as the SED maintained rituals of solidarity with China for purposes of diplomatic performance, it policed contact across national lines with all available means. Even if East German leaders could live with the Chinese version of communism abroad, providing it avoided overly sharp anti-Soviet denunciations, it would still seek to smash it at home. In some cases, this meant the literal application of iron bars to glass.

The campaign against what was known as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ sheds light on the transnational traffic of actors and ideas within the Second World and the challenges that it created for the East German leadership. In viewing the Sino–Soviet Split and Chinese Cultural Revolution from the perspective of a

10 B. Erlinghagen, *Von ‘wildgewordenem Kleinbürgertum’ und ‘Weltherrschaftsplänen’: die Volksrepublik China im Spiegel der DDR-Presse (1966–1976)* (Cologne 2009); J. Krüger, ‘Das erste Jahrzehnt der Beziehungen,’ in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Beziehungen der DDR und der VR China: Erinnerungen und Untersuchungen* (Münster 2002), 65–111; H. Möller, *DDR und VR China: Unterstützung der VRCH auf politischem, ökonomischem und militärischem Gebiet (1949–1964): eine Dokumentation*, (Berlin 2003), 1–44; N. Stuber-Berries, ‘East German China policy in the face of the Sino–Soviet conflict: 1956–1966,’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (2004); M. Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949–1990: kulturelle Diversität und politische Positionierung* (Münster 2004).

11 C. Gardet, *Les relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949–1989)*, (New York, NY 2000); Meissner, *Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990*; Möller, *DDR und VR China*, 46–94.

12 Q. Shen, ‘A Question of Ideology and Realpolitik: DEFA’s Cold War Documentaries on China,’ in Q. Shen and M. Rosenstock (eds), *Beyond Alterity: German Encounters with Modern East Asia* (New York, NY 2014), 94–114; Q. Slobodian, ‘The Uses of Disorientation: Socialist Cosmopolitanism in an Unfinished DEFA-China Documentary’ in Q. Slobodian (ed.), *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York forthcoming); Q. Slobodian, ‘“Wir sind Brüder, sagt der Film”’: China im Dokumentarfilm der DDR und das Scheitern der politischen Metapher der Brüderlichkeit,’ in S. Marti and D. Eugster (eds), *Das Imaginäre des Kalten Krieges. Beiträge zu einer Wissens- und Kulturgeschichte des Ost-West-Konfliktes in Europa* (Essen 2015), 45–67; D. Tompkins, ‘The East is Red? Images of China in East Germany and Poland through the Sino–Soviet Split,’ *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung*, 62, 3 (2013), 393–424.

relatively peripheral country, it shows that the rupture inside the Cold War camp had repercussions to the edges of the communist world. Most significantly, the official and vernacular response to the Maoist challenge suggests that East German ideology was constituted by a double demarcation in the 1960s. The GDR defined its version of socialism against West German social democracy to its west and Maoism to its east. Deep estrangement from China strengthened defensive links among the East European countries under Soviet coordination and helped create the conditions for *détente* in the years that followed.

The German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China were founded within weeks of each other. On 16 October 1949, Mao Zedong wrote a congratulatory telegram to the East German leaders welcoming 'the country of origin for both world wars and the center of militarism and Nazism. . . into the ranks of the people's democracies.'¹³ In the official phraseology, the two republics were 'fraternal socialist countries' or 'socialist brotherlands' (*sozialistische Bruderländer*) 'under the leadership of the Soviet Union.' Premier Zhou Enlai wrote to offer the establishment of diplomatic relations soon after the republic's founding, and the East Germans moved into a section of the old German embassy in 1950, inheriting the files and archives of the diplomatic missions that had preceded them.¹⁴ The GDR diplomatic mission was converted into an embassy in September 1953, possibly as a gesture of Chinese support after the East German regime was rocked by an uprising in June of that year.¹⁵ Connections developed rapidly after 1954. By 1959, East Germany had become China's second largest trading partner after the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Even in the early phase of enthusiastic cooperation, referred to by some as the period of 'China euphoria,' the SED was keen to manage and even limit the amount of interaction between East German and Chinese individuals.¹⁷ These efforts were consistent with the official East German strategy of centralizing supervision of foreigners and prohibiting them from organizing independently.¹⁸ Diplomatic relationships were too important to risk being jeopardized by the unforeseeable outcomes of interpersonal contact, no matter how well-intentioned. In the early 1950s, the office of the East German Council of Ministers reported internally of 'continuous requests' and 'extraordinary interest' from 'broad circles' of the population, including doctors, academics, and cultural producers, to take

13 Mao to Pieck and Grotewohl. 16 October 1949. Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter SAPMO-BArch) DC 20/15870.

14 'Gründung der DDR aufs wärmste begrüßt.' TASS/ADN 25 Oct 1949. PA AA/A 15515; Dipl. Mission Beijing to MfAA. 17 September 1950. PA AA/A 15515; Dipl. Mission Beijing to MfAA. 18 September 1950. Ibid.

15 Krüger, 'Jahrzehnt,' 78; For speculation about the timing see Möller, *DDR und VR China*, 6.

16 Erlinghagen, 'Weltherrschaftsplänen,' 35.

17 B. Erlinghagen, 'Anfänge und Hintergründe des Konflikts zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik China. Kritische Anmerkungen zu einer ungeklärten Frage,' *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 49, 3 (2007), 117.

18 On the policing of foreigners see D. Mac Con Uladh, 'Studium bei Freunden? Ausländische Studierende in der DDR bis 1970,' in C.T. Müller and P.G. Poutrus (eds), *Ankunft, Alltag, Ausreise: Migration und interkulturelle Begegnung in der DDR-Gesellschaft* (Cologne 2005), 175–220.

part personally in efforts of Chinese–German solidarity. Yet they noted at the same time their instructions not to create an organization to coordinate these efforts.¹⁹ Officials turned down requests to form a ‘German–Chinese Friendship Society’ repeatedly in 1952.²⁰ Around this time, the East German government also dissolved the Chinese associations (*Vereine*) that had been formed by Chinese already resident in Germany before 1949.²¹ In the SED worldview, the scripts of fraternal solidarity were dictated from the top down, not written from below. Safeguards regulated unpredictable forms of transnational sociability.

The East German state preferred symbolic gestures to extensive personal connections.²² They printed three million paper Chinese flags for German–Chinese Friendship Month in 1951, and showed films about China in East German theaters and factory meetings.²³ Face-to-face contact happened mostly between Chinese and German university students. By mid-decade, about 45 students per year were coming from China to study in the GDR. In the academic year 1955–6, there were 127 Chinese students in East Germany and just over 200 the following year.²⁴ The first group of German students traveled to China in 1953 with a high point of 51 students and five apprentices in the country in 1957.²⁵ Though East German students stayed in dormitories apart from the Chinese population and their movement within the country was restricted, they still developed relationships with Chinese and foreign students.²⁶ After the beginning of the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958, East German students were ‘sent down’ to the countryside and factories with their Chinese fellow students to augment their book learning with labor.²⁷ This first generation of German students who traveled to China became East Germany’s primary Sinologists and Far Eastern diplomats in the years that followed.²⁸ One Sinologist who studied in China in the 1950s became the most important Stasi informant on the Chinese residents in East Germany from 1968 onward.²⁹ Other Sinologists trained in East Germany emigrated to take up positions in West Germany.³⁰

19 Gotsche. 17 Nov 1951. SAPMO-BArch/DC 20/3881; Gotsche to Thunig. 10 January 1952. Ibid.

20 Krüger, ‘Jahrzehnt,’ 76.

21 Ibid.

22 The combination of tight personal control with proliferation of metaphor-laden discourse is consistent with the Stalinist-era SED production of German-Soviet ‘friendship.’ See J.C. Behrends, *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propaganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR* (Cologne 2006), 227.

23 Plan for German–Chinese Friendship Month in June 1951. n.d. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV 2/20/116; For more on the Friendship Month see Tompkins, ‘The East is Red?’ 396–401.

24 Draft. 21 Feb 1956. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV 2/9.04/638; State Secretariat for Higher Education, Subsection for Foreign Students, 1957. Ibid.

25 Krüger, ‘Jahrzehnt,’ 102.

26 E. Müller, ‘Studienjahre in China,’ in J. Krüger (ed.) *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Beziehungen der DDR und der VR China* (Münster 2002), 52–4.

27 Gardet, *Les relations*, 41.

28 Krüger, ‘Jahrzehnt,’ 102.

29 The Sinologist in question studied in China from 1954 to 1958. Richter. HA XX/2/I. Report, 26 February 1968. MfS, AIM, 48/91, Teil 1, Bd. 1, 16.

30 Among those Sinologists named in a Stasi report who left the GDR are Heinz Friese and Wolfgang Lippert, who later held consecutive professorships in Erlangen, Rolf Trauzettel, who held a professorship in Bonn, and Dieter Heinzig, who completed a Ph.D. at Bochum. n.a. n.d. [ca. 1968], report. MfS, AIM, 48/91, Teil 2, Bd. 1, 51–2.

The Sino–East German relationship peaked in the first two years of the Great Leap Forward. The SED stood out by being vocally supportive of China’s ‘people’s communes’ even as the Soviet leadership criticized them.³¹ Central to the Great Leap Forward, the communes sought to dissolve the division between agricultural and industrial production by reorganizing almost the entire rural population into collectives of an average of 30,000 people.³² In the last year of the decade, East German newspapers used the term ‘Great Leap Forward’ to describe both Chinese efforts and those in East Germany itself, and the East German military borrowed models of organization from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.³³ Addressing the eighth party congress in Beijing in 1959, East German prime minister Otto Grotewohl used Mao’s own vocabulary, announcing that the ‘east wind had conquered the west wind’ and ‘the imperialist paper tiger had no chance of turning back the wheel of history.’³⁴ The front page of *Neues Deutschland* commemorated the event with a headline in inch-high Chinese characters.³⁵

Yet even as the culture of solidarity was flourishing in East Germany, relations between China and the Soviet Union were degenerating. Mao was rankled by his position as the junior partner to the Soviet Union from 1949 onward and CCP leaders were unimpressed by Joseph Stalin’s hesitant support for the Korean War.³⁶ Khrushchev’s failure to inform Chinese leadership before launching his campaign of de-stalinization in the so-called ‘secret speech’ of 1956 was a further affront to their status in the socialist camp.³⁷ Chinese leaders also objected to the content of the speech, which they felt jeopardized both the unity of the socialist camp and the socialist interpretation of history, and failed to acknowledge the complex status of personality cults in socialist thought.³⁸

Historians differ on whether the Sino–Soviet relationship was salvageable and who bore the primary blame for its collapse. Yet they agree that the most neuralgic point for the Chinese leadership was the belief that Khrushchev was neglecting his alliance with China in favor of détente with the United States of America, especially after the summit with President Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959.³⁹ The Soviet leader’s doctrine of peaceful coexistence seemed to translate into a position

31 Meissner, *Die DDR und China*, 102; J. Scholtyssek, *Die Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Munich 2003), 19.

32 M. Meissner, *Mao’s China and After*, 3rd edn. (New York, NY 1999), 218–20.

33 For examples of both see F. Hahn, ‘Wie wir den großen Sprung schaffen,’ *Neues Deutschland* (11 July 1959); ‘Volkschinas großer Sprung geht weiter!’ *Neues Deutschland* (8 September 1959); On the NVA see K.P. Storkmann, *Das chinesische Prinzip in der NVA: vom Umgang der SED mit den Generalen und Offizieren in der frühen NVA* (Berlin 2001).

34 *Freundschaft sichert Frieden* (dir. Joachim Hadaschik, 1959).

35 ‘Wir grüssen die Volksrepublik China zu ihrem 10. Jahrestag,’ *Neues Deutschland* (1 Oct 1959).

36 Chen, *Mao’s China*, 53, 55–6.

37 Radchenko, *Two Suns*, 9–10.

38 D. Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution* (New York, NY 2013), 30–35.

39 See Dong Wang, ‘The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino–Soviet Split, 1959–1962,’ *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, 49 (2006); L.M. Lüthi, *Split*, Ch. 5; See also: D. Wolff, ‘“One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events”’: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino–Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959,’ *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, 30 (2000).

of continuing vulnerability for the non-nuclear powers, an impression reinforced when the Soviets denied promised nuclear technology to China in 1959.⁴⁰ When the Chinese made their discontent public in 1960, Khrushchev withdrew all Soviet specialists from China in retaliation, dealing both a symbolic and practical blow to a country struggling through the catastrophic human consequences of the failed Great Leap Forward program and the mass famine it caused.⁴¹ By early 1960, the Sino-Soviet disagreement was an 'open secret' in East and West.⁴²

The first public point of rupture in East Germany came over the people's communes in 1960.⁴³ At the time, the SED was experiencing popular resistance to its own, much less radical, program of rural collectivization on the model of agricultural cooperatives (LPG). When a Chinese representative in East Germany was quoted in a local newspaper describing LPGs as a transitional stage to people's communes, the SED bridled against the distorted portrayal of their program that they felt would stoke the fears of rural East Germans about collectivization.⁴⁴ An article in *Neues Deutschland* publicly protested the notion that 'the path of land reform taken by China from the LPG to the people's commune applies to other countries as well.' It reassured readers that kitchens were not going to be collectivized and 'every male and female farmer may behave as they personally wish.'⁴⁵ When the Chinese brought a photography exhibition to the GDR in October 1960, they were asked to remove reference to People's Communes.⁴⁶

Ulbricht seemed to have sided with the Soviet Union against China without explicit pressure from Moscow.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, it was after a trip to the Soviet capital to consult with the 'fraternal parties' about the Chinese threat that he gave one of his most unambiguous statements against Maoism, declaring to the Central Committee of the Politburo in December 1960 that 'there is no Chinafied Marxist-Leninism' (*chinesierten Marxismus-Leninismus*), effectively rejecting the validity of 'Mao Zedong Thought.'⁴⁸ The dictum expressed the sentiment that the Chinese challenge was becoming a frontal assault on the right to define the

40 Lüthi, *Split*, 103.

41 *Ibid.*, 173–4; On the consequences of the Great Leap Forward see F. Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962*, (New York, NY 2010); Yang Jisheng, *Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962*, (New York, NY 2012).

42 Mingjiang Li, 'Ideological Dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63,' *Cold War History*, 11, 3 (August 2011), 390.

43 Erlinghagen, 'Anfänge und Hintergründe des Konflikts,' 133; Tompkins, 'The East is Red?' 417.

44 The Chinese official later protested that he was misquoted, which may have been true. For a thorough account of the incident see Gardet, *Les relations*, 115–23.

45 Document 27. 'Zur Klärung einer Frage,' *Neues Deutschland* (17 June 1960), reprinted in Meissner, *Die DDR und China*, 116.

46 SED Internal Memo to Ulbricht. 17 October 1960. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV 2/20 115.

47 Erlinghagen, 'Anfänge und Hintergründe des Konflikts zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik China,' 115; On Ulbricht's position on China in 1960 see Gardet, *Les relations*, 136–41; For an argument about Ulbricht's sympathy for Mao at the time of the split, based on thin evidence, see H. Millard Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, N.J. 2003), 80.

48 Quoted in 'Ist China ein sozialistisches Land?' *Informationsdienst*. Nr. 79/V, 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A2/9.02/17.

content of the term of socialism itself, one that was creating opposing poles of interpretation in Beijing and Moscow. From the turn of the decade onward in East Germany, Maoism was no longer to be treated as a national variant of communism but a deviation from socialist truth.⁴⁹

The Chinese challenge in East Germany quickly became a fight over information. With the GDR drawn into the Sino–Soviet Split, a carefully constructed culture of solidarity faded from the foreground and eventually all but vanished. While the diplomatic relationship between the two republics was never severed entirely, public expressions of socialist brotherhood were largely suspended. After publishing hundreds of thousands of copies of Mao's writings, rhapsodic travelogues penned by East Germans, and volumes on Chinese art and literature, the books were removed from East German bookstores and libraries.⁵⁰ Books in development, including a translation of Mao's collected writings, were halted, and German language publications from China were no longer permitted to enter the country.⁵¹ The series of over a dozen films that the East German film company had made about China between 1954 and 1960 disappeared from screens. Factories and schools named after Mao were renamed.⁵² Mao Zedong Ring in Erfurt became Yuri Gagarin Ring in 1964.⁵³

The first East German response to the Chinese threat was a strategy of silencing and censorship. An example on the stage of high diplomacy came at one of a series of East European party congresses where the Sino–Soviet conflict first came into the open. Ahead of the SED congress in January 1963, the East German politburo ordered the chair to 'switch off the microphones' in case of 'provocations by the Chinese delegation.' Delegates from East Germany and other East European countries took direct action during the Chinese speech, drowning the speaker out with whistling, stomping and shouts.⁵⁴ The CCP complained in a letter to the SED later, comparing the tactic unfavorably to those of bourgeois parliamentarians. 'Stomping cannot replace thought,' they wrote, 'nor can whistling replace language.'⁵⁵ In a clever rhetorical turn, the Chinese claimed a mode of socialist democracy that permitted internal dissent for themselves against the intolerant, 'parliamentarian' practice of the parties loyal to Moscow.

In 1964, the SED moved beyond the tactic of silence to a counter-campaign in press and print against the Chinese. That year, the party referred to the Chinese

49 It is worth noting that the term 'Maoism' itself was only used in isolated instances in the GDR before 1969. Its use in print peaked in the mid-1970s before subsiding after Mao's death in 1976. See <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/suchergebnisse/> (accessed 13 December 2014).

50 Wobst, *Kulturbeziehungen*, 50, 70.

51 Schällicke and Dietz to Reinhold, 9 July 1960. SAPMO-BArch /DY 30/IV 2/9.02/26; Department on Foreign Policy and International Relations. Draft, 18 July 1960. Ibid.

52 See e.g. Kipsch. Regional Party Control Commission (RPCC) Frankfurt/Oder. 15 May 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

53 See <http://www.erfurt-web.de/Juri-Gagarin-Ring> (accessed 15 December 2014)

54 Lüthi, *Split*, 235.

55 CCP Central Committee to SED Central Committee. 27 March 1963. BA/DY 30/3607/88; These direct action interventions were far from the 'veiled' criticisms described by Li at the party congresses. Li, 'Dilemma,' 404.

challenge internally as ‘the main danger within the international communist movement.’⁵⁶ The gyrations, and ongoing ambiguity, of the party line disoriented many ordinary East Germans. Irritated high school teachers asked party officials what they were supposed to teach their students. Were the people’s communes of the Great Leap Forward good or not? The textbooks, which had yet to be replaced, still said they were, but the party newspaper said that they were not.⁵⁷ In many exchanges with officials, China became a proxy topic for the question of access to information in the GDR in general. In doing so, it followed a pattern repeated over the decades, as East Germans used the supposedly deviant behavior of other socialist countries to provoke and embarrass the SED. One party member in 1963 complained that ‘there was no correct information about China. The party does not report on all sides.’ Another said: ‘We have very little written material on China here. Where are we supposed to get the correct image of China from?’⁵⁸ A party official noted in discussions that ‘a number of comrades sought to justify listening to Western radio through the demand for ‘objective information from all sides [*allseitige, objektiv*].’⁵⁹ East Germans were surprisingly open about the fact that they turned west for information. Factory workers, including party members, watched West German television in their break rooms and discussed it openly at the workplace.⁶⁰ A party member at a tractor factory said unambiguously: ‘we only receive true and correct information when we watch Western television.’⁶¹ Through such moments of talking back, East Germans undercut the authority of SED representatives, remaining outwardly loyal to the party line even as they challenged it.

The SED’s vertiginous reversal of position on China from 1960 to 1963 strained credibility for many party members and prompted them to be frank, and even defiant, about the need for more perspectives on geopolitical developments. Through West German and US radio and television broadcasts, they were able to follow the Western viewpoint on the Sino–Soviet Split, one that had its own ideological distortions, but which allowed for triangulation on the zigzagging position of the official East German line.⁶²

China also became a proxy topic for East German subordination vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Some party members said that ‘China would protect itself against the paternalism of the Soviet Union’ and ‘finally someone is around who will speak

56 Quoted in S.J. Scala, ‘Understanding the Class Enemy: Foreign Policy Expertise in East Germany,’ Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland (2009), 261.

57 This complaint was reported more than once from teachers. RPCC Cottbus to Haussmann, Central Party Control Commission (CPCC). 1 June 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/4; RPCC Erfurt. Report. 28 May 1964. Ibid.

58 Behring, RPCC Berlin to Paul Verner, RPCC Berlin. 17 September 1963. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

59 Juch, CPCC. 26 June 1964. Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Eyer mann, RPCC Magdeburg. Report to CPCC. 6 June 1964. Ibid.

62 On stereotypes in the China reportage in West Germany see M. Leutner and D. Yü-Demb ski, ‘“Die gelbe Gefahr hat rote Hände”: Rotchina 1949–1972,’ in M. Leutner and D. Yü-Demb ski (eds), *Exotik und Wirklichkeit: China in Reisebeschreibungen vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich 1990).

their mind to Moscow.⁶³ Others saw the direct connection between China's fall from grace in the GDR and their opposition to the Soviet Union, saying 'the Chinese won't dance to Khrushchev's tune so now they are the bad guys.'⁶⁴ Such statements expressed less support for the content of China's policies than a casual approval of their courage in defying Soviet hegemony but they still provided East Germans with a vocabulary for talking about the existence of imperial relations *within* the communist camp.

More substantive than grudging respect for China's independent-mindedness was the attraction of some East Germans to its embrace of the ongoing need for revolution. A series of East Germans were expelled from the SED around the time of the Sino-Soviet Split in 1963 for siding with the Chinese against the Soviets.⁶⁵ Sympathy for the Chinese was especially strong among the group known as the 'old comrades' (*alte Genossen*), that is, people who had joined the German Communist Party (KPD) in the 1920s. Relating the Sino-Soviet conflict to the clash between communists and social democrats in the Weimar era, many 'old comrades' saw the Chinese as closer to the spirit of communism. They shared the belief that fixating on the goal of peace and the notion of a 'gradual growth into socialism' was an error. 'Only bloody revolution,' as one *alter Genosse* put it, would help socialism conquer capitalism.⁶⁶

In addition to the necessity of violence, some East Germans felt that the Chinese were correct in maintaining similar standards of living for the population rather than allowing the 'intellectuals and middle classes' to earn more, a position the authorities dismissed as 'primitive egalitarianism' (*primitive Gleichmacherei*).⁶⁷ In a letter of resignation from the party in 1964, a former police officer wrote in rough prose:

China was an example for me. The Chinese leaders said that if there is nothing to eat then nobody gets to eat. They haven't raised themselves up to another level. I know that some don't live good while others live bad over there. If the people starve, they'd starve too. Their example shows me that we [party members] are fooling ourselves when we grow ever further from the population. Nobody is against socialism, everyone is against capitalism and if our leaders acted like the Chinese leaders, the entire population would be behind us.⁶⁸

For many old communists and some new ones too – this person had only been in the party since 1947 – the Chinese stood for a model of socialism based on sacrifice, violent struggle, and even shared deprivation.

63 RPCC Dresden. Report. 15 May 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

64 Ibid.

65 See e.g. RPCC Halle. 17 June 1964. Ibid.; RPCC Berlin. 25 May 1964. Ibid.

66 Ibid.; Fischer, RPCC Karl-Marx-Stadt to CPCC Berlin. 13 May 1964. Ibid.

67 RPCC Karl-Marx-Stadt to CPCC Berlin. 13 May 1964; Juch. CPCC. 26 June 1964. Both in *ibid.*

68 RPCC Berlin. 25 May 1964. In *ibid.*

Although the GDR was itself a highly militarized society, the centrality of martial virtues for the Chinese was at odds with the official conception of communism in 1960s East Germany as a technocratic project of raising consumer living standards under the sign of world peace. Party chairman Walter Ulbricht made this vision for East German society explicit in 1958 when he declared 'that the principal task of the state was to overtake the West in per capita consumption.'⁶⁹ To a select group of East Germans, the Chinese were still fighting for true communism, while the Soviet bloc had capitulated to material goals and lost the moral values of the workers' movement along the way. When functionaries refused to billet Free German Youth members for the holidays in 1964, some party members remarked, 'the Chinese are probably right. Prosperity leads to petty bourgeois values (*Spießertum*).'⁷⁰ For some East Germans, the Chinese example reflected back their own state's digression from the path of both independence and communist tradition.

It goes without saying that such insights were undesirable for the ruling party. Yet even as the SED sought to seal off their state territory from alternative viewpoints on China, information found its way in. While some East Germans turned west for more information, others turned further east. Authorities noted in the mid-1960s that many party members listened to Chinese radio and received printed material from the Chinese embassy.⁷¹ An elderly party member who had lived in China for 25 years claimed that one could be informed properly only through Radio Peking, which had begun broadcasting in German in 1964.⁷² The circulation of Chinese materials happened against the party's best efforts. Substantive reports of CCP decisions disappeared from East German newspapers in the early 1960s, and the importation of printed material from China was outlawed.⁷³ The Chinese responded by smuggling in pamphlets and books as part of a global campaign to disseminate their 'counter-revisionist' message through their embassies.⁷⁴ In August 1963, the SED told customs agents to confiscate all printed material sent from China, and directed all Chinese entering the country to be 'thoroughly searched' for any newsletters or brochures.⁷⁵

The Chinese were dogged, though. They began translating Chinese polemics locally at the East Berlin embassy after 1963. Throughout the next year, East German high school teachers, factory leaders, and low-level functionaries received bulletins praising the success of the Chinese model of economic development, and invitations to the embassy were handed out to workers at factories.⁷⁶ Though the

69 Quoted in K. Pence, 'The myth of a suspended present,' in P. Betts and G. Eghigian (eds), *Pain and Prosperity: Reconsidering Twentieth-century German History* (Stanford, CA 2003), 145.

70 Ibid.

71 Juch, CPCC. 26 June 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

72 Behring, RPCC Berlin to Verner, RPCC Berlin. 17 September 1963. In *ibid*.

73 Wobst, *Kulturbeziehungen*, 50.

74 The global campaign was initiated by a CCP directive in January 1963 and extended to both socialist and developing countries. Li, 'Ideological dilemma,' 404–5.

75 Honecker SED to Hager. 22 August 1963. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/221.

76 Gerhardt Masur to Central Committee (CC). 19 September 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/222; Dohlus, SED CC to SED CC, Foreign Relations Department 14 October 1964. *Ibid.*; Funke, SED to Honecker, SED CC. 21 April 1964. *Ibid*; Memo, 11 January 1963. BA/DY 30-IV A 2/20/221.

efforts fell on deaf ears the great majority of the time, small groups came to the embassy, responding to the attraction of an alternative, anti-Soviet model of socialism that continued to conceive of the good life in terms of radical equality rather than in the asymptotic pursuit of West German-style consumer prosperity.

Beyond the 'old comrades,' the most receptive group the Chinese found for their message were foreign students from the global South.⁷⁷ The attraction of the Chinese position for students from Asia, Africa and Latin America was, above all, the belief that the communist doctrine of world peace was geographically biased, and accounted for the realities of the global North while ignoring their own. When Mao rejected the notion of peaceful coexistence that the Soviet Union had promoted since 1956, he contended that the US and Soviet version of peace only meant the export of conflict from Europe to the world's periphery. This geopolitical reading found favor among foreign students. Some would have seen empirical supporting evidence in their home countries. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, the US-supported coup d'état in Brazil in 1964, the occupation of the Dominican Republic by the US Marine Corps in 1965, and the ongoing intervention through the covert funding of political parties throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia suggested that the terrain of conflict had shifted from Europe to proxy territories in the Third World.⁷⁸ East German authorities noted that Latin American students had been the group that followed the Chinese interpretation of peaceful coexistence most closely from 1963 onward.⁷⁹

The population of foreign students was growing at mid-decade. From 1960 to 1965, the number of foreign students had tripled at East German universities to 3400, including nearly 2000 from African, Arab, Southeast Asian and Latin American countries.⁸⁰ There were only 60 Chinese students among them in 1963 yet they used their numbers effectively to turn seminars into discussions about their political position. Most foreign students lived sequestered in specially designated dormitories and Chinese students took advantage of the close quarters. After a meeting of 40–60 foreign students in June 1963, four Chinese students reminded the group that they could continue their discussion back in the dormitory.⁸¹ At one technical school, foreign students listened to Radio Peking and records of Mao's speeches in groups and an African student kept a portrait of Mao on his bedside table.⁸²

77 Gardet, *Les Relations*, 169–73.

78 For the authoritative study see O.A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Makings of our Times* (New York, NY 2007).

79 This fact directly contradicts the assertion about Latin American students in Gardet, *Les relations*, 171; SED party organization. Herder Institute forum on 9 January 1963. SAPMO-BArch /DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/470; Attachment 4. 25 September 1967. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466.

80 Ibid.

81 SED party organization. Herder Institute forum on 9 January 1963. SAPMO-BArch /DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/470

82 Fichtner. 4 June 1964. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/222.

In 1963, foreign students in Leipzig articulated the Maoist critique of peace when they said that the Soviet Union had ‘lost its right to lead the international working class because they did not want to put their own accomplishments at risk in a war.’⁸³ East German authorities delayed a conference of the Union of African Students and Workers in the GDR three times in 1961 because of their declared intention to discuss the Chinese position about the East German failure to support revolutionary movements.⁸⁴ In 1967, Cuban students declared publicly at an East German technical university that ‘the East German Leninist model of revolution was incorrect’ and that ‘Cuba had provided the example that a handful of fearless revolutionaries are in the position to both successfully begin a revolution and lead it to a successful ending.’⁸⁵ An official noted with concern that ‘a large percentage of the Latin American students tends to make undue generalizations in seeing GDR citizens as petty bourgeois (*Spießler*), people lacking revolutionary *élan* of any kind.’⁸⁶

East German officials were especially dismayed to find that Vietnamese students seemed to be the closest allies of the Chinese in their critique of the Soviets.⁸⁷ In October 1966, a Vietnamese student in Halle left the common room at the dormitory ‘in demonstrative protest’ when a report on Ulbricht’s visit to Yugoslavia appeared on television.⁸⁸ An official reported that ‘Vietnamese students reacted with joy to the news of the existence of a Chinese hydrogen bomb’ in June 1967 with one Vietnamese student handing a female Chinese trainee a bouquet in congratulations and calling for other foreign students to do the same.⁸⁹ Ham-fisted administration at the university level exacerbated the problem. In April 1964, a party official at the Dresden Technical University refused permission to Chinese and North Vietnamese students to hang their flags at a day of solidarity with anti-colonial youth groups, suggesting that they did not belong to this group.⁹⁰ For some SED officials, China’s status as a deviant within the communist camp obscured its history as a nation emerging from partial colonization and imperial economic control. Yet it was precisely this history that the Chinese used to create affective bonds with foreign students from the global South, creating an alternative internationalism to that coordinated by the Soviet bloc.

Despite success with some foreign students and isolated cases of identification among East German communists, largely from an older generation, the Chinese critique of peace found little traction in the larger public in the mid-1960s.

83 Section on technical and higher education policy. 19 July 1963. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/470.

84 ‘3. Unionkongress Afrikanischen Studenten und Arbeiter der DDR.’ handwritten notes n.a. n.d. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV 2/20/56; On the Union of African Students and Workers see Q. Slobodian, ‘Bandung in Divided Germany: Managing Non-Aligned Politics in East and West, 1955–63,’ *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41, 4 (2013), 633–4.

85 Bähr, 13 December 1967. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30-IV A 2/9.04.

86 Attachment 4. 25 September 1967. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466.

87 Kühlinger. 28 August 1967. Ibid.

88 HA XX, Information, 1966. MfS, HA XX, 10224, Teil 1, 83.

89 Attachment 4. 25 September 1967. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/466.

90 n.n. to Honecker. 30 April 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/222.

Indeed, in many cases, the Chinese challenge brought racist attitudes to the surface that explained the Chinese position as a product of culture rather than history. Party sources reported that the term ‘yellow peril’ was heard in all districts at the time of the Sino–Soviet Split.⁹¹ In group discussions, East Germans explained the Chinese attitude toward war as the cultural product of an Asian ‘mentality’ or a demographically-motivated desire ‘to stop their rapid population growth.’⁹² Workers in Halle personified the threat in racist stereotype, saying: ‘Look at the yellow peril, smiling to your face with a dagger behind its back, that is the Asian grimace.’⁹³ Some went even further, seeing the Chinese position as confirmation of the attitude of both the imperialists and Nazis. One party member said that ‘Europe must join together under a single flag to defend against the ‘yellow peril,’ regardless of socio-economic system.’⁹⁴ Another recast the class war into a race war, predicting that ‘there will no longer be a war between capitalism and socialism but between the colored and white nations. China will take the leadership of the colored peoples.’⁹⁵

Party officials formally denounced the use of racial arguments. In a 1964 televised panel discussion, Herta Classen, a director at Berliner Rundfunk, called the notion of the ‘yellow peril’ an ‘unscientific and provocative theory that is wrong now as it ever was. Human interests are not divided by skin color.’⁹⁶ Yet the very fact that she countered publicly what she called the ‘resurrection’ of this notion testifies to a degree of purchase in popular opinion. Repulsion for the Chinese disrupted the public transcript in a different way. Auguries of a coming race war setting Europe against the non-white world upset the SED’s division of the continent – and Germany itself – into camps of peace and imperialism. For the East German state, it could potentially be as dangerous for China to push people westward as to draw them eastward. Racializing the enemy could reaffirm the unity of European against non-European interests. The critique of peace threatened to reorder the world to the detriment of the Moscow-led bloc.

The fight to define socialism took on a more violent form when the repercussions of the Cultural Revolution arrived in East Berlin in the fall of 1966. When the employees of the Chinese embassy gathered to commemorate national independence that year, their green ‘cadre suits’ bore the addition of a large pin of Mao’s face.⁹⁷ Chinese diplomats began criticizing Ulbricht openly at public gatherings in the embassy in October, saying that he ‘followed the line of the Soviet Communist Party dogmatically and doesn’t make his own decisions.’ The embassy had also begun serving Chinese rather than Western food, a change that a German

91 Fischer, RPCC Karl-Marx-Stadt to Roscher, CPCC. 4 September 1963. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

92 Party Organs Department, CC. 12 June 1964. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/20/222.

93 Hinz, RPCC Halle to CPCC Berlin. 19 July 1963. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV A 2/4/3.

94 Juch, CPCC. 26 June 1964. *Ibid.*

95 *Ibid.*

96 *Sonntagsgespräch des Deutschlandsenders*. 19 April 1964. Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, DRAB-H, 064965.

97 A XX, Information, 15 November 1966. MfS, HA XX, 10224, Teil 2, 425.

informant found worth repeating to his Stasi contact, perhaps seeing it as a sign of deviation to a 'national' form of culture.⁹⁸ The vitrines in front of the embassy showcased the more confrontational Chinese line, featuring German translations of the signs carried by Red Guards with the slogan 'proletarians of all countries, unite in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism.'⁹⁹

The pairing of imperialism and revisionism reflected the Maoist conflation of former (and ongoing) European colonial powers, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and its allies. The Red Guards in the photograph were the appointed messengers. In China, Mao gave the mobilized youth his official blessing in August 1966. In a ceremony at Tiananmen Square, he became an honorary Red Guard and enjoined them to 'bombard the headquarters' the same month, legitimizing the full-scale offensive on his own Chinese Communist Party establishment that would follow.¹⁰⁰

Red Guard attacks also turned on representatives of the supposedly 'revisionist' Soviet bloc. The Soviet embassy in Beijing was the site of continual demonstrations in August 1966 with as many as 200,000 people marching, chanting and covering buildings with big-character posters (*dazibao*) that threatened retribution for failing to follow the Chinese line.¹⁰¹ In one incident, Red Guards tore East German diplomats approaching the Soviet embassy from their cars with their wives and children. Red Guards held them in a building for several hours, striking one woman in the head, and punching a diplomat's son in the face.¹⁰² The attack followed an earlier incident in May when the wife of an East German embassy official had been attacked with her small child and hospitalized while alone in Beijing.¹⁰³

In November 1966, Ulbricht initiated the first of what would be a series of mounting diplomatic incidents. In *Neues Deutschland*, he came out against the 'excesses and rioting of the Mao troops' which he said was 'directed in the first line against the cadres of the Chinese Communist Party.'¹⁰⁴ Chinese ambassador Zhang Haifeng declared the speech to be evidence that East Germany had 'entered the choir of the Soviet revisionists.'¹⁰⁵ In China, the crisis peaked in February 1967 after the aforementioned clash with Soviet troops at Lenin's Tomb in Moscow. As part of the retaliation, crowds in Beijing surrounded the car of East German embassy employees for several hours and eventually destroyed the automobile.¹⁰⁶

98 File. 19 October 1966. MfS, ZAIG, 1271, p. 1.

99 HA XX, Information, 15 November 1966. MfS, HA XX, 10224, Teil 2, 428.

100 Meissner, *China*, 318.

101 Radchenko, *Two Suns*, 178–9.

102 Ibid; Meissner, *Die DDR und China*, 143.

103 The attack against the wife of the First Secretary of the East German Embassy, Bruno Mahlow, took place on 29 April 1966. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chinese embassy in Berlin. 30 August 1966. PA AA/C 1058/73.

104 Reprinted in Meissner, *Die DDR und China*, 159.

105 Transcript of a conversation between Comrade State Secretary Hegen and the Ambassador of the PRC in GDR Zhang Haifeng on 23 November 1966. PA AA/C1058/73.

106 Rolf Berthold. Note for the file. 14 February 1967. Ibid.

According to *Der Spiegel*, black paint – the color of evil and reaction – was poured over the car and its inhabitants.¹⁰⁷ Zhang was unapologetic, saying that the ‘East German diplomats did not respect the revolutionary order so it was natural that such provocations should call forth the justified anger of the revolutionary masses.’¹⁰⁸ The ambassador’s formulation illustrated the ever-widening divergences in the conceptions of socialism between East Germany and China as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. Deference to the insight of ‘the masses’ and the sanctioning of violence departed from prior modes of diplomatic practice, representing aspects of what the Chinese called ‘proletarian diplomacy.’¹⁰⁹ As total fidelity to Mao became the sole criteria for securing political legitimacy, CCP leaders found their own claim to govern crippled and the reins of power slipping from their grasp.¹¹⁰

In February 1967, Chinese students in East Germany were summoned back to China to take part in the Cultural Revolution.¹¹¹ On 11 February, Red Guards arrived in Berlin to escort ambassador Zhang himself back to China, signaling a further radicalization of the diplomatic corps posted in the GDR.¹¹² The Berlin embassy’s display cases were redone on the same day. The new displays showed images of the clashes at Lenin’s tomb.¹¹³ Other images were of Laotian soldiers in cadre suits and caps reading from Mao’s writing on ‘People’s War’ and another one showing a dark-skinned man from Congo (Brazzaville) having a pin put upon his lapel.¹¹⁴ East German intelligence reports confirmed that ‘since the rearrangement of the boxes, they have been looked at by passersby continually.’¹¹⁵

The SED and the Stasi watched the content of the display cases as a barometer of shifts in Chinese political climate and as a tool in itself for broadcasting that message to Berlin residents as the physical fixture enabled direct access to East German consumers within the apparent sovereign immunity of the embassy grounds. It was the images from the clash in Moscow that pushed East German authorities to the act of extralegal violence mentioned in this article’s introduction. Two days after the photographs were displayed, Soviet ambassador Petr Andreevich Abrasimov visited the East German Foreign Office and ‘asked that steps be taken accordingly.’¹¹⁶ The Stasi began gathering information about the strength of the vitrines and their precise location. After confirming that they were indeed on the territory of the embassy and that it would be impossible to open them and remove the material without setting foot on its grounds, they concocted the scheme described in the introduction, including an arrangement with the guard

107 ‘Farbe der Schande,’ *Der Spiegel* (13 February 1967).

108 Rolf Berthold. Note for the file. 14 February 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

109 Lüthi, ‘Origins,’ 411–26.

110 Leese, *Mao Cult*, 125.

111 Gardet, *Les relations*, 173.

112 Oskar Fischer. Memo. 13 February 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

113 HA XX/2, Information. 13 February 1967. MfS, HA XX, 11125, p.4.

114 Pictures of the arrangement of the display cases, 13 February 1967. MfS, HA XX, 11125, p.10.

115 HA XX/2, information. 13 February 1967. MfS, HA XX, 11125, p.5.

116 Oskar Fischer, memo. 13 February 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

to leave his post after the pre-scheduled provocation.¹¹⁷ Soon after the attack, police took away the broken tree limbs and long sticks used to pry off the display cases, overruling Chinese protests at the removal of evidence with the claim that the debris was a danger for pedestrians.¹¹⁸ Stasi agents photographed the front of the building and included it in their files to their superiors, capturing the blank slate absent of counter-narrative that the authorities desired.¹¹⁹

The destruction of the display cases seemed like a crude victory. A closer look at the incident, however, suggests Chinese astuteness in the politics of communication. In their reportage, the West German newspaper *Die Zeit* had noticed the detail that ‘as one embassy employee heroically submitted to the beating by the FDJ members, another one snapped photos from a safe distance.’¹²⁰ The technique had been used in Moscow two weeks earlier. During the removal of the display cases, a Chinese embassy employee lit the scene with a spotlight from the second floor as another one took photographs.¹²¹ Deftness with media was one of the sources of frustration for the East German leadership in their confrontation with the Chinese. While their own approach to unwanted information was censorship, the Chinese were adept at dictating the script themselves. Lorenz Lüthi provides the example of how, after Chinese students were injured in a 1965 attack on the US embassy in Moscow, journalists from the official Chinese paper put make-up on them for their arrival to make them seem deathly ill, and had them carried out of the plane on stretchers, creating enduring visual images in the propaganda battle against the Soviet Union.¹²² The Chinese used opposition to propaganda to create more propaganda.

Reporting on the removal of the display cases, *Der Spiegel* remarked that ‘the offshoots of the Chinese cultural revolution have now reached East Berlin too.’¹²³ From this point on, the challenge took on more openly confrontational qualities. By spring of 1967, East Germans were caught in a sequence of exchanges with actions and reactions that see-sawed between the spaces of East Germany and China. To cite one example, East German authorities criticized Chinese diplomats in May 1967 for insulting Mongolian visitors to the East Berlin legislature building (Volkskammer).¹²⁴ Two days later, and thousands of kilometers away, the secretary of the East German embassy was surrounded on the street in Beijing and harassed.¹²⁵ The East German ambassador said that the event must ‘be seen as a response from the Chinese side to the steps we took in Berlin.’¹²⁶

117 HA XX/2. 13 February 1967. MfS, HA XX, 11125, p.9; Grünberg, HA VII. 24 Feb 1967. Ibid., p.65.

118 Bodenthal, Volkspolizei captain and Hase, major of the executive committee of the Berlin Volkspolizei, department of criminal police, report. 14 February 1967. BStU, MfS, HA XX/2, 11125, p. 17; Fuchs, report. 15 Feb 1967, Ibid., p. 34.

119 Attached map, HA XX/2. 14 February 1967. Ibid., 15.

120 ‘Zeitspiegel,’ *Die Zeit* (24 February 1967).

121 ‘Chinese embassy accuses Russians of beating aides,’ *New York Times*, 4 February 1967.

122 Lüthi, ‘Origins,’ 419.

123 ‘Revanchepolitik,’ *Der Spiegel* (20 February 1967).

124 Rolf Berthold, note. 31 May 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

125 Rolf Berthold, memo. 2 June 1967. Ibid.

126 Martin Bierbach to Kurt Schneidewind. 2 June 1967. Ibid.

The climax of the conflict in East Germany came in June 1967 when four Chinese embassy employees, including the charge d'affaires, died in a head-on car crash north of Berlin.¹²⁷ Convinced that the accident had been orchestrated to liquidate the troublesome communist opponents, Chinese officials barricaded themselves into the embassy and hung the building with photos of the dead and ten foot-by-ten foot banners painted with bellicose slogans including a quote from Mao about the need to fight 'so long as a single man remains' and, of most concern to the East Germans, the threat that 'blood must be answered with blood!'¹²⁸ The Chinese transformed their embassy into a billboard, bringing the *dazibao* of the Cultural Revolution to the East German streetscape.

Their provocations produced events. In one of the first instances where large crowds of East Germans were drawn into the conflict, 450 students from the University for Economics along with passers-by gathered at the embassy by 7.30 p.m., booing and hissing as the embassy members shouted 'Long Live Mao Zedong!' and 'Down with Revisionism!' through loudspeakers.¹²⁹ When the embassy officials began to play the *Internationale* in a clear attempt to express their claim of leadership in the world communist movement, the East Germans responded by singing along, to the boos of the Chinese within. When an East German Foreign Office representative showed up with an official letter at 11 p.m. requesting that the signs be removed, the Chinese embassy employee tore it up unopened and threw the pieces on the departing car.¹³⁰ In his complaint about the car accident to the East German undersecretary the next day, the deputy military attaché said through a translator, 'We warn you. Those who carry out an anti-Chinese campaign will not come to a good end.' The person transcribing noted that the young Chinese translator was speaking 'in a considerably sharper tone than the attaché himself' and wondered if they were taking their own initiative to increase the vehemence of the polemic.¹³¹ The endorsement of youth rebellion in the Cultural Revolution made this quite plausible. By expropriating the right to interpret and enact communism from the party leadership, young people at the height of the Chinese Cultural Revolution upended the hierarchies of decision-making that characterized the East German system.

The conflict in East Germany took on its most martial tones at the moment when the Cultural Revolution was climaxing in China itself. In Beijing in August 1967, rebels occupied the Foreign Ministry, deposed the foreign minister Chen Yi and launched a campaign of radicalized foreign policy through directives and telegrams to foreign embassies.¹³² That same month, the Chinese ship, *Song Jiang*, docked in the East German harbor of Rostock. The crew hung the ship with

127 Meissner, *DDR und China*, 144.

128 SED Berlin regional headquarters, party organs department. 29 June 67. BArch/NY 4182/1222.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Note for the files about a discussion between comrade state secretary Hegen and the deputy military attaché of the Chinese embassy on 29 June 1967 from 22:00 to 22:45. 30 June 1967. BArch/NY 4182/1222.

132 Meisner, *China*, 338.

banners quoting Mao in German and Chinese, and distributed Little Red Books, Mao pins, Chinese illustrated magazines, and other periodicals to the local population.¹³³ The authorities denied the request of the captain to visit the embassy in Berlin with two crew members, concerned about the escalation of the confrontation. They felt their fears confirmed when a search of the ship found two anti-aircraft guns, two light machine guns, two submachine guns, two pistols, and one hundred hand grenades on board.¹³⁴ The police sent a report of the weapons to Security Secretary of the Politburo's Central Committee Erich Honecker and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Otto Winzer. The tone of their reports suggested real concern that the weapons were part of an arsenal to be delivered to Berlin as the means to turn bellicose rhetoric into practice.

The possibility was made all the more real by the fact that there had been another attack on the Chinese embassy's display cases the same day. The first display had shown Algerian farmers in the Chinese pavilion of a book fair; the second showed Congolese carrying images of Mao Zedong through a city street.¹³⁵ The cases had just been rearranged that afternoon when they were defaced with lipstick. In the East German foreign ministry, the Chinese embassy's second secretary recalled the first attack, saying, 'This old debt has not yet been settled and you place a new debt upon it already. One day, scores will be settled.'¹³⁶ The next morning, the word 'pigs' was scratched across the display cases.¹³⁷ The Chinese made explicit reference to repercussions overseas, saying: 'The GDR should realize what consequences the continuation of such actions could have for the East German embassy in China.'¹³⁸

These attacks and counter-attacks linked the Second World's westernmost and easternmost points, what Mao had called in 1949 'the front lines of the great anti-imperial struggle.'¹³⁹ With the Sino-Soviet Split, the struggle was turned inward. From 1966 on, the clashes of China's Cultural Revolution played out across the Second World as 'proletarian diplomacy' instigated confrontations from the outside and the inside.

In the fall and winter of 1967, the popular reverberations of the Cultural Revolution in East Germany peaked, and a new hazard appeared in the form of East German youth drawn to the Maoist message. In that period, the Chinese sent out 3000 packages monthly with 6000 issues of *Peking Review* and *China im Bild*.¹⁴⁰

133 The first read, 'The world is progressing, the future is bright and no one can change this general trend of history.' and the second 'When dark clouds appeared in the sky, we pointed out that they were only temporary, that the darkness would soon pass and the sun break through.' Information, 4 September 1967, MfS, ZAIG, 1386, p.6; Information, 24 August 1967, Ibid., p. 2.

134 Ibid.

135 Information, 25 August 1967. MfS, ZAIG, 1329,16.

136 Eller. 28 August 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

137 Information, 25 August 1967. MfS, ZAIG, 1329, 18.

138 Eller, 30 August 1967. PA AA/C 1058/73.

139 Mao to Pieck and Grotewohl. 16 October 1949. SAPMO-BArch/DC 20/15870.

140 Schröder, 22 February 1968. MfS, HA XX, 10775, 2.

Close to 800 East German youth and 250 East German adults visited the Chinese embassy from the end of July to the beginning of December. At the high point in October 1967, as many as 63 young East Germans a day entered and left the embassy with Mao buttons and Little Red Books.¹⁴¹ Security forces confiscated over one thousand copies of Mao's book of quotations in that period.¹⁴² There were other signs of support. At a high school in Lichtenberg, a one meter square poster with the slogan 'Long Live Mao Zedong' was hung from a window.¹⁴³ There were reports in September that students at another high school intended to form their own 'Mao troops'; others were forming study groups to read Mao's writings received from the embassy and wearing home-made Chinese-style caps reading 'Mao fan.'¹⁴⁴

The Chinese appealed to anti-authoritarian tendencies among the youth, setting themselves up as more communist and more independent than the GDR and the Soviet Union. They told students that 'a revisionist government ruled in the USSR which worked hand in hand with capitalism' and that 'the GDR did not even have a government, it was just a pure domain of the Soviet Union and had no will of its own.'¹⁴⁵ Mao's validation of youthful rebellion in the Cultural Revolution had been fascinating for student radicals from West Germany and West Berlin since 1966. They were regular visitors to the East Berlin embassy, smuggling copies of the Little Red Book back home to sell to fellow activists.¹⁴⁶ The Chinese made the embassy available for East–West German encounters. In October 1967, they hosted a film evening with invitations distributed by members of the well-known West Berlin 'Kommune 1' and 'Kommune 2.'¹⁴⁷ In early 1968, the East German government took direct action against the growing links between German youth and Chinese diplomats. They passed a new law on 6 January prohibiting entry of East German citizens into the Chinese embassy without express approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, slowing the flow of visitors to a trickle.

Despite the ban, small groups sympathetic to Mao continued to trouble East German authorities. In 1969, the Stasi launched a special operation to investigate and infiltrate an allegedly 'pro-Maoist group' of students in Dresden.¹⁴⁸ According to reports, the students were in possession of a mimeograph machine and wanted to help create a 'swing to the left' (*Linksruck*) in the GDR.¹⁴⁹ In the same year, there were reports of another, possibly overlapping 'Maoist' group of Vietnamese students, allegedly led by one student from Congo and another from Luxembourg.¹⁵⁰

141 HA XX/2/I, biannual report. 20 December 1967. Ibid., 77; 'Die Beeinflussung von Jugendlichen durch Mitarbeiter der Botschafter der VR China in Berlin-Karlshorst,' 23 October 1967. Ibid., 28.

142 HA XX/2/, biannual report. 20 December 1967. Ibid., 77.

143 Information, 25 September 1967. MfS, ZAIG, 1329, 25.

144 Ibid; Gräfe, Secondary School Inspectorate, Department Head. n.d. PA AA/C 1058/73.

145 Information, 25 September 1967. MfS, ZAIG, 1329, 24.

146 Q. Slobodian, 'Badge Books and Brand Books: The Mao Bible in East and West Germany,' in A.C. Cook (ed.), *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (New York, NY 2014), 220–1.

147 HA XX/2, report. 15 November 1967. MfS, HA XX, 11054, 8.

148 HA XX/2, periodic report. 1 July 1969. Ibid., 42.

149 HA XX/2, periodic report. 10 September 1970. Ibid., 173.

150 HA XX, 30 August 1971. MfS, HA, XX, 100, 91, Teil 2., 342.

The most serious threat perceived by the Stasi, however, was from the group around a 17-year old high school student named Alberto Miguel Carmo. The son of Brazilian refugees from the 1964 coup, Carmo enjoyed the right as a foreigner to travel back and forth across the Berlin Wall. From early 1970, he lived in West Berlin but traveled nightly to the East to host gatherings of youth at his parents' home where they sang songs by critical folk singer Wolf Biermann and discussed Mao's writings.¹⁵¹ As communist party members of high standing, Carmo's parents enjoyed immunity from more invasive Stasi methods. Nonetheless, the Stasi began an operation against Carmo's circle, resulting finally in a ban on his further travel to East Berlin, effectively dissolving the group.¹⁵² After 1968, there were isolated attempts in East Germany to form groups with self-understood allegiances to the Chinese (and, after the death of Mao, Albanian) line. These groups, including later in the 1970s and 1980s, were vigorously policed through the use of informants, travel bans and arrests.¹⁵³ The measures were successful in repressing self-identified Maoist organizations in East Germany.

As in the West, identification with Chinese communism in the GDR around 1968 was often more a gesture of defiant and voguish anti-authoritarianism than a sign of allegiance to Maoist doctrine as such.¹⁵⁴ One person recalls trading Mao memorabilia with his teenage friends for Rolling Stones posters and confesses that he never actually read his copy of the Little Red Book.¹⁵⁵ Questioned about their motivations at the time, two East German high school students told authorities that wearing a Mao button was 'ultra-modern' (*hochmodern*) and they wanted to be the first at their high school to have one.¹⁵⁶ For those in Carmo's circle, as with many other young critics of the regime, the more substantive political identification was with the reform socialism of the Prague Spring than Mao's China. Indeed, it was the invasion of Prague by Warsaw Pact nations in August 1968 that produced the real security threat for East Germany in the 1960s.¹⁵⁷

151 Carmo's adoptive mother has self-published a well-researched study that reproduces many of the relevant Stasi documents. J. Vogel, *Die Auflehnung des Miguel C. Eine Spurensuche auf drei Kontinenten* (Norderstedt 2011), 91.

152 Vogel, *Auflehnung*, 94.

153 For a detailed study of the Stasi campaign against East German Maoism in the 1970s and 1980s see T. Wunschik, *Die maoistische KPD/ML und die Zerschlagung ihrer 'Sektion DDR' durch das MfS* (Berlin 1997).

154 Q. Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham, NC 2012), Ch. 6.

155 G. Meyer, 'Volksbuchhandlung Alexanderplatz,' in Arbeitskreis Berliner Regionalmuseen (ed.), *Im Blick: Berlin* (Berlin 2003), 37.

156 'Einzelninformation über die Beeinflussung Jugendlicher durch die chinesische Botschaft in Berlin-Karlshorst.' 25 Sep 1967. MfS, ZAIG, 1329, p.23.

157 On Prague Spring and the GDR see I.-S. Kowalczyk, "'Wer sich nicht in Gefahr begibt...'" Protestaktionen gegen die Intervention in Prag und die Folgen von 1968 für die DDR Opposition,' in K.-D. Henke, P. Steinbach and J. Tüchel (eds), *Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR* (Cologne 1999), 257–74; S. Wolle, *Der Traum von der Revolte. Die DDR 1968* (Berlin 2008).

Yet it is significant that the SED and Stasi first applied the term ‘Maoist’ with regularity in its persecution of these student groups. When Carmo’s group was targeted, it was for ‘spreading Maoist views.’ When Carmo himself was blocked re-entry into East Germany, it was because he was a ‘carrier of Maoist ideas.’¹⁵⁸ East German representatives began regular meetings with other Warsaw Pact states to confront the Chinese challenge collectively around this time. The newly formed ‘Interkit,’ or what the Chinese called ‘the Anti-China International,’ had its first major meeting in Berlin in January 1969, and resulted in a coordinated propaganda push from the gathered communist states.¹⁵⁹ It was in the Interkit discussions that Maoism became an ideology of its own, taking on a valence equivalent to Trotskyism. Responding to the flood of critical press in the early 1970s, the attaché of the Chinese embassy asked why East German intellectuals published so many ‘anti-Maoist polemics’ even though the public seemed relatively uninterested in the matter.¹⁶⁰ One could argue that, in the 1970s as in the decade preceding, the negative example of Maoism became an important way for the East German state to articulate the positive content of its own version of communism.

The prospect of a war with China helped propel Moscow and its allied East European nations toward détente.¹⁶¹ Responding to the Chinese challenge in East Germany offered an opportunity to demonstrate its distance from the Far East by representing the domestic vision of communism as one of technocratic, consumer-based development against the specter of voluntarism and mass mobilization.¹⁶² When an East German official referred to Maoism as the ‘opposite of socialism’ in 1973, he made it clear that China was a cracked mirror for the SED, reflecting back what its own socialist democracy was, and what it had no intention of becoming.¹⁶³

Historians in recent years have followed the twisting progress of the Sino–Soviet split at the diplomatic level as it played out across the expanse of the communist camp. Yet they have not given sufficient attention to the way that Chinese communism disrupted the public transcript of communism by drawing the interest of non-state actors and chipped at the foundations of the official practice and rhetoric of internationalism. The efforts of the East German security forces to smash and silence Maoism was much wider than previously documented, as was the attractiveness of the Maoist message.

What do the turf wars between China and East Germany mean for the broader historiography? This article looks at the Sino–Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution as a means of addressing a problem in the historiography of the

158 Vogel, *Auflehnung*, 94, 113.

159 J. Hershberg et al., ‘The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship,’ *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, no. 63 (2011), 14–15.

160 Kern, 6 June 1975. MiS, AIM, 48/81, Teil 2, Bd. 3., 15.

161 Radchenko, *Two Suns*, 197; Schaefer, ‘Krieg,’ 254.

162 R.G. Stokes, *Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany 1945-1990* (Baltimore, MD 2000), 154.

163 ‘East German report on Interkit meeting in Moscow, May 1973’ reproduced in Hershberg et al., ‘The Interkit Story,’ 88.

GDR as it has been written to date. That problem is a tendency, particularly in the field of social and cultural history, to black box the history of East Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, turning the nation into a sealed space into which the only transnational influences that penetrated came from either fellow East European countries or West Germany.¹⁶⁴ Until now, the tendency to black box – or what one might call ‘red box’ – East German history before the era of détente (and the later era of labor migration) has been dominant. Yet thinking with the display case as a metaphor, we might propose that it would be better to ‘glass box’ them. The nations themselves represented carefully constructed attempts to present one model of events and the political world, yet the walls were not impermeable. Radio and television waves got through, and opposing glass boxes were set up for perusal.

If histories of divided Germany are now being written to account for the reality of the shared media landscape, acknowledging the fact that the border was porous to broadcasts from the West, then we also need more research on the human traffic into East Germany from East Asia and countries of the global South.¹⁶⁵ The GDR was in the world, and the world was in the GDR. In the case of China, it was much more engaged than West Germany, which did not have diplomats in Beijing until 1972. The historiography does not yet reflect the domestic realities of East Germany’s international entanglement.

Expanding the frame of analysis of East German history to include China does not ‘globalize’ the historiography for its own sake but demonstrates that the dichotomous interpretive schema of capitalism/communism, or the notion of an ‘East–West conflict,’ are insufficient to deal with what was in fact a triangular conflict by the 1960s.¹⁶⁶ Histories of the 1960s have been focused overwhelmingly on the ways that the GDR defended itself from the West German and American alternatives, that is, challenges from its ideological right. In the Chinese, we see the potential of East Germans being outflanked from the left, by a power that believed, at least rhetorically, more in sacrifice for socialism, more in the goal of absolute equality, and more in the necessity of armed anti-colonial struggle. During the Cold War, the US and West Germany found their political self-understanding in

164 For notable exceptions see Young-Sun Hong, ‘Kalter Krieg in der Ferne. Dekolonisierung, Hygienesdiskurse und der Kampf der DDR und der USA um die Dritte Welt,’ in U. Balbier and C. Rösch (eds), *Umworbener Klassenfeind. Das Verhältnis der DDR zu den USA* (Berlin 2006); B. Schaefer, ‘Die DDR und die ‘chinesische Lösung’: Gewalt in der Volksrepublik China im Sommer 1989,’ in M. Sabrow (ed.), *1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt* (Göttingen 2012); J.R. Hosek, *Sun, Sex and Socialism: Cuba in the German Imaginary* (Toronto 2011); K. Hagen, ‘Internationalism in Cold War Germany,’ dissertation, University of Washington (2008); J. Verber, ‘The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany,’ Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa (2010).

165 See e.g. C. Dittmar, *Feindliches Fernsehen. Das DDR-Fernsehen und seine Strategien im Umgang mit dem westdeutschen Fernsehen* (Bielefeld 2010); T. Hahn, ‘“Aetherkrieg”. Der “Feind” als Beschleuniger des Mediendiskurses,’ in I. Schneider and P.M. Spangenberg (eds), *Diskursgeschichte der Medien nach 1945* (Wiesbaden 2002); G. Holzweissig, *Die schärfste Waffe der Partei: eine Mediengeschichte der DDR* (Cologne 2002); J. Staadt, T. Voigt and S. Wolle, *Operation Fernsehen: die Stasi und die Medien in Ost und West* (Göttingen 2008).

166 On the effect of Chinese policy on German–German conflict see Schaefer, ‘Ostpolitik.’

part by negative comparison to the specter of communism. In the Maoist enemy, East Germany found a communist Other of its own.

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