

SERIES ONE



Research papers. Historical analysis & Current Investigation Apr. 1983

SERIES ONE

HOW REVISIONISM USES ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ARMED STRUGGLE

PART I

I. We must develop a stronger analysis of revisionism and neo-colonialism, and in particular a concrete analysis of their current relationship to the armed struggle. It is dangerous (and for many comrades already fatal) to view things as "simple as Black and white." It is very dangerous to look upon revisionism and neo-colonialism as political trends which, being opposed to revolution, are thought of only as existing <u>outside</u> the revolution. This problem becomes most visible in the guerrilla wars of national liberation in the oppressed nations, particularly as imperialism decays and weakens.

-Our conception of revisionism has been the traditional one of petty bourgeois social-democracy. Social-democracy tries to limit the mass struggle to election campaigns, to welfare legislation, and to conceptions of socialism through gradual reforms rather than the revolutionary seizure of state power. Since the split in the world socialist camp, many have simply used "revisionist" to designate any and all pro-Russian socialists. In a similar fashion, neo-colonialism is exemplified by Lon Nol in Cambodia, Mobutu in Zaire, Andrew Young in Atlanta, and other blatantly pro-U.S. puppet bourgeois. This is true as far as it goes. It does not, however, encompass enough. Revisionism in the era of national liberation has a neo-colonial character in both the oppressor and oppressed nations.

When communists speak of revisionism we mean "the voice of the petty bourgeoisie within the proletarian movement." To explain: There was a time, in the origins of European socialism, when the petty bourgeoisie of the various nations had their own class programs, their own political parties and movements. The political division between the petty bourgeoisie and the young proletariat was very distinct, even though a tiny handful of radicalized intellectuals from the privileged classes had joined the proletarian movement.

This was transformed by the polarization of classes and nations as capitalism matured. In Western Europe the late 19th century petty bourgeoisie, once a large class with numerous political parties of its own, was pushed down closer to the masses by emerging monopoly capitalism. The independence of small shopkeepers, intellectuals, small entrepreneurs was pared down. Many were ruined economically and forced even further down into the army of wagelaborers. Increasingly, therefore, large numbers of the petty bourgeoisie entered the proletarian movement. Not only were they filled by resentment against monopoly capital, but with the historic decline of their class they had come to recognize the mass power of the oppressed classes as the best instrument to reclaim their lost privileges.

By the 1920s the petty bourgeois political parties of Western Europe had faded, pushed aside by the polarization of capitalist politics there into large bourgeois parties and large working class parties. Even today in nations such as England and West Germany the great political parties are the Conservative vs. the "Labor" or "Social-Democratic" revisionist parties, while the centrist

COVER: Traitor Luis Taruc, one-time commander of the Huk army, with puppet officers after he "turned."

petty bourgeois parties (such as the Liberal Party in England and the Free Democrats in West Germany) are small remainders.

Thus, while the proletarian masses wanted socialism and revolution, the influx of radicalized petty bourgeois in the European social-democratic parties in Lenin's day favored positions in parliament, inflated trade union bureaucracies, and bourgeois reformism. Their special base was the new labor aristocracies, created out of colonial super-profits. This was the original, classic revisionism of the late 19th century, which still exists to this very moment on a world scale--"the voice of the petty bourgeoisie within the proletarian movement."

Imperialism also polarized the world in terms of nations, we must remember. In the oppressed nations of Afrika, Asia, Latin Amerika and North Amerika, imperialism by brute force crushed the ambitions of the native petty bourgeoisie in the same measure as it enslaved their whole nations. Anticolonial movements arose that represented and embraced the whole oppressed nation, all classes and sectors. Democratic multi-class movements have always been a normal form for revolutionary upheaval.

To understand that revolution brings together a number of classes---and that national liberation unites in an oppressed nation "<u>All its various</u> <u>classes</u>, <u>except for some traitors</u>" (Mao Zedong) makes the question of scientifically identifying specific class politics not less important (as some think) but even more so. It should be clearly understood that all classes have their own distinctive ideological outlooks and their own social goals, even when united in a struggle of national liberation.

The petty bourgeoisie in the oppressed nations has revolutionary tendencies, and some go over to communism and the oppressed. Neo-colonial tendencies are also quite strong in this class. Some petty bourgeois of the oppressed nations, like the neo-colonial bureaucrats and puppet officers who serve the imperialists for pay, are traitors to the nation. More dangerous than these, in our opinion, are the revisionists who strive to use national liberation and socialism to carry out even more grandiose neo-colonial ambitions. This is at the cutting edge of what is now being struggled out.*

As we know, imperialism in the Third World is usually married to the most corrupt and bloodthirsty comprador classes, in which semi-feudal landowners and military juntas are prominent. In some cases imperialism has worked through imported settler populations, leaving even the most capitalistic "natives" only the tiniest of crumbs. Revisionism in the oppressed nations has been one vehicle for the class advancement of a section of the national petty bourgeoisie, who as a small class by themselves alone have almost no power. The dissatisfied products of missionary schools, finding no "room at the top," quickly learn that only by hitching a ride on the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed masses can they even hope to replace the backward and sluggish generals and oligarchs.

* Revisionism in the oppressor nations has a neo-colonial character in that it attempts to co-opt the anti-colonial uprisings, bringing them under its reformist hegemony and hence under the continued domination of oppressor nation elements (the "good whites").

A certain section of the oppressed nation petty bourgeoisie therefore joins the revolution, but only to reach out for unrealized class ambitions, only to try and step up on the revolution; joins the armed struggle, but only to try and use it against itself. This revisionism is neo-colonial in that it sees the goal of revolution and independence as a new "junior partnership" with imperialism. They don't want to be imperialism's servants, but its partners. We can list the main aspects of this (these are not opposed to each other, and often coexist in one situation):

1. Supporting the armed struggle in only a tactical sense, while trying to head it off. Armed struggle, as we know, represents the will of the oppressed masses who desire to throw off their oppressors. Often the masses spontaneously turn to uprisings, to picking up the gun, even without organization or leadership. Often the revolutionary cadres correctly join their brothers and sisters in fighting back against the death squads and puppet troops. When the masses move forward into struggle revisionists must go along or risk falling off from their position atop the movement. This "going along" is only tactical and temporary.

2. Using armed struggle only as the ultimate "bargaining chip," as leverage to force Washington to make a better deal with "native" bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests. Dialectically, they see the objective of armed revolution as a more harmonious relationship with imperialism. This is difficult for many cadre to understand.

3. In cases such as Algeria, Zimbabwe, Palestine, etc. imperialism historically imported a European settler occupation to hold the colony. Here even revisionism is forced, however unhappily, to admit that outright military victory and transfer of state power is necessary. Nothing less will blast out the entrenched settler regime that is unwilling to share with the oppressed nation petty bourgeoisie. Here their objective is a "liberated" nation for themselves to head, with the national petty bourgeoisie substituting themselves for the old settler regime in being imperialism's local partners.

4. In some oppressed nations, such as El Salvador, the imperialist counterinsurgency is so murderous and unrestrained that even those reformist political elements opposed to revolution have been forced to take shelter within the guerrilla front. Within the five fighting organizations of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNLF) and the larger "mass" alliance of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF), there are forces that advocate protracted Peoples War to socialism—and there are forces which say that their only goal is to restore bourgeois democracy and friendship with the U.S.A.. This is quite a distance apart in roads to be taken. By the way, it is no secret which side is getting the most support from the "movement" in the U.S..

For instance, Commander Roberto Roca, leader of the guerrilla Revolutionary Party of Central America, says publicly that his party would lay down its arms and accept the Salvadoran fascist military if only the latter would permit bourgeois election campaigns: "We took up arms because the political struggle was not possible in El Salvador. <u>If there is political pluralism, there's no</u> <u>need for the military struggle</u>." If there is not a secret cooperation between imperialism and some of these elements then there soon will be. Communists should understand these matters now, rather than years from now. II. We can see how this revisionist penetration of the armed struggle works by the actual history of the Huk uprising in the Philippines between 1946-1955. This is one of the great popular struggles in modern Asian history. After conducting guerrilla war against the Japanese invasion during World War II, thousands of Pilipino communist workers and peasants took up arms again to overthrow U.S. colonial rule. Ten years later, despite heroic sacrifices by fighters and activists of all ages, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB or Peoples Liberation Army) had been crushed by the puppet forces of the neo-colonial Republic of the Philippines (led by the C.I.A.'s Major Edward Lansdale). At a time when Asian Peoples Wars in China and Vietnam were well on the road to victory, the defeat in the Philippines was a revealing contrast.

1. The Huk guerrilla movement was born in the Japanese invasion period. Close to 100,000 Pilipinos took part in the Communist guerrilla struggle against the Japanese, as couriers, organizers, supply porters, spies and armed fighters.* Some 20,000 Japanese soldiers and puppets were killed by the guerrillas, who by the War's end governed large sections of their nation. Jose Sison, leader of the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), writes:

"To themselves principally, the Filipino people owe their liberation from the Japanese imperialist invaders... It was not U.S. imperialism which liberated the Philippines. U.S. imperialism merely returned to reimpose its colonial rule. In fact, it concentrated its air bombardment and artillery fire on the Filipino people and their homes in late 1944 and early 1945 to pave the way for their resubjugation." (Philippine Society & Revolution)

The U.S. Empire was not anti-fascist and the Pilipino national bourgeoisie was treacherously submissive to foreign rule. The U.S. Empire had invaded the Philippines in 1898, holding it as a U.S. colony since then. Since Japanese colonial rule simply replaced U.S. colonial rule in 1942, the Philippines under their invasion continued just as before. Japanese "fascism" was exactly the same as U.S. "democracy." The former U.S. puppets promptly became Japanese puppets. The Philippine Constabulary (PCs), Amerika's puppet counterinsurgency police, went on as before only under Japanese commanders. The majority of the U.S. colonial "Commonwealth" legislature served in the new Japanese puppet government. Even the laws stayed the same. A State Department official commented: "Under Japanese military occupation the Philippine Islands have been governed very largely under the same laws and by much the same men as under the Commonwealth."

Of necessity, then, the U.S. "liberation" of the Philippines in 1945 meant a repressive campaign against the new national liberation movement. As a general rule, the U.S. government in 1945-46 assumed that those puppet elements who had profited by collaborating with the Japanese would be good U.S. servants, while those peasants, workers and intellectuals who had taken part in the armed struggle under communist leadership should be repressed.

For their No. 1 Pilipino puppet, U.S. commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur picked Manuel Roxas. In April 1945 Roxas was made a Brigadier General of U.S. colonial troops, and attached to Gen. MacArthur's staff as a figurehead. In 1946 he was installed by U.S. imperialism as the first post-war Philippine

* There were also some guerrilla units led by U.S. military, generally known as "USAFFE" forces (United States Armed Forces Far East).

President. Roxas had become infamous in his role as chief of rice procurement for the Japanese occupation (seizing rice from Pilipinos), becoming a cabinet minister in the Japanese puppet regime. Indeed, U.S. intelligence itself described Roxas as "an exonerated collaborationist." This was the U.S. "Liberation" of the Philippines from "fascism."

While the Red Army in China and the Viet Minh in Vietnam had resisted similar reintroductions of Western colonialism, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) surrendered in 1945 to U.S. reinvasion. The strong Huk armed units were told to follow U.S. orders and even to disband. This is from a distance hard for many to believe. The old Pilipino Communist Party (PKP) had been founded the same year as the Indochinese Communist Party-1930-but instead of Ho's and Giap's the PKP leadership was dominated by revisionists.

Various petty bourgeois cliques, who saw the movement as a means of personal careerism, competed for top positions. The most important of these were led by the Lava brothers (Jose and Jesus) and the Taruc brothers (Luis and Pedro). While countless peasants and workers (many of them children) gave everything to liberate their nation, the PKP's revisionist leadership consistently used and undermined the Peoples War. In the long run many would "turn" and become open traitors.

2. The pressure for guerrilla war of national liberation came in all instances from the Pilipino people and from the revolutionary cadres in the field. In 1942, despite the favorable turmoil of the imperialist war, the revisionist PKP leadership refused to start armed struggle. Refusing to leave Manila, the capital, the revisionists "maneuvered to preoccupy the Party leadership with bourgeois parliamentarianism, pacifism and civil liberties" (Sison). Three weeks after the Japanese seizure of Manila the PKP leaders were arrested, still refusing to begin a military front. The communist cadres, in the confusion that followed, convened a secret conference of the General Luzon Bureau (Luzon is the main island in the Philippine archipelago) in the Spring of 1942, which founded the guerrilla Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Peoples Anti-Japanese Army).

The Peoples War was thus born from below, against the original plans of the revisionist leaders. Everywhere in Luzon peasants and workers picked up the gun. Japanese convoys were ambushed. The rice crops of collaborationist landlords were liberated and redistributed to the masses. New Peoples Governments were set up in some areas. Even then the revisionists tried to head off the popular guerrilla movement, to water down the movement so it could be controlled. In 1943 they passed the "retreat for defense" policy, which broke up the Huk units into small 3-5 person teams. These were too small to fight, and could only run and hide in a "survivalist" way. Individual survival was promoted even at the price of military helplessness. Angry cadre forced the PKP Central Committee to repudiate this traitorous policy.

At the same time the revisionists politically misled the masses and the guerrillas. One PKP leader admits: "Throughout the war we had nothing but praise for the Americans, and had done everything possible to bring about a pro-American feeling..." How can you fight an anti-colonial war while your leadership is promoting neo-colonial loyalty to imperialism? Jose Sison writes:

"...the Party had liberated almost the entire region of Central Luzon, had organized provincial and municipal governments and had dispatched armed units to Manila and Southern Luzon.

"There was however no ideological and political preparation against the return of U.S. imperialism and the reimposition of feudalism in the countryside. Consistently acting as the instrument of U.S. imperialism within the Party, the...Lava's and Taruc's harped on loyalty to the U.S. government and the puppet commonwealth government and hoped to engage in parliamentary struggle under the dispensation of these monsters. Yet, U.S. imperialism and the local exploiting classes were determined to attack the Party, the people's army and the people with real bullets as well as with sugar-coated ones.

"...the HUKBALAHAP welcomed the U.S. imperialist troops that marched through Central Luzon from Lingayen in 1945. Some units of the people's army fought together with the U.S. imperialist troops in dislodging the Japanese troops from the Floridablanca airfields but were surprised when after the battle the U.S. troops turned their guns on them and disarmed them. In Manila, the imperialist aggressors also disarmed and turned back units of the HUKBALAHAP that had preceded them. Squadron 77, a unit of the people's army, was massacred in Malolos, Bulacan while on its way from Manila after being disarmed.

"To suppress the Filipino people, U.S. imperialism put together under its Military Police Command its USAFFE puppets and the erstwhile pro-Japanese Philippine Constabulary. It encouraged the traitor landlords to take back full control over the lands that they had left during the war, to demand rent arrears from the peasants and to organize private armed gangs, then known as the civilian guards, to enforce their class rule in coordination with the military police. In their attempt to dissolve the provincial and municipal governments established by the Party and people's army, the U.S. imperialists and the landlords unleashed a compaign of white terror against the people. The general headquarters of the HUKBALAHAP in San Fernando, Pampanga was raided by the U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps. Mass arrests and imprisonment of Party cadres, Red fighters and common people were made all over Central Luzon. Massacres, assassinations, torture and other forms of atrocities were perpetrated by the military police and civilian guards.

"So incensed were the people that they wanted to fight back and continue the people's war. But the...bourgeois gang of the Lava's and Taruc's insisted on the line that the people were tired of war and that a campaign for 'democratic peace' was called for. The hidden traitors within the Party hailed the fake independence promised by U.S. imperialism in their desire to occupy high positions in the puppet reactionary government. So the headquarters of the Party was moved out of the countryside to the city. They organized the Democratic Alliance so that it could help U.S. imperialism put up a sham republic. They converted the HUKBALAHAP into the Huk Veterans' League and thus put the people at the mercy of the enemy. The people's committees, tempered by the anti-fascist war, were turned into mere chapters of a legal peasant association and these were used to spread the false illusion that land reform could fall from the palms of the enemy."

For three years the PKP revisionist leadership tried to advance itself in bourgeois elections and various deals, while the root and branch of the movement increasingly was driven underground and returned to armed struggle. By 1948 there were 10,000-12,000 Red fighters, and in Central Luzon over 150,000 active supporters. Finally, in May 1948 the PKP Central Committee called upon the people to view the guerrilla war as the main form of struggle. That meeting officially reconstituted the Huk forces as the Peoples Liberation Army (HMB). So for the second time in seven years the revolutionary struggle of the Pilipino people forced a reluctant leadership to enter the zone of war. The revisionist leadership found it necessary to control the increasing military activity of the cadres and masses.

3. The defeat of the HMB was not inevitable. Sison, looking back, points out that: "The objective conditions for waging a protracted people's war were extremely favorable." The difference between Vietnam and the Philippines was primarily a difference of political-military leadership. The HMB was defeated because of the utterly incompetent and traitorous decisions of the Lava-Taruc leadership, which threw away the sacrifices of Red fighters as though they were nothing.

It is hard to believe how badly the PKP leadership mismanaged the war. So hard, in fact, that most comrades here assume, without investigating, that the Huks did their best but were just overwhelmed by superior U.S. power. Such explanations, laying defeat to external factors outside the revolution, can be a narcotic, soothing the troubled mind into pacification. The Lava-Taruc leadership rejected Mao Zedong's doctrine of protracted war, demanding instead that the fighters spend their lives bringing them instant victory. Since victory was supposedly only months away, the PKP leadership saw no need to give military training, to use landmines, highway barricades, economic sabotage or any of the other tactics already proven in Vietnam. Sison writes of this stage:

> "After the 1949 elections, the Jose Lava leadership took the line that it could seize power within two years and for this purpose prepared a timetable of military operations and rapid recruitment into the Party. Without relying mainly on the strength of the Party and the people's army and without rectifying a long period of compromises with U.S. imperialism and the local reactionaries, the Jose Lava leadership considered as basic factors for the victory of the Philippine revolution such external conditions as the 'certainty' of a third world war, the economic recession in the United States and the liberation of the Chinese people...In January 1950, the adventurist line of quick military victory was formally put forward by the Jose Lava leadership through resolutions of the Party Political Bureau.

> "All units of the people's army were ordered to make simultaneous attacks on provincial capitals, cities and enemy camps on March 29, August 26 and November 7, 1950. The attacks of March 29

and August 26 were executed. But these over-extended the strength of the people's army. On October 18, the enemy counter-attacked by raiding all central offices of the Party in Manila, arresting among others the Politburo-In led by Jose Lava. Subsequently, campaigns of encirclement and suppression were launched in the countryside against the thinly-spread people's army. Overextended lines of supply and communication of the People's Liberation Army became easy targets of the reactionary armed forces. Because of its putschist orientation, the Jose Lava leadership brought the most crushing defeats on the Party and the people's army."

By 1955 the uprising had been ended. Luis Taruc, Huk commander against the Japanese and one of the most famous guerrilla leaders, had surrendered in 1954. Like Eldridge Cleaver, Taruc experienced a "miraculous" religious conversion and decided that God wanted him to "turn" (he has worked as a propagandist for the puppet regime ever since). In 1955 PKP Secretary Jesus Lava ordered the cadres to pull in from the jungles and concentrate on elections. Some units resisted, although in the isolation many were driven into the "roving bandit" life just for food and survival. The Party as a force for the national liberation was dead.

4. This stunning mismanagement and widespread treason in the upper ranks of the Peoples War was not an accident. It was a question of politics. The No. 1 objective of the Lavas and Tarucs was to use the struggle to propel themselves into careerist bourgeois respectability. In 1946, for example, these misleaders tried to win the approval of the U.S. government by giving it the list of all the underground Huk fighters! An ex-PKP leader writes: "As part of our peaceful legal struggle we decided to apply for back pay... Actually we proved drastically short-sighted in so trustingly submitting a roster of Huk names. Later it was used as a blacklist to persecute and murder our comrades." The particular petty bourgeois class goals of the Lavas and Tarucs placed them objectively on the side of imperialism, even though they were in the leadership of the national liberation struggle.

This was proven in 1948, when they did the precise same betrayal all over again. Puppet President Quirino was frightened at the growth of revolution, and put forward a trick to discredit and disorganize the armed struggle. He proposed a truce and negotiations, offering as proof of his good intentions to reinstate the PKP leaders in the colonial legislature with "back pay." Quirino vaguely hinted that he might even be willing to come over and join the PKP in setting up a new nationalist government. All he asked in return was that the HMB start sending in its troops to disarm and identify themselves to the police while the talks started.

The revisionist PKP leadership, represented by the traitor Luis Taruc, gladly accepted, rushing to get their checks and government privileges. Huk fighters registering with the police were told: "We'll take care of you later." <u>Colonial police and agents were allowed to visit guerrilla camps and identify</u> <u>Party cadre.</u> After two months the imperialists had enough, and broke up the charade. The PKP envoys were shot down. Mass terrorism and arrests took place throughout the islands. Even after months of renewed fighting, the PKP still continued to do imperialism's work of discrediting the Peoples War by offering publicly to support the puppet government in return for "civil liberties." Both the revisionists and the fighters wanted a movement, both took part in armed resistance—but their goals were completely different. According to one of the top PKP leaders, their main aim in 1948 when they formed the HMB was "to build up bargaining strength." He says that despite what the fighters were led to believe, "There was no insurrectionary plan, and the effort was made to employ the expanding strength of the Huks as a lever to attain a democratic peace, for the resumption of parliamentary struggle." That is why the lives of so many fighters were thrown away in military adventures that had no future.

The Re-Establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines

The most significant development so far in the Philippine revolution is the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines under the supreme guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. The Party was re-established on December 26, 1968 after several years of criticism and selfcriticism conducted by both old and young proletarian revolutionaries.

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Under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the people's guerrillas were transformed into the <u>New People's Army on March 29</u>, <u>1969</u>. In the meeting of Red commanders and fighters, the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique was repudiated as a counter-revolutionary remnant of the old...bourgeois gang of the Lava's and Taruc's. The Red commanders and fighters issued a document of rectification, "The New People's Army", and promulgated the Rules of the New People's Army.

--Jose Sison

What is most interesting is this ex-PKP leader's assertion that even if they had accidentally succeeded in seizing power, their new government would have been pro-capitalist: "Full democratic rights would be guaranteed, including the rights of private enterprise. Foreign investments, including American investment, would have been permitted..."


5. This revisionism within the Pilipino socialist cadres was, in fact, another variant of neo-colonialism. While the Lava-Taruc cliques were verbally pro-Moscow, they were really much more influenced by Amerika. Their closest international ties were not to the more advanced communist movements of Asia. They chose instead to become closest to the Communist Party USA, the revisionist party of the colonizing oppressor nation. This is why protracted war and other communist concepts were so foreign to their party. In the age of imperialism, revisionism has national characteristics. Their closest allies were from the oppressor nation, rather than from other national liberation movements.

As an interesting example, the ex-PKP leader we've quoted is perhaps the most widely-read "authority" internationally on the Pilipino struggle of the Huk period. He is not himself a Pilipino. He is a Euro-Amerikan named William Pomeroy, an ex-G.I. and a CPUSA journalist who joined the top leadership of the PKP and became head of propaganda. Pomeroy's skill at revisionist schemes and lies made him very valuable to the Lavas and Tarucs. In fact, he wrote an "autobiography" for Luis Taruc, former Huk commander during World War II, in which Taruc sounds like a very modest but dedicated communist. Taruc was, as history has shown, really an opportunist and a traitor to his people. Pomeroy helped promote Taruc's cover-up, he now says, because <u>he personally decided</u> that Taruc should be made "a symbol" of the Philippine revolution. This is interesting.

Why should Euro-Amerikans have decided who should be promoted as "leaders" of the Pilipino revolution? Why should a Euro-Amerikan be in a position to cover-up for misleaders, making them look good? Why was he "better" than Pilipinos for writing their propaganda? Pomeroy himself admits his presence was a strain on the fighters. Some, he admits, were always suspicious of him. Others always called him "sir" and deferred to him since he was a colonial "master." Pomeroy himself is a minor matter, primarily important in that his destructive role reveals how deeply neo-colonial attitudes had infected not just a few leaders but the body of the armed movement.

We say that "defeated armies learn well." Today a new Communist Party and a New Peoples Army are waging Peoples War in the Philippines. Defeat, we say, is primarily a product of internal contradictions. The phonograph record of "repression was too heavy" and "the imperialists were too strong"—at best meaningless statements—should be smashed. It is time to advance our understanding to a new level, and thus to prepare for new seasons of struggle that lie ahead. The example of revisionism in the Huk struggle is only one aspect of this phenomenon. In our own day revisionism and neo-colonialism have found new roles even in military victory and national liberation. We will go deeper into this.

(TO BE CONTINUED IN FUTURE ISSUES)



"PSEUDO-GANGS"

In war both sides must try to carry out bold plans. The imperialists as well as the guerrillas build with elements of surprise and deception. This is one part of gaining the initiative, life and death in military matters. On the tactical level we can see this in the heavy imperialist use of "pseudogangs" in counter-insurgency. "Pseudo-gangs" are small units of captured or surrendered guerrillas, who are "turned" by the imperialists and sent back into the underground to pretend at still being revolutionaries. The "pseudogang" sets up assassinations and traps, causes confusions, and also provides an on-going depth of intelligence to the imperialists. It was during the "Mau Mau" rebellion of 1952-56 in Kenya that the imperialist security forces first promoted this tactic in a major way.* The leading imperialist theorist on "pseudo-gang" tactics, Brigadier General Frank Kitson of the British Army, learned his trade as a young officer in Kenya.

Insurgency In Kenya

The background of the 1952-56 Kenya revolution shows the development of "pseudo-gangs" as one integral part of the whole imperialist counter-insurgency. The uprising was primarily based among the "KEM" peoples (Kikuyu and the related Embu and Meru peoples) in the Central Province. At the time of the uprising they numbered one-third of the Afrikan population of Kenya. These 1¹/₄ million Afrikans in the Central Province had borne the worst of the colonial oppression. By the eve of the revolution the Kikuyu were increasingly land-less, a million people pent up on 2,000 square miles of tribal reservation (called the Reserves by the British) while the 30,000 European settlers directly occupied 12,000 square miles of the best farmlands.

Afrikan workers earned an average wage of \$73 per year, including food and housing. The contract laborers on the settler plantations were paid with a few coins each month and being allowed to raise their own food on a 1½ acre plot. In return each Afrikan family signed a three-year contract obliging the entire family, including children, to give the settlers 270 days of work each year. No Afrikan could leave their area or be absent from the plantation overnight without his "master's" permission. For landless Kikuyu real income had fallen by 30-40% during the fifty-year colonial period. By 1950 the Afrikan living standards in Kenya were going down rapidly as war-torn Britain needed more and more capital to reindustrialize (just like in the U.S. Empire today).

The anti-colonial revolution in Kenya was a mass uprising by the hungry and oppressed. The goal was "Land and Freedom," national liberation and the ouster of the European settlers. Two events had also precipitated the uprising. One was the refusal of the new "socialist" Labor Party government in England to grant independenct to the Afrikan colonies. This ended the faint hopes that the colonial system could be nonviolently reformed or that "friends" in Britain would give freedom to Afrikans.

* The term "Mau Mau," which has disputed origins, was invented and popularized by the British authorities. The Kenyan people never used this term, and usually called their uprising simply "The Movement." The organized fighters were hamed the Land & Freedom Armies. The second event was an attack against Afrikan children. The Beecher Report plan (named after its missionary author) was being imposed despite universal Afrikan protests. Under this 75% of all Afrikan school children were to be forced out of school after the 4th grade. Another 18% would leave school after the 6th grade. This would have ensured the settlers a continued reserve army of semi-educated Afrikan child labor. This scheme stirred up deep anger among the masses, who had made great sacrifices to give their children what little education was available to them. The feelings were so strong that during the war Afrikan schoolmasters who followed the government plan were targets of assassination. While the imperialist propaganda pictured the guerrillas as "blood-thirsty savages" running wild, we can better understand the heart of the Kikuyu fighters by one of the popular songs they sung in the forest:

> "Neither your unsatisfied wants Nor your difficulties will kill you. Without eyes to see the tears of the children It matters not whether one is foolish or clever.

"If Mumbi's children are not educated Then neither the European Nor the Asian will lose sleep Worrying about how to satisfy their needs.*

"This is a time for sharing. Kikuyus arise! Let us help the children with their difficulties For they are the ones who will take our places.

"The need for a spear is gone Replaced by the need for a pen. For our enemies today Fight with words..."

The armed struggle had great mass support, perhaps close to the highest degree that could be imagined. This was necessary since the fighters had very little in the way of modern weapons or political/military preparation. At peak strength the great majority of the guerrillas had only simis, the traditional Kikuyu sword. The homemade guns constructed from $\frac{1}{2}$ " waterpipe and the sprinkling of "precision" (as they were called) rifles, pistols and shotguns bought on the black market or seized in attacks equipped only some 20% of the guerrillas. Ammunition was initially so scarce that the Kikuyu women forced into prostitution by colonialism secretly charged puppet troops one bullet each; this slender supply being one necessary source for the new Land & Freedom Armies.

There were almost 20,000 fighters. This was a very large number, considering the Kikuyu population of under 1½ million. By official British estimates 90% of the Kikuyu actively supported the struggle. When the Movement called upon Kikuyu to boycott the Nairobi bus system, to give up frequenting Asian cafes, and to stop using European beer and cigarettes, the masses responded. The underground Movement was so all-pervasive that the puppet Kikuyu Home Guards were at first heavily infiltrated. General Kitson accidentally

* Gikuyu and Mumbi were the legendary father and mother, the founding parents, of the Kikuyu peoples.

reveals this in describing a late-night "native" dance he attended:

"The assembled company represented a pretty fair cross-section of the sort of Afrikans with whom we did business. All our own men were there... three or four tribal policemen were happily drinking away with the Afrikan foreman of a big European farm. This man was a great personality in the area, a pillar of the Christian Church and leader of an enthusiastic band of Kikuyu Guard. Four months later we discovered that he was also a member of the MauMau Central Committee..."

In the first year of military struggle, starting in the Winter of 1952-1953, guerrillas were in the ascendancy--assassinating puppet officials, capturing police posts, and forcing the British Army units back out of the forests. This initial success proved the potential of Afrikan power, but it was also somewhat misleading. While the revolutionary zeal of the people was high, there were important contradictions within the nationalist movement.

The nationalist movement was divided into two political tendencies. One was headed by Jomo Kenyatta, beyond any doubt the main independence leader and hero to the Kikuyu peoples. Kenyatta was the leading representative of his class, the European-educated Afrikan petty bourgeoisie. Their program was parliamentary democracy for Afrikans, which meant civil rights, equality with settlers in business and land ownership, and eventually an Afrikan majority government. To do this Kenyatta and his associates had led their banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) in the 1940's to begin a secret campaign of oathing-of having each Kikuyu take a sacred oath to regain their land and freedom.

By 1952 the KCA, although in theory legally banned by the colonial authorities, was conducting mass rallies of 20,000 to 30,000 Kikuyu, with the black, red and green Afrikan flag waving from the speaker's platform. Jomo Kenyatta's strategy was to slowly build momentum toward campaigns of mass civil disobedience, just as Gandhi had done in India, to nonviolently urge the British out. As a legal, mass united front the KCA had organized the Kenyan African Union, which embraced all the other Afrikan peoples as well. This was the public movement that most Afrikans and most Europeans knew of.

But within this nationalist stirring there was another more secret organization, which became the actual leading nucleus of the uprising. This was a revolutionary political tendency, centered in the Afrikan proletariat and set upon the course of armed struggle. On May 16, 1950 the Afrikan and Asian workers in Nairobi (the colony's capital) began a nine-day general strike, which stopped all economic activity in the city. The 100,000 strikers were protesting the British repression against their new nationalist unions (which had openly demanded independence). The strike spread to Mombasa and elsewhere. Using troops and mass arrests the British finally crushed the political general strike.

This set-back was not unexpected, and only consolidated the resolve of the Afrikan working class leadership to organize armed struggle for liberation. While the new underground a spiracy included Kikuyu from almost all classes in Nairobi, from peddless, une loyed youth and street criminals to small merchants, it was primarily les by the workers in two unions, the transport workers and the domestic and hotel workers.* In June 1951 the young revolution-

* Unlike the AFL-CIO-type imperialist unions, these nationalist Afrikan unions were highly militant associations led by political workers.

aries took over the large Nairobi chapter of the moderate Kenya African Union (KAU). Within the next year they would secretly win over control of the KAU local committees in much of central Kenya, unable to fully take over the KAU National Executive because of Jomo Kenyatta's great prestige.

In the Summer of 1951 the revolutionaries established their clandestine Central Committee as the supreme leadership of the rapidly growing network of underground cells. Small armed teams were started to provide security and eliminate informers. The Central Committee took Jomo Kenyatta's oathing campaign, which had been going on with rising response, and raised it to a new level with the "Warrior's Oath." This new, second oath ceremony secretly pledged one to join the armed struggle as a fighter, and was administered on a surprise basis. Once a Kikuyu was honored by being invited to take the "Warrior's Oath," he had to either do so on the spot or be immediately executed. It was a selective national draft. This then was the armed movement that the British called "Mau Mau," a nationalist movement initially led by the young Afrikan proletariat.

Armed propaganda had started, most particularly in assassinations of prominent Kikuyu puppets. All this placed Jomo Kenyatta and the Afrikan intelligentsia in a difficult position. The British enforced collective punishment (seizure of livestock, etc.) on Kikuyu villages where armed propaganda had been most visible. Kenyatta had been warned by the colonial authorities to join the puppet chiefs in attacking the "Mau Mau" terrorism--or else. In the Summer of 1952 Kenyatta and his petty bourgeois group of KCA leaders began publicly denouncing the "Mau Mau" guerrillas at large rallies. This was a serious crisis, since Kenyatta was the beloved hero of the Kikuyu peoples, and even most fighters thought of him as their ultimate leader.

The Central Committee decided to try and hold together the political tendencies by coopting Kenyatta as the figurehead of their revolution. In a secret meeting Kenyatta was introduced to the Central Committee; to his surprise he found out not only that most were working class leaders in "his" organization, but that the illegal Central Committee had drafted him as a member. Although angry, Kenyatta went along. His disagreement with the armed struggle was so evident, however, that his execution as a traitor was discussed later. Kenyatta's arrest and removal from Kenya by the British saved him, and preserved his public position as the No. 1 leader of the independence struggle.

This is a sharp example of the incomplete political consolidation of the Movement. In fact, Kenyatta's own class did not fully participate in the Revolution (although they became its main beneficiaries). The British-educated Afrikan petty bourgeoisie, while of course desiring civil rights and later independence, was in the main loyal to British imperialism. They clung to their precarious positions as minor officials, as clerks and schoolteachers. Those petty bourgeoisie who did give support to the revolution did so primarily for tactical reasons, to save themselves from reprisals and keep a foot in both camps.

This had a strategic effect upon the struggle. There were almost no intellectuals among the over 15,000 fighters in the main Land & Freedom Armies in the forest; the most educated person among them had two years of high school. This mass guerrilla struggle was poorly armed politically, with no revolutionary science available to the fighters. The revolution as a whole was not socialist. While there had been a few socialists among the Nairobi unions, they were among the first arrested. Without revolutionary science,

without the advances and lessons that had been won in the revolutions of many nations, the Kikuyu movement could make only the most improvised and spontaneous plans. This was decisive in their defeat, outmaneuvered both politically and militarily by imperialism.

Events reached a turning point with the assassination of Chief Waruhiu on October 6, 1952. He had been one of the highest ranking puppets. That night spontaneous beer parties were held all over Central Province in celebration. Imperialist authority had been so clearly undermined that the British declared a State of Emergency and began wide-scale repression. Local underground committees fought back, thousands of young men fled to the forests, and the war had been fully joined.

The nationalist underground was reorganized starting in January 1953 to wartime roles. There were two sectors, the Passive Wing of support committees (buying arms, supplying food, etc.) and the Active Wing comprising the seven Land and Freedom Armies. Hope was bright in Afrikan eyes. The revolt was spreading, including to the Kamba (who were 12% of the Afrikan peoples). This was especially significant, as Kamba recruits were used by the imperialists as a main element in the puppet police and military. The Movement was so widespread, almost universal, that its activities seemed unstoppable. Afrikans expected an intense but short war, in which their numerical advantage of 100to-1 over the settlers would inevitably bring them victory. One Land and Freedom Army commander recalls:

"We had to defeat the Europeans, I continued to reason. There were 60,000 Europeans against six million Africans. Each European had to fight againt 100 Africans. It did not matter if he killed half of them and finally be killed himself, making sure that the survivors would share the land that had been used by the European, cast down the colonial rule and form an African government...

"My knowledge had been swept together with the thousands of ignorant warriors whose focus was only the Kenya settlers. I had ignored the fact that the colonial system from United Kingdom was the source of our exploitation which we were determined to eliminate."

Counter-Insurgency In Kenya

British imperialism gradually assembled a military force of over 50,000 troops. There was the Kenya Regiment of local settlers and some elite British infantry battalions, but the total of European police and soldiers was not large. Most of the imperialist forces were puppet Afrikan troops. There were six battalions of Kings African Rifles (regular colonial infantry), local Home Guards and thousands of Turkana and Somali tribal police brought in from other British colonies.

Weakened by World War II, and also fighting in wars in the Middle East, Korea and Malaysia, British imperialism could not afford to assemble any overpowering concentration of strength. In spite of their useless handfull of old armored cars, cannon and World War II bombers, the technological gap between the imperialists and the revolutionary fighters was not qualitatively significant. In the forested mountainside or Nairobi slum street a grenade, a shotgun or even a simi in the hands of a guerrilla was more potent than a British tank. Imperialism's advantage in the war was a matter of professional strategy and modern organization; with these imperialism regained the strategic initiative. While there have been several books written by British officers implying that "pseudo-gangs" and Afrikan guerrillas "turning" defeated the uprising this is not true. "Pseudo-gangs" were not primary in counter-insurgency, but only secondary. Their tactical importance in some situations can only be evaluated by first understanding the overall situation of counter-insurgency.

Imperialist counter-insurgency operations exposed the urban revolutionary infra-structure and destroyed the organized political leadership. This was the key step. The British security forces had the advantage of wielding a well-practiced level of violence that Afrikans didn't anticipate. Few oppressed peoples, even the revolutionaries, believe that imperialism really will apply massive repression overnight. This unwillingness to face the impending destruction of "normal" life allows imperialist security forces to so often get in the decisive blows early.

In October 1952 the British began "Operation Jock Scott," a preemptive campaign of arresting the nationalist leaders to forestall the armed struggle. Within a month some 8,000 Afrikans and been arrested, moderate and revolutionary alike--Jomo Kenyatta was among the first and most prominent of the detainees. The entire Central Committee was arrested. This first blow damaged, but did not completely cripple the Movement. A new Central Committee was formed, and the liberation war was fully launched. So unsuccessful were the imperialists at first that an inspecting British Parliamentary Delegation reported critically in January 1954:

"...the influence of Mau Mau in the Kikuyu area, except in certain localities, has not declined; it has, on the contrary, increased... In Nairobi, which is one of the most important centres in Africa, the situation is both grave and acute. Mau Mau orders are carried out in the heart of the city, Mau Mau 'courts' sit in judgment and their sentences are carried out by gangsters."

So the Movement not only survived in the forested mountains but right in the colonial capital. It was, in fact, in the city where the political organization was the best developed. In Nairobi the underground center obtained arms, ammunition, medical supplies and food for the forest guerrillas, while also waging urban guerrilla warfare and recruiting new fighters for the growing forest armies.

Although the local settlers and the visiting British politicians were worried that "Mau Mau" had the military initiative, in part this was because the colonial authorities were buying time; major preparations, including the training of thousands of new puppet police, were underway for strategic counter-blows against the rebellion.

On April 24, 1954 an army of 25,000 imperialist soldiers and police suddenly cordoned off all the Afrikan areas of Nairobi. This was "Operation Anvil." Sweeping each street and building, the security forces herded the entire 100,000 person Afrikan population before them into a large field, where they were held and individually screened. 15,000 Afrikans were then detained in concentration camps, including all suspected nationalists and even all known union members. Relatives of the detainees were forced to leave Nairobi. The entire new Central Committee was arrested, and the underground was effectively hamstrung by this operation. At one stroke the political leadership of

the revolution was removed and the major center of organization smashed.

Parallel operations took place in other urban areas. In the White Highlands (the settler plantation districts) over 100,000 Kikuyu were forcibly uprooted and expelled. General terror was used, since the imperialists had correctly concluded that the entire Kikuyu peoples were against them. Some 77,000 Afrikans were eventually detained in the coming months in concentration camps. Torture was casually and commonly administered. Prisoners were subject to severe beatings, rape, castration and other mutilation. Over 1,000 Afrikans were officially tried in colonial courts and executed (in contrast, the British had executed only eight of Begin's fascist-Zionist terrorists in Palestine).

It was in the countryside that the imperialists next demonstrated the effectiveness of massive force against the unprepared. In June 1954 the "villagization program" took hold, forcibly uprooting over 1 million Kikuyu in the tribal reservations. The entire Kikuyu population was forced to move into new guarded compounds, under close confinement by the police. Their subsistence farming was disrupted, livestock lost. Both men and women had to spend much of their time on unpaid, forced labor gangs, cutting down brush and doing military construction. This deliberately lowered food production below the minimum for survival, so that no surplus foods existed to supply the forest Land and Freedom Armies. Thousands of Kikuyu children and aged died from starvation and disease.

Puppet troops were encouraged to victimize the general Kikuyu population at will, robbing homes, seizing livestock, beating and abusing women. Thousands and thousands of Afrikans were shot down or hacked apart by puppet troops and local settlers, with the uncounted bodies simply being thrown away. The British claim to have killed 11,503 guerrillas during combat, but the total of Afrikans killed has often been estimated as high as 50,000.

These strategic counter-blows effectively defeated the 1952-1956 revolution. The Land and Freedom Armies were still thousands strong, but were cut off from both political leadership and from their base of support among the masses. In the heavily forested mountainsides of the Aberdale and Mt. Kenya areas the guerrillas could temporarily evade the security forces, but were unable to replace their losses or resupply themselves. They had lost the strategic initiative. Efforts were made to recreate political structures in the forests with new mass patriotic organizations and new leadership bodies such as the Kenya Parliament. In the growing confusion these could not, work. Guerrilla armies were suspicious and independent of each other; under the tightening imperialist pressure these too kept breaking down for survival into smaller and smaller autonomous units. The capture in October 1956 of Dedan Kimathi, the leading military commander and one of the last of the guerrilla hardcore, marked the final end of the revolution.

The revolution of 1952-56, even in defeat, profoundly shook up and changed East Afrika. Local European settlers proved unable without major reinforcements to hold down the Afrikan masses, who were determined to struggle for national independence and justice. Rumors of new oaths and new preparations for guerrilla war arose. British imperialism could not afford an endless series of such escalating rebellions. The revolution forced the dismantling of the old British colonial empire in East Afrika and the concession of independence. That this set the stage for the rise of the new neo-colonialism in no way lessened the heroic accomplishments of the young fighters who had sacrificed so freely. Most of all, the Kenya Revolution was not an end but a beginning, a foundation on which all succeeding Afrikan liberation movements have built.

The Use of "Pseudo-Gangs"

Operation Anvil was followed in December 1954 by Operation Hammer, a classic imperialist annihilation campaign to destroy the cut-off Land and Freedom Armies. The Aberdale forest was surrounded and bombed day and night, while a division of British troops searched through it in force. This big sweep was an admitted failure. Even in the thousands the Afrikan guerrillas easily filtered past the lines of awkward European troops crashing through the forest. After a whole month of intensive forest operations the imperialists had netted only 161 guerrillas killed or prisoner. It was in these circumstances that the "pseudo-gang" tactic (the British called the Kikuyu guerrilla units "gangs" to deny their political character) came into the foreground.

It all began in March 1954 with the capture of a single Afrikan guerrilla known to us only as "George." During long interrogation Gen. Kitson (then a captain in army intelligence) persuaded George to "turn." As Kitson tells it:

"After completing the interrogation we took George out on a patrol and he pointed out several huts near the forest edge where his gang used to go for supplies. He went into one pretending to still be in the gang and the owner gave him some interesting bits of news. Over the next few days we did the same thing in other areas where George's gang was known to work, making up a suitable story each time to account for George's presence. On one occasion a contact made in this way told George that a supply group from his gang was lying up nearby. George went and met them and led them back to where we lay in wait so that we...killed or captured all the members of this group. We had in fact done something far more important than that: we had at last broken through the great divide..."

Soon it became too difficult for George to explain why he was always alone. To be more convincing, he coached eight puppet Afrikan police how to impersonate guerrillas. Suitably dressed and armed with simis and home-made guns, these men pretended to be the rest of his unit, staying in the background while George did the talking. This was the first "pseudo-gang" in Kenya. At first the "pseudo-gangs" were direct Phoenix-type units, setting up guerrillas for army traps, or, if they could lull them into letting down their guard, shooting down their newly-met "brothers." New traitors were recruited so that the "pseudo-gang" members would all be experienced forest "veterans," known and trusted. Intelligence-gathering quickly became an equal function, and often some guerrillas were left unharmed by the "pseudo-gang" if they seemed to be a good source of news about the revolutionary Armies further away.

Then an even greater conceptual breakthrough came to the imperialist security forces. Instead of merely lurking on the edges of the Movement, why couldn't they <u>become</u> the Movement? Gen. Kitson says that it began with the problem of a very efficient guerrilla unit in Thika District, which had corrected some seventy puppets in the previous six months:

"The main reason for the survival of these terrorists was that we had been unable to make contact with our pseudo-gang. We knew who the terrorists' supporters were and we sent various members of our team to meet them pretending to be visitors from Nairobi or emissaries from the forest. Whatever the story the local Mau Mau committee received them courteously and promised to arrange a meeting with the gang. But a meeting never took place.

"Eventually the Military Intelligence Officer for Thika District devised a long-term plan. Near to the area in which the gang operated were a number of farms which had no Mau Mau committee on them because they'd all been arrested some months earlier. He decided to introduce a pseudo-gang who would tell the laborers that they had been forced out of their normal area in Kiambu. Our gang would ask for support and encourage the formation of the normal chain of committees to provide it. Once the system was operating freely he would arrest all the supporters of the real gang from the other group of farms. He hoped that the real gang would be forced into getting supplies from the committees which he had set up to support our pseudo-gang. Our gang would then be well within their rights to demand a meeting with the terrorists in order to co-ordinate operations."

This plan worked perfectly, with the "pseudo-gang" organizing a whole network of secret support committees among the Afrikan laborers. Soon the real guerrillas, now convinced of the "pseudo-gang's" authenticity, agreed to meet with the "pseudo-gang," and were wiped out in a police ambush. The imperialist security forces were very pleased by this "immense success." Secret "pseudo-gang" operations were set up by a new police Special Forces command in each district. These "pseudo-gangs" built their own base of support, becoming "warrior's oath" administrators and recruiting eager Afrikan youth straight into their contaminated pseudo-movement. This positively confirmed who was disloyal and neutralized them while using them as a front to kill the revolution.

By the war's end, in 1956, roughly half of the last several hundred guerrillas holding out were actually "pseudo-gangs." Having started as straight hunter-killer teams, using disguise to get within killing range of guerrillas, the "pseudos" finally evolved into a complex, full-time pseudo-movement. The settler police officer who ran the pseudo-Movement recalls:

"The task of keeping every man in our force recognizably active, that is to say acceptable to the remnant hostile gangs as comrades-in-arms, was extraordinarily difficult, and as much work and time had to be devoted to this extremely important aspect of our technique as was devoted to the actual hunting of Mau Mau. We had to get all out teams seen in the forest from time to time; we had to get their members to write letters and keep up the chain of correspondence in the jungle; we had to keep their food stores going. You could not remove half the Mau Mau from the forest and expect the subsequent absence of hide-outs, letters, traps and many other signs of Mau Mau activity to pass unnoticed by the other half.

"Often we were able to arrange meetings in the forest where our teams would confer with hostile Mau Mau. Having proved their loyalty to the cause and extracted all the information they possibly could without giving the game away, our men would withdraw...and the way would be paved for more operations."

The question naturally arises of who these "turned" guerrillas were, and how did the imperialists twist them around? The security forces love to play up "turned" revolutionaries, implying that they can always intimidate or buy many freedom fighters. This contemptuous propaganda is very deliberate, since they know that this degrades the image of the liberation struggle. Such propaganda blows can be even more damaging than temporary defeat itself.

Actually very few Kenyan guerrillas betrayed their revolution. At their largest, in June 1956, the "pseudo-gangs" involved only ninety traitors out of over 15,000 forest guerrillas. In every struggle we have always seen some who "turned" out of weakness or ambition. This was true in China, Mozambique and Vietnam as well. Even in defeat and when confronted with execution, Afrikan guerrillas (most of them teenage youth) remained true to their people and their revolution.

"Pseudo-gang" traitors were carefully hand-picked by the security forces. Gen. Kitson learned from experience that guerrillas with patriotic convictions were resistant to his scheme: "...it was best to rule out people who had joined Mau Mau because they were fanatically keen on the movement politically." What Gen. Kitson looked for were Afrikans who had the same mentality that he himself had. These he could trust. As he put it:

"By far the best were the Africans who joined the gangs from a spirit of adventure... Tired of their drab lives on farms or in the Reserves, they thought that it would be fun to be a gangster and carry a pistol and kill their acquaintances. Their outlook was not far from that of many young men of spirit anywhere else in the world and they were the easiest to handle because they were the easiest to satisfy."

Gen. Kitson once asked an Afrikan traitor who had become a "pseudo-gang" leader about George, the very first of them:

"'I know why you joined our organization,' I said, 'but what about George?'

"'George is different,' he answered. 'George does not mind about the Mau Mau or the Government and he certainly does not care who wins. George just likes excitement. He wants to walk around with a pistol and get plenty of loot. He changed sides because he could do all this better with you and be more comfortable at the same time.'"

The Afrikan revolutionary forces were aware of potential problems from these unreliable types, but in the political disorganization were unable to firmly deal with it. The Movement called these lumpen "Komerera," a Kikuyu word for "criminals in hiding." They were a problem to the Land and Freedom Armies, particularly when military pressure forced fighters into autonomous, smaller units. Komerera were always straying off from the main Armies, trying to escape political discipline, and often interested in raiding the closest Afrikan farms for food, women and money so that they could lay up in the forest. While the Armies tried to find and redraft komerera back into the regular fighting ranks, this only preserved outward unity while also preserving the contradictions. These problems infected whole Armies eventually.

It was a mark of Gen. Kitson's professionalism that even as a young captain, fresh from England, he was able to understand the opportunity that the komerera gave him. Kitson didn't let his bigotry (his team spoke of "taming" Afrikans) blind him to the possibility of winning over and using unknown Afrikan guerrillas to penetrate back into the heart of the rebellion. His "pseudo-gang" system in Kenya earned him medals and a swift promotion to Major. From Kenya he went to Malaya (building "pseudo-gangs" there as well) to the Middle East with the U.N. peace-keeping forces, and on to General's rank and a place as one of imperialism's top counter-insurgency commanders. The Rand Corp. (the major U.S. Defense Department "think tank") recognized Kitson's role as a counter-insurgency theorist by inviting him to be one of the participants in their 1962 counter-insurgency planning conference (to prepare for Vietnam). His reputation was crowned by the publication in 1971 of *Low-Intensity Operations*, a theoretical study for the Imperial General Staff and a semi-official primer for British Army officers. Since this study was technical and written only for a military readership, neither Kitson nor his superiors expected it to attract any public attention. To their regret, it did.

Gen. Kitson's tendency toward boldness put the Army in an awkward position, because the special usefulness of his study was that it discussed these matters in a relatively open way. So that Gen. Kitson recommended that the British Army be engaged in peacetime to use counter-insurgency tactics against the British trade unions and other reform movements at home! Further, he also recommended that Army counter-insurgency officers be integrated into all civilian decision-making on social problems, from the local town level on up. This wouldn't pose any political problems, Gen. Kitson wrote, since it would be kept secret from the British public. Once this all-too-revealing study was discovered by the British Labor Party, there was a very embarrassing furor over it in Parliament and the media.

While Gen. Kitson's study was too honest and too publicized for the imperialists, there is no doubt that it represented the official thinking of the imperialist security forces on both sides of the Atlantic. The "Introduction" in this book is by Gen. Sir Michael Carver, as Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. This high-level endorsement is continued in the study's "Foreward," which is by U.S. Army Gen. Richard Stilwell. This is more interesting than it appears.

Gen. Kitson's admiring colleague, U.S. Gen. Richard Stilwell, is identified in the book as U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff. This is a high ranking connection, indeed. But the U.S. Army's Gen. Stilwell is much more than that. He is the most important counter-insurgency planner and administrator in the Pentagon. In 1964-65 Stilwell was Chief of Staff (MACV) for all U.S. forces occupying Vietnam. After that he was head of the C.I.A. counter-insurgency effort in Thailand. Gen. Stilwell's entire career has been linked to covert counter-insurgency operations. In the 1950's we know that he was officially an obscure military attache, but in reality was the secret commander of all C.I.A. military operations in the Far East. In that role, in 1952 Stilwell organized the last U.S. invasion of China--the disastrous offensive by Gen. Li Mi's 10,000-man puppet Kuomintang army across the Burma-China border.

According to the N.Y. Times, May 11, 1983, Gen. Stilwell was the "prime mover" in the creation of the Army Intelligence Support Activity, a new, secret counter-insurgency force that helped rescue U.S. Gen. Dozier from the Red Brigades in Italy, and is active now in El Salvador and Nicaragua (and elsewhere). The N.Y. Times says of Gen. Kitson's Amerikan colleague: "Now retired, General Stilwell is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and, in that capacity, plays a leading role in intelligence, counterintelligence and security policies." It is clear, then, that Gen. Kitson is close to the highest levels of the U.S. counter-insurgency command, and writes of it with certain knowledge.

This is important to ascertain, because one of the noticeable cover-ups in Gen. Kitson's study relates to the U.S. He wrote: "A more elaborate

operation might involve the building up of a pseudo-gang from captured insurgents and the cultivation by them of a local supporters' committee in a particular area... There is some evidence to the effect that pseudo-gangs of ultra-militant black nationalists are operating now in the United States."

While Gen. Kitson obviously believed that only his fellow security officers would read this revealing comment, he properly had to formally deny that this information was officially leaked from his Pentagon colleagues (such as Gen. Stilwell). So Gen. Kitson's study says that his source of information on that was a book by a white pacifist professor in Philadelphia. This Euro-Amerikan professor, who is a former Civil Rights supporter and an advocate of nonviolent integrationism, claims in one line of a book that he had heard unspecified "rumors" discrediting some unknown armed Black nationalists as "pseudos." This is the lightest of smokescreens, since it's obvious that a close imperialist colleague of top Pentagon and C.I.A. officials doesn't depend upon "rumors" allegedly heard by a pacifist college professor to know about U.S. counter-insurgency operations. It is interesting that a leading U.S. counter-insurgency official was pushing Gen. Kitson's "pseudo-gang" theories. Perhaps the experience of Kenya has practical application for us today.

"Pseudo-Gangs" In Perspective


"Pseudo-gangs" are not invincible weapons, but like all imperialist tactics are effective within certain strategic constraints. In Kenya the strategic situation favored their use. There the movement was ideologically underdeveloped, and, after the first blows, without effective overall leadership. The fighters were increasingly disunited as the war progressed--both politically and organizationally--and were broken up into small, isolated, self-geverning collectives or units. This describes a near-ideal situation for "pseudo-gang" tactics to penetrate and spread.

In Vietnam, which is almost the polar opposite in terms of strong communist leadership and strategic unity, similar imperialist tactics got absolutely nowhere. "Turned " Vietnamese guerrillas, such as the "Kit Carson Scouts" attempted by the U.S. Marines, were useless as a whole. Even Gen. Frank Kitson, the best-known practitioner of "pseudo-gangs," was unable to advance one inch with his expertise against the Irish Republican Army. Sent to Belfast with the elite 2nd Airmobile Brigade, Gen. Kitson predicted that they would completely eliminate the I.R.A. and finish the war--by 1975. The I.R.A. is still laughing.

Of course, there is no iron wall between strategic situation and tactics. One influences the other, and vice-versa. There is at least one hypothetical framework in which "pseudo-gang" tactics can have major strategic consequences. This is when the "pseudo-gangs" become the movement, organizing a pseudomovement of underground community committees, new recruits, etc., all out of honest supporters of the revolution. So that an entire pseudo-movement exists (in competition with the original movement) which looks authentic, is mostly made up of honest elements, but which conceals at its heart the imperialist security forces. In such a process the security forces create movement leaders-of their own. This has certain implications, particularly in the more sophisticated "encapsulated-gang" tactics.

In Kenya the security forces had recruited two minor guerrilla officers, Gati and Hungu. Both had taken an active role in a faction fight wherein they and other opportunists had tried to divide the Armies along the lines of illiterate vs. literate. They were both opposed to the existing commanders (who could read and write) and sought to whip up resentment among the fighters against those who could read. If they took over, Gati, Hungu and their friends had hoped to make a deal with the British Army. Instead, these two went over to the authorities alone.

The security forces quickly promoted them as "leaders." The authorities offered big rewards for their capture, put them on the "most wanted" list, said that they had shot down police, and in every way gave them a "revolutionary" image. Then, backed up by "pseudo-gangs," Gati and Hungu were reinserted into the guerrillas to become major revolutionary leaders, to undermine the already-difficult efforts of the real leadership. Once such a pseudo-movement operation gains entry into the struggle it can have strategic consequences.



Original team: Kitson third from right



Pseudo-gang on move-





Research papers. Historical analysis & Current Investigation Dec. 1983

SERIES ONE

FROM SOUTH AFRIKA TO PUERTO RICO TO MISSISSIPPI

On September 28, 1978, Jay Mallin, the "Latin America/Terrorism Editor" of <u>Soldier of Fortune</u> magazine, was in Puerto Rico at a secret imperialist counter-insurgency conference. That conference was hosted by the Puerto Rican Attorney General's office, under the supervision of the U.S. Dept. of Justice. For three days puppet police and government officials were given intensive instruction by counter-insurgency experts from different countries on how to repress the Puerto Rican Independence Movement. And one of the main lecturers was Mr. Jay Mallin.

What is this hidden connection between police in Puerto Rico and Soldier of Fortune, the main recruiting and news magazine for right-wing white mercenaries? For that matter, who is Jay Mallin? These questions help to bring to light more about how U.S. imperialism really operates.

Both the U.S. Government and the press have always pictured the white mercenaries as a disapproved-of "extremist fringe." The mercenaries are pictured as a few gun-crazy, private "adventurers," colorful but unimportant. Now we find out that an editor for <u>Soldier of Fortune</u>, which was the No. 1 instrument of mercenary recruitment for the defeated settler regime of "Rhodesia," has been giving secret indoctrination to officers of the Puerto Rican puppet police.

Mr. Jay Mallin's career, once brought into the daylight, is not that of any "extremist fringe" or "adventurer." Mallin lives in Coral Gables, Florida, and is a researcher at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami. This university has also cooperated in his academic cover by publishing several of Mallin's books on guerrilla warfare. Before that Mallin was Havana correspondent for <u>Time</u> magazine for ten years before being expelled in 1962. He still handles special Latin Amerikan assignments for Time.

It is important to clearly understand that Mr. Jay Mallin is himself not a mercenary, not a soldier, and not an "adventurer." <u>He is a right-wing</u> <u>political propagandist</u>. And his work stretches everywhere U.S. imperialism goes into battle. In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson had 15,000 U.S. troops invading the Dominican Republic in his bloody warmup for Vietnam. Naturally U.S. imperialism had touched off much world-wide criticism and anger by this Grenada-like invasion.

Afterwards Doubleday & Co., a major New York publisher, came right out with a book on how international communist takeover conspiracies in the Dominican Republic completely justified the U.S. invasion. The book was called <u>The Truth About the Dominican Republic</u>—written by none other than our Mr. Jay Mallin. How convenient for U.S. imperialism then that an "independent" book was being widely sold backing up its repressive crimes.

It will be no surprise to learn that the book was a U.S. Government propaganda project. Jay Mallin had been secretly approached by the U.S. Government and signed to a contract, under which he agreed to write that book for them. Mallin received the usual author's royalties on book sales from Doubleday & Co., plus an extra payment from the Government of \$2,368. U.S. State Department officials gave Mallin classified documents to work from, and even edited his manuscript. The Truth About the Dominican Republic was 100% imperialist propaganda, secretly initiated, paid for, supervised, approved and distributed by Washington. The U.S. Information Agency purchased 25,000 copies from Doubleday to give out to students in other nations. Jay Mallin was undoubtedly expressing his own right-wing opinions, but, more fundamentally, he was a minor employee of the U.S. Government counter-insurgency machinery.

Mallin has a great many "respectable" connections. When kidnappings of U.S. executives became common in Latin Amerika and Europe in 1973, Burns International Security Services brought in Mallin to give lectures on guerrilla movements to departing businessmen. His main connection, however, has been to the front-line forces in counter-insurgency.

While Washington denies any relationship to the armed white right, to "extremist" groups such as the Minutemen, to mercenaries and <u>Soldier of</u> <u>Fortune</u> magazine, S.O.F. editor Jay Mallin has been welcome everywhere within the U.S. military. And welcome on an official basis. He has written on terrorism for the Marine Corps. At Fort Bragg's U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (where the C.I.A. and U.S. Special Forces give Latin Amerikan puppet soldiers counter-insurgency training), Mallin has been an invited lecturer. He has even taken part in seminars at the Pentagon.

Perhaps Mallin's closest connection had been to the U.S. Air Force. He has been a "regular contributor" (as that journal says) to <u>Air University</u> <u>Review</u>, "The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force." Although it has attracted little public attention, the U.S.A.F. maintains a permanent counter-insurgency force, a small elite trained both as aircrew and assault commandos. This force is headquartered at the Special Operations School, Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Elements of this hand-picked counterinsurgency force have operated in many nations in Afrika, in El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, and dozens of other countries. <u>In fact, these "Special Operations" Air Force commandos took part in the Government raid on the Republic of New Afrika's children's school outside Jackson, Mississippi in 1981. Jay Mallin has been a political lecturer for the Eglin AFB counterinsurgency school, and has often been a guest there since the early days of the 1960s (when it was named the Special Air Warfare Center).</u>

We should not look upon Jay Mallin himself as personally important or special in some mysterious way. He is just one of thousands of voices orchestrated by Washington. His job has been to give out imperialist indoctrination. His words are the same worn, anti-communist tirade we are well. aware of, painting every popular struggle as a tentacle of the Soviet international conspiracy, painting freedom fighters as "terrorists." Mallin always insists on more military action, more invasions, more repressions, as the thing for Amerika to do.

As a typical example of his right-wing indoctrination, one of his raps on Cuba calls on White Amerika to recover its misplated manhood: "All that is required from America is a genuine determination to get rid of Castro. Once the decision is made, Castro will be overthrown. But the decision had not been forthcoming. Throughout these critical years. United States policy

towards Cuba has been a reflection of overall policy towards the hemisphere, a policy characterized by hesitation, indecision, and lack of understanding of <u>Latinos</u> and their countries... Too often America has acted as if it had a guilty conscience, and therefore had to keep turning its cheek. <u>Latinos</u> respect <u>machismo</u> in a man and in a nation."

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ad Lov This swaggering, reactionary nonsense should not be confused with U.S. imperialism's actual strategy. Mallin's writings on Cuba, for example, express nothing of the strategy used by the C.I.A.'s "Operation Mongoose" in its attempt to turn back the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. In an identical way, Mallin's ranting against what he portrays as the perverse evil of today's guerrilla warfare is also obvious nonsense: "Terrorism is a disease of modern society, a virus growing in an ill body...The actions of terrorists, however, cannot be measured in the way other acts of war or revolution are appraised. Urban guerrillas do not march to the same drummer as regular soldiers, or even rural guerrillas."

So the simplistic work of Jay Mallin only reflects a part of what the imperialists and their commanders actually think. The larger issues of neocolonialism and real counter-insurgency strategy are far above his level. Even in the area of mass propaganda Jay Mallin in insignificant (certainly so compared to the Moral Majority or Jesse Jackson). His specific role is basic political indoctrination of U.S. imperialism's front-line soldiers against national liberation, keeping them motivated and "ready to go." This is the strand that ties together Jay Mallin's diverse connections.

U.S. Imperialism maintains a multiplicity of armed forces--some military, some police, and some supposedly unofficial and para-military--but all are carefully taught to think the same. Both U.S. Air Force officers reading <u>Air University Review</u> and Klansmen reading <u>Soldier of Fortune</u> got similar political indoctrination from Jay Mallin. As did Puerto Rican police officers, white mercenaries in South Afrika, U.S. "Green Berets" operating in Central Amerika, and many others.

It is just as if Jay Mallin were an employee of a central imperialist military indoctrination bureau. Only it is clearly in U.S. Imperialism's interest to hide the connections. Just as in 1965 the U.S. Government tried to hide the fact that Mallin's book supporting the Dominican Republic invasion was a secret C.I.A. project from start to finish. As the C.I.A. Chief of Cover and Commercial Staff told a Senate Committee in 1976: "We need a variety of mechanisms. We need a variety of cooperating personnel and organizations in the private sector." U.S. Imperialism wants to conceal their overall command and coordination of all the diverse repressive forces of imperialism. From South Afrika to Puerto Rico to Mississippi.

# HOW REVISIONISM USES ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

### SUMMARY

In Part I we discussed how revisionism developed historically. Revisionism is "the voice of the petty bourgeoisie within the proletarian movement," created by the polarization of classes, in 19th Century Europe, which pushed the petty bourgeoisie down to and in some cases into the growing proletarian movement. This familiar revisionism of Western Social-Democracy pictures socialism as the product of gradual government reforms, of legal struggles and welfare programs. In the same way we are familiar with neocolonialism as a false independence covering up a submission to imperialism by the puppet bourgeois.

Both revisionism and neo-colonialism must be seen not only in these familiar forms (which are still widespread), but in new forms within the national liberation struggles. This is true for guerrilla wars as well. A section of the colonial petty bourgeoisie, being ground under the heel of imperialism, seeks to use the power of the liberation struggle only to help them advance themselves. They use the armed struggle against itself. Their goal is to stop being imperialism's slaves--and instead be its new junior partners.

As an example of how this revisionism can infect an armed struggle we started examining the 1946-1955 Huk rebellion in the Philippines. The old Philippine Communist Party (PKP) was started in 1930--the same year as the Indochinese Communist Party. A Communist-led guerrilla army was formed during World War II, against the Japanese occupation. By 1950 the PKP was leading almost 12,000 soldiers in a major drive to seize power. This rebellion was smashed by the C.I.A.-led puppet military in a quick military disaster. The defeat was not because "imperialism was too strong," but because the Pilipino people were betrayed by the very people leading the war. Particularly striking to us was the presence of one of the PKP leaders, the Euro-Amerikan William J. Pomeroy.

# HOW REVISIONISM USES ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ARMED STRUGGLE. PART II

Neo-colonialism is an alliance between like-minded people of certain classes, in both the oppressor nation and the oppressed nation. We are used to only thinking of revolutionary solidarity as such an alliance. Imperialism has its alliances, just as we do. We are sharply reminded of this when we hit upon the role of William J. Pomeroy in the Huk rebellion. Pomeroy was a young, Euro-Amerikan intellectual, a member of the revisionist Communist Party USA, when he served as a G.I. in the 1945 reconquest of the Philippine colony. After being discharged he returned to the Philippines, married a Pilipino communist, and rapidly found favor with the revisionist PKP leadership. During the Huk rebellion Pomeroy became the head of propaganda for the Philippine Communist Party. To us today that situation should look strange, to put it mildly.

William J. Pomeroy's allies, the revisionist PKP misleaders, were alone responsible for the military disasters that brought the 1946-1955 rebellion to defeat. There is something basic behind those military disasters, and all the "errors" of the Lava-Taruc clique. The revisionists who misled the war against U.S. domination were themselves pro-Amerikan.

Even though the Lavas and Tarucs had joined the rebellion against U.S. imperialism, even though they had damned U.S. imperialism, they still were inwardly convinced of the superiority of "American" ways, "American" technology, "American" politics and culture. The Lavas and Tarucs secretly looked down on their own people and secretly looked up to and wanted to imitate the oppressor nation. Revisionism in the age of national liberation has a neocolonial character.

This hidden pro-Amerikanism (and the opportunism it inevitably accompanies) was exactly what the alliance of the Lava-Taruc clique and Euro-Amerikan revisionists was founded on. What made them so like-minded was their common neo-colonial orientation. So William J. Pomeroy's role was a symptom of a fundamental political crisis within the Pilipino Revolution of the 1950s.

Pomeroy as an individual was without any legitimate qualifications to be in the center of the Pilipino Revolution. Like a helicopter he just dropped right into the headquarters. Certainly neither the Pilipino masses, the liberation movement, nor the guerrilla cadre as a whole had any say in the matter. It was, we might say, an involuntary and enforced alliance as far as many were concerned. Pomeroy in his memoirs writes about how one Huk fighter, whose sister had been treacherously executed in 1945 by G.I.s, always kept a drawn gun aimed at Pomeroy whenever the Euro-Amerikan "ally" came into this fighter's hut. On the other hand, the Lavas and Tarucs pushed Pomeroy forward as a symbol. The neo-colonial misleaders were proud of having a Euro-Amerikan collaborator, and clearly felt that the stamp of Euro-Amerikan approval gave them extra legitimacy.

CORRECTION: Part I identified "the Taruc Brothers (Luis and Pedro)." The Taruc brothers were Luis and Peregrino. Pedro Taruc, another revisionist, was a distint relative of the brothers. This neo-colonial infection was manifested in far more important ways than the role of one person at guerrilla headquarters. <u>Hidden admiration</u> for "American" things affected all military aspects, from strategy to <u>tactics</u>. The military disasters did not come from so-called "errors," but from that fundamental flaw in the whole political leadership. The war was planned in a thoroughly bourgeois fashion, as an armed adventure, with no thought of the protracted drawing in, educating and transforming of the oppressed masses themselves as the main task.

In 1950 PKP Secretary Jose Lava predicted that they would win complete victory by 1952. He gave the fighters several reasons why this easy victory would take place. The first was that the Peoples Liberation Army (HMB) would simply outrecruit the puppet military so rapidly that it would become overpowering. Lava ordered that the over-10,000 soldier HMB should recruit at a "geometric" rate, until they reached 170,000 by September 1951. Further, all training was to be done according to the U.S. Army training manual, in revisionist imitation of the U.S. Army. This scheme, in which the building of a Red Army was posed in a mechanical and bourgeois way, destroyed the HMB.

Not only was the unrealistic numbers goal never reached, but the demand for mechanical recruiting resulted in opening the doors to unreliable elements and imperialist agents. One such agent, who became a new unit commander, led puppet military intelligence in October 1950 to the secret Party headquarters (still in Manila). In one blow the imperialists captured Secretary Jose Lava and a number of other leaders, guards, couriers and other cadre, all military plans and communications, lists of safehouses, meeting points and secret sympathizers, and complete Party records. It was a blow the PKP never recovered from.

The main reason PKP Secretary Lava gave out in 1950 for why the fighters should expect easy victory was that U.S. imperialism would not oppose them. Lava said that because U.S. imperialism was faced with crises in so many places and had internal contradictions, it would "sit out" the war and let the communists win. Bases on this the traitor Lava ordered all guerrilla units to not attack or in any circumstances fire on any U.S. forces, only on Pilipinos. Their neo-colonialism took control of the military strategy itself, twisting it.

The old PKF leadership had thoroughly undermined the armed struggle. Impatient to carry out showy and dramatic raids in 1950, the Lava-Taruc clique ordered the Red fighters to concentrate on certain big targets.

This in most cases greatly over-extended the Peoples Army, forcing it to maintain tactical bases, supply lines, and communications in and through hostile areas where it had never organized the population. "Fish" without a "sea." Thus over-extended, the Peoples Army was unable to withstand the savage "encirclement and suppression" offensives of the C.I.A.-led puppet military.

As the military situation became worse, the Jesus Lava Secretariat was unable to give any overall leadership. In 1951, while trying to dodge the increasing blows from the C.I.A. counter-insurgency, the Red fighters received farcical orders to give up a guerrilla structure. They were told to immediately transform the HMB into a big, regular army. Instead the fighters were forced to break down into smaller units, less and less responsive to the irrelevant central leadership.

Relations with the masses were broken up as well. The Lava-Taruc clique, thinking to solve the serious food problems of the fighters in their customary bourgeois way, ordered that all barrios be divided into "friendly" and "unfriendly." In a "friendly" barrio the peasants voluntarily gave food and other aid to the HMB. The "unfriendly" barrios were those that refused. Under revisionist policy guerrillas could take whatever they needed by force from the peasants of "unfriendly" barrios. Poor peasants would be made to stand aside at riflepoint while hungry guerrillas took all their food, and even their precious carabao (water buffalo) used to pull the plow. This gave the Huks a reputation for criminal activity. C.I.A. pseudo-gangs took this and multiplied it, robbing and abusing peasants while pretending to be Huks.

On April 11, 1952 puppet troops surprised and captured the HMB Regional Command 1 headquarters. William J. Pomeroy was captured, and eventually spent ten years in prison as a celebrated political prisoner. In that same raid Gregoria Calma, Commander Luis Taruc's wife, was killed. Luis Taruc himself barely escaped. Shaken, Taruc began calling for "peaceful co-existence." In 1954 Taruc surrendered to C.I.A.-led forces, who used a young "radical" from a big capitalist family, Benigno Aquino, Jr., to coax him in. Mass surrenders spread. By 1955 the war was over. PKP Secretary Jesus Lava ordered all armed units to disband and instead take up organizing for bourgeois elections.

We have to see this in perspective. The Pilipino people wanted national liberation and socialism. The masses, who had a rich history of mass peasant uprisings (armed only with knives and spears) against U.S. colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s, dragged the PKP into the armed struggle. But the revisionist misleaders betrayed their people, creating military disasters by their bourgeois schemes. All this was long after the brilliant advances of Peoples War in China and Vietnam had proven how to defeat imperialism. All this was twenty years after Mao Zedong and the Red Army had begun their historic work in China. Over ten years after Mao's brilliant works on protracted war and guerrilla strategy were written. The Lavas and Tarucs deliberately turned their backs on communist science from other liberation struggles.

It is not true that this science was unavailable to the PKP. Mao Zedong's writings were being circulated internationally by communists and in the overseas Chinese communities even in the 1940s. Chinese in New York City and San Francisco were seriously studying his theories even then. The Chinese national minority in the Philippines, which was represented on the Central Committee of the PKP, could easily have translated Mao's pamphlets for the PKP. If they had been wanted. For that matter, many detailed accounts of China's Peoples War (such as those by Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, and Agnes Smedley) were available in English. So to not pick up this knowledge

was a deliberate act, a deliberate turning away from it.

The Lavas and Tarues did not use communist military science because they didn't want it. They didn't want a war that served the Pilipino people; they wanted a war that served themselves. That is why they turned to bourgeois schemes and U.S. Army training manuals rather than the revolutionary experiences of the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples. Some "errors" happen on purpose.

William J. Pomeroy is again a good example of this. After he was pardoned in 1961, Pomeroy settled in London and became a big revisionist "expert" on guerrilla warfare. Pomeroy refuses to criticize himself or his party, the Communist Party USA, for neo-colonialism or anything else. Nor has he ever admitted that the Pilipino people were betrayed by misleaders. Pomeroy puts all the weight for the defeat on the innocent lack of knowledge and experience of the PKP leadership:

"Not a single theoretical work by any Marxist or non-Marxist authority on guerrilla struggle or armed revolutionary struggle was in the possession of the Huk movement...The theories of Mao Tse Tung on the protracted war and its elements were scarcely heard of and played no part in Huk deliberations on strategy and tactics.

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"Together with these theoretical and organizational defects, in neither the military forces of the Huk nor in the Philippine Communist Party did there exist even one leader with anything approaching a grasp of over-all military theory or of the elements of its strategy and tactics affecting the Philippine situation..."

Contrary to Pomeroy's misleading appraisal, the PKP traitors had wrapped themselves in the mantle of the Chinese Revolution. The misleaders assured the Red fighters of that. Secretary Jose Lava claimed to have so mastered Mao's military-political thought that he knew that the concept of rear base areas didn't apply to the Philippines! Does anyone believe that the Pilipino Revolution would have followed leaders who had confessed to not knowing about or not understanding the leading revolutionary ideas in the world? Or who had confessed to throwing aside those ideas? That is why Ernesto Diaz, the editor of the PKP's theoretical journal, <u>Ang Kommunista</u>, assured the cadres that the PKP was following a certain course: "This course is the one blazed by the Chinese Revolution."

This helps us understand why Philippine communism has taken such a serious view of the Lava-Taruc clique. Philippine communism refused to let them evade responsibility for their acts as honest "errors" and insisted that their successive policies were "right errors" and "ultra-left errors" indeed, but errors committed by bourgeois misleaders and traitors. Philippine communism long ago took full responsibility before their nation for that heavy set-back. William J. Pomeroy is a very minor issue of the past for them. After all, were it not for the Lavas and Tarucs, Pomeroy and his Party would never have been allowed to meddle in the liberation struggle. No serious liberation movement allows foreign meddlers to walk right in the door and take up residence. Our Pilipino comrades have cleaned up their own house. There is much in this difficult history for everyone to learn from. Pomeroy may be a figure of the past, but Pomeroyism has never been corrected. Euro-Amerikan communists have never cleaned up their own house. It is a heavy thing to send Red fighters to their deaths politically disarmed. It is a heavy thing to abuse the important call for international solidarity, to cover up for neo-colonial infiltration. It is a heavy thing to promote a clique of misleaders and traitors as the leaders of a national liberation movement. Pomeroyism did all those things.

The Lavas and Tarucs, while able at some factional intrigue, appreciated help from the Communist Party USA in fooling the Pilipino people. William J. Pomeroy was useful to them by producing lots of revolutionary-appearing propagands that puffed the misleaders up, giving them temporarily the look of the real thing. "Ernesto Diaz," (the editor of the PKP theoretical journal) was actually none other than Pomeroy himself. He was only the representative of an entire U.S. oppressor nation movement, one which eventually raised neo-colonial meddling to its main activity.

Pomeroy did not go to the Philippines to consciously sabotage them. Doubtlessly he was pleased to be allowed to join the Huks, to show his solidarity by sharing their risks and hardships. But his still-dominant oppressor nation attitudes led him to abuse the friendship of the Pilipino people. Without a struggle he allowed himself to claim a special position. Soon Pomeroy was "thick as thieves" with the misleaders and traitors. What could have been a great service (as Nym Wales and Norman Bethune did in China) and an example of real internationalism, became its opposite.

It was many years before all this was unmasked here. Little truth was known in the U.S. about the Huk rebellion (thanks to the revisionist Communist Party USA). William J. Pomeroy was thought of as a model of internationalism, as an exemplary "communist." After all, how could anything be wrong with a Euro-Amerikan who heroically joined the leading ranks of a Third-World guerrilla movement?


The lessons of the 1946-1955 Huk rebellion lead us to go beneath surface appearances. Imperialist repression did not defeat the rebellion--the masses were betrayed by revisionist and neo-colonial politics. Further, most publicized Euro-Amerikan "allies" turned out to have had "solidarity" only with the clique of neo-colonial misleaders--and have only harmed the cause of the Pilipino people. When we go beneath the surface appearance of matters, we see that all those who pick up the gun, all those who lead armed struggle, are not automatically revolutionaries. And that every armed struggle is not necessarily Peoples War.

While the Lava-Taruc clique brought the rebellion to defeat, the contradictions go beyond the question of momentary military defeat or military victory. The Pilipino people created the patriotic armed struggle against all imperialist invaders, and refused to abandon it.

The Lava-Taruc clique used armed struggle against the armed struggle. They tied the workers and peasants up in a bourgeois war, a war that was

guerrilla (most of these militia do not yet have rifles). Even more positive, the NPA is but the armed spearhead of a mass, anti-imperialist mobilization (whereas the old HMB tried to act as a substitute for mass mobilization). The number of active supporters of the NPA is put at five millions. As of 1981 the National Democratic Front claimed some 40,000 local organizers in revolutionary mass organizations. Armed struggle has systematically been spread throughout most provinces in the islands. After 14 years of overcoming obstacles the new Communist Party of the Philippine (CPP) adheres to its original strategy of protracted war. Despite great achievements it still considers its war in an <u>early stage</u>, still one of the strategic defensive.

> "Who shall be victorious? Only the undefeated in the midst of defeat."



## SERIES ONE

### REPORT: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ZIMBABWE REVOLUTION

In hard times we must face hard truths.

We must stop viewing armed struggle in a romanticized and deliberately simpleminded way. The same thing applies to national movements. There are three reasons why this is imperative:

1. With no practical, communist understanding of what is going on in liberation wars between oppressed and oppressor nations, solidarity work is very underdeveloped.

2. Since in the real world things are not so simple as comrades here in the U.S. desperately try to believe, quite often imperialism is several jumps ahead of us. All ico often the "movement" has been raising funds or holding rallies for what in reality is an ally of U.S. imperialism.

3. A romanticized and ignorant view of armed struggle in Afrika, Asia and Latin Amerika may be fine for a cheerleader team, but when comrades who suffer from this infection try to do armed activity themselves they naturally do so in a romanticized and ignorant way. Ours is now a road partially blocked with political-military wrecks in the first hundred yards. It is not an accident that people who failed to see the decisive political-military problems of their own work in recent years are still uncritical of their support of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. It is not an accident that those who learned nothing from Zimbabwe are ignorant about El Salvador. At some point repeated ignorance is not innocent, but a deliberate choice in politics.

Recent developments in Southern Afrika have been a blow. Many comrades are surprised and upset at the South Afrikan government's success at maneuvering socialist Mozambique and Angola into cooperation with it. Once new liberated nations bordering South Afrika were thought to be the launching pad for a decisive war to liberate South Afrika. Now, Mozambique has apparently been bent into some limited cooperation with the apartheid regime, becoming a buffer state to keep South Afrikan guerrillas disengaged in exile.

These contradictions did not grow overnight, but have been ten years in the making. The "key" event was when U.S. imperialism stopped the Zimbabwean Revolution. How imperfalism stopped this revolution must be understood--not only for its own sake, but for what it tells us about the larger situation. Imperialism did so by penetrating the liberation movement itself, making a neo-colonial alliance with the petty-bourgeois leaderwhip. Class unites with class. Neo-colonialism used the armed struggle against itself, having the Zimbabwe freedom fighters unknowingly bring into power imperialism's own agents. This regime of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party shields itself by using the socialist and national liberation identity of the movement it betrayed and struck down.

These contradictions are class contradictions within the oppressed nations. To not inderstand them is to not see the class and national factors that imperialism--quite concretely including the C.I.A.--tries to use in <u>neo-colonial counter-insurgency</u>. The imperialist experience gained in suppressing the '60s movement in the New Afrikan ghettoes here was used in Zimbabwe. Potential revolution in New Afrika partially shaped imperialist strategy in Southern Afrika. We can say that if you don't understand Zimbabwe, then you probably don't yet understand Amerika.

### I. THE GENERALS OF NEO-COLONIALISM

The search for a neo-colonial weapon to kill the Zimbabwe Revolution began with a <sup>Polit</sup>ical struggle within U.S. imperialism. While we are most familiar with im-

perialism's traditional strategy--keeping the Afrikan masses down through the repressive beer settler-colonial regimes--this is not imperialism's only option. Many imperialist officers in the C.I.A., the State Department, the Council on Foreign Relations, the planning staffs of many multi-national corporations, saw the long-term necessity of indigenous neo-colonialism rather than European settler-colonialism in Afrika. Even in the form of "neo-socialism."

There has been an intense policy struggle within the imperialist camp between those libe who favor the traditional option of military repression and those who favor the neocolonial option of embracing and subverting the national liberation movements. (Imperialism actually uses both weapons, and neither will ever completely replace the other.) Within the imperialist state a so-called radical grouping on Afrikan strategy formed during the 1970s.

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Until 1976 the most visible member of this tendency was W. Anthony Lake, a career State Department officer. He was the perfect, almost stereotype, elite liberal: a product of private schools, of Harvard, Cambridge, and Yale. By 1970 Lake had served in Saigon and had advanced to the White House. He was Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger Afri on the National Security Council staff. In a surprising move Lake openly broke with the thei Nixon-Kissinger conservative line, resigning in protest over the destabilization of Cambodía.

Although in exile from government, W. Anthony Lake rose still higher in imperialist policy-making circles. He became a focus in the preparations for new imperialist strategy in Afrika. Lake became a familiar figure in discussions in the Rockefellerbased Council on Foreign Relations. In 1971-72 he was foreign policy coordinator for U.S. Senator Muskie's Presidential campaign. At a time when most foreign policy attention was fixed on Southeast Asia, Lake argued for the importance of Afrika to U.S. world interests.

As director of the Special Rhodesia Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Lake organized Congressional liberals against U.S. support of the Smith regime of "Rhodesia." He had become, in an insider's sense, a foreign policy star. So much so that in 1973 conservative William Safire, writing in his <u>New York</u> <u>Times column on "The Next Kissinger," said that "a liberal-activist President might go</u> for Anthony Lake" as his foreign policy advisor.

In 1977 such a "liberal-activist President" did come to power. And the new Carter Administration was faced with a crisis in Zimbabwe. The old Nixon-Kissinger policy of relying on the European settlers of "Rhodesia" had failed. Afrikan guerrillas were knocking out imperialist defenses, mobilizing the masses, and on the verge of unconditional military victory. The C.I.A. reported that the Smith regime had only a short time to live. Another U.S. fiasco was near in the chain of humiliating defeats that stretched from Vietnam to Angola.

The Carter Administration charged into the crisis, pushing through a sharp change in strategy. There was an accompanying shake-up of personnel. W. Anthony Lake came back as State Department Director of Policy Planning. Richard M. Moose became Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. A former Lake ally on the National Security Council staff in 1969, Moose was a key mover within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff in cutting off funding for Kissinger's ill-fated 1976 war in Angola. "Rhodesian" settler officials, bitter at their abandonment by Washington, started the doubleentendre that "The Moose drinks in the Lake."

The Washington Post reported: "The Carter Administration, emphasizing its bolder support for Black majority rule in Africa, is replacing the top officers at the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs... Two of the present three Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the African Bureau also are scheduled for replacement, informed sources said, with a fourth deputy to be added on economic policy. Officials deny 'any purge'...'

Although the small group quickly reshaping U.S. Afrika strategy was chaired by Vice-President Mondale, the real star was U.N. Ambassador Andy Young. For years, as a Civil Rights leader, Young had visited Afrika as a fellow activist and friend of the liberation struggles. He had international stature as one of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s chief aides in S.C.L.C.. In South Afrika the authorities had allowed him to meet with an imprisoned Robert Sobukwe, the founder of the Pan-Africanist Congress. Young took Sobukwe's two children back into his own home in Atlanta; they were raised as part of his family. These well-publicized personal ties to Mother Afrika made Young the best possible advance-man for imperialism's courtship of Afrikans. This was not just a cosmetic touch. The Andy Youngs and Jesse Jacksons have a practical understanding of mass Third-World movements that a Kissinger will never have.

Led by Andy Young and W. Anthony Lake, the small Carter Administration group on Afrika strategy laid down a realistic view of imperialism's options. Two key points in their assessment were: 1. U.S. imperialism, irregardless of what anyone thinks, is unable to defeat communism in Southern Afrika by military means; 2. U.S. strategy on Aftika must take into account the ever-present danger of mass uprisings in New Afrikan shettoes here. These points were interrelated, in fact.

Of the three existing military options, two had failed and the third was too dangerous to use. The settler-colonial regimes had been militarily broken in Portuguese Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Settler-colonialism in "Rhodesia" was losing its war, and South Afrika, the last settler-colonial fortress, thought the "Rhodesian" situation so hopeless that it had been looking for a neo-colonial solution since 1974. Aissinger's fantasy of C.I.A. mercenary armies substituting for the U.S. Army and Warines had been totally smashed in Laos, Cambodia, and then Angola. The third military option, of direct intervention ala Vietnam, was suicidal in Afrika.

Andy Young said it all: "I see no situation in which we would have to come in on the side of the South Africans... You'd have civil war at home. Maybe I ought not to say that, but I really believe it. An armed force that is 30 percent Black isn't going to fight on the side of the South Africans."

So U.S. imperialism's ultimate option of superpower invasion was ruled out because <sup>of</sup> their fear of Afrikan mutiny and "civil war at home." This was not only Andy Young <sup>speaking.</sup> The intelligent white elements of the imperialist forces shared this concern. They take seriously the revolutionary possibilities of the New Afrikan masses. The <sup>Rockefeller</sup> Commission on "Critical Choices" wrote on Afrika policy: "Among other <sup>considerations</sup>, Americans should recognize that the effects of a major race war in <sup>Afrika</sup> would extend far beyond that continent, with the ominous prospect of encouraging <sup>further</sup> racial polarization in the United States."

W. Anthony Lake perceptively said: "One should also consider the possible impact on Our society if a racial conflict in Southern Africa were to escalate dramatically, if <u>televised</u> reports of Black and white bloodshed were to become even fractionally as <u>familiar to American living rooms as the bloodletting in Indochina became in the 1960s.</u> In short, the domestic divisiveness of the issue makes Southern Rhodesia all the more <u>dangerous a problem for the United States.</u>"

 $^{
m So}$  the Carter Administration pursued the search for a "peaceful," neo-colonial

solution. By publicly pulling away from the white settler-colonial regimes, by publicly while a settler settler settler by bow claiming to support the goals of the liberation struggles, U.S. imperialism was man repositioning itself to find Afrikan allies. Their goal was to disarm the guerrillas, fig stop the revolutionary process, and usher in pro-Western, bourgeois Afrikan governments, This would also help reinforce the same politics here in the New Afrikan communities. Zimbabwe, Andy Young insisted, was "the key." Whi.

to i This broad turn towards co-optive neo-colonialism was also shared by the other inte Western regimes involved in Zimbabwe, by Britain and South Afrika. There were reg: significant differences between them, however. The South Afrikan regime wanted a pupper Afr Afrikan government under its hegemony. Britain wanted the most bourgeois Afrikan regime, stable and protective of British investments, that it could set up, providing that at least part of the guerrilla leadership was involved (since London understood had that no regime without those credentials could defuse the liberation war). Amer

ther U.S. imperialism had, for once, the most sophisticated strategy. On the surface, guer Washington would call for Afrikan majority rule in Zimbabwe--and then let Britain take a pr the leadership (as the former colonial power) in international negotiations. This negc modest attitude was unusual coming from Washington. One of Lake's criticisms of Kissinger's Afrika strategy was that "Super-K" had foolishly catapulted U.S. imperialism into the spotlight as the No. 1 power, the No. 1 ally of South Afrika, the No.1 Western Smit power fighting in Angola and Zimbabwe. Out of which U.S. imperialism only got further guer exposed as the No. 1 enemy of liberation. And lost the wars, too. outr

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Lake's line on Zimbabwe was to let Britain run the risks and take the responsibility: "The aim was a low posture on the issue; Washington would follow London's form lead and try to hide behind British skirts in the face of African pressures for more forceful action against the Smith regime." All the while Andy Young, as chief U.S. negotiator on the issue, would openly sympathize with the Zimbabwe freedom fighters while building relationships.

This was the innovative thrust in U.S. imperialism's new Southern Afrika strategy. While South Afrika wanted an Afrikan puppet who had no involvement in liberation, while Britain wanted the most bourgeois Afrikan leaders it could install, Young and Lake gambled that U.S. imperialism could win over the main guerrilla leadership itself--that of the ZANU-PF Party. After all, who could better cover for neo-colonial betrayal than the political leadership of the guerrilla armies?

Andy Young was counting on several hidden factors working for imperialism within the Zimbabwe Revolution. The first was that, just as in the U.S. Empire, Afrikan national independence movements contain within them different class and political forces. Much of the Afrikan petty-bourgeois leadership has always wanted, first and foremost, the "freedom" to become capitalists and Europeanized. Young's most remembered quote is about this not-so-secret attraction: "At the junction of Jomo Kenyatta Avenue Kentucky Fried Chicken. " and Uhuru Avenue in Nairobi I saw a sign. It read:

In March 1980, Andy Young wrote very happily on how the emerging petty-bourgeois leadership in Zimbabwe "will join a Southern Africa bloc that has been very pro-United States and anxious to establish economic ties to the West...everyone will be a winner." This, he said, included even the guerrilla leadership everyone in the West thought was so radical:

shu "Zimbabwe will begin with a greater per-capita trained Black leadership and a ¥it larger Black middle class than any other African nation at the time of independence ... One burly bearded guerrilla leader pulled me aside during negotiation attempts in Malta in 1978 and, as I prepared to be attacked as a 'tool of imperialism,' he quietly asked

What really happened to the Oakland Raiders? They were supposed to be in the Super gowl!' Like many of his fellows he had studied in America for nine years and had made gany friends there. Later I was able to identify at least 30 Patriotic Front freedom fighters with post-graduate degrees from American universities."

The other hidden factor Young was counting on was the front-line Afrikan states. While U.S. imperialism could not reach the 30,000 Zimbabwe guerrillas, it might be able to get the host Afrikan states to disarm the guerrillas. In June 1977 Andy Young was interviewed on Public TV's "MacNeil-Lehrer Report." He dramatically said that the Smith regime could fall within 18 months, and that plans were needed to deal with the new Afrikan government that would emerge.

Most important, said Young, was that joint plans to disarm the liberation forces had to be made with the front-line states: "These plans cannot be just British and American... I think we cannot deal with these problems 5,000 miles away. The people there on the border are going to have to take responsibility for dismantling the guerrilla army..." That month Presidents Carter and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had made a private understanding to cut short the Zimbabwe liberation war by international megotiations and bourgeois elections. We will cover this in detail later.

So in the critical year of 1977 U.S. and Britain brought increasing pressure on the Smith regime to transfer power, while working to identify imperialism with the guerrillas. Young said that Washington just wanted "to unwrite some real neglect and outright wrong-doing on the part of much of the West." British Foreign Secretary David ween praised the Zimbabwe guerrillas as "essentially men of good will driven to take up arms." Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver flew into Zimbabwe to become British Commissioner. Carver, who had commanded counter-insurgency operations against "Mau-Mau" in Kenya, announced: "What I am basically committed to is that Rhodesia will become a basically Black country run primarily by Black Africans for the benefit primarily of Black Afrikans." The imperialists even had their thugs trying to sound like the liberation movement. The neo-colonial operation to deep-freeze the Zimbabwe Revolution bad been launched.

### II. INSTALLING THE NEO-COLONIAL AGENTS

For U.S. imperialism to deflect the revolutionary war it was necessary for their Nidden agents to subvert the liberation army. This was done in 1977, when a surprise Oup installed Robert Mugabe and his clique over the ZIPA fighters. Mugabe pretends to have been the political leader of the liberation war, a pose that helped his ZANU-PF Party into power and still helps cover for them. But Mugabe himself, who was imprisoned from 1964-1974, did no political writing and had no communication with the liberation "adres, had nothing to do with building the guerrilla forces or guiding the war. He was, in fact, practically unknown by them until 1975.

Imperialist strategy was simple: to co-opt the war, deflecting its political aims function to bourgeois democracy ("majority rule"), grant Afrikan government as fuckly as possible so as to stop the growth of socialist consciousness. As one major distory of the liberation war put it: "To prevent the radicalization of the Zimbabwean ationalist movement through armed struggle, Kissinger had to remove the cause of the war by making Smith concede majority rule. The Rhodesian leader, with his narrow vision the war went on... the more radical the guerrillas would become a liability... For the longer the war went on... the more radical the guerrillas would become." Kissinger's "Afrika with Smith. Now a new U.S. Carter administration was moving to co-opt the liberation

For this strategy Mugabe was the perfect tool. He was a prominent Afrikan teacher iend and nationalist politician, who had always been close to liberal church circles as a the "Christian socialist." Moreover, his tactical sense had always led him to pose as a "militant" or socialist, while in practice his concept of independence was precisely what Washington wanted -- Afrikan "majority rule" in the form of bourgeois government. elmc

In 1960 Mugabe, as the "militant" nationalist, had offered to pledge loyalty to poli "Rhodesia" if a new constitution gave him and the other petty-bourgeois Afrikan then politicians half the seats in the settler parliament. As late as 1975 Mugabe had agree mili to the abortive South Afrikan "Detente" plan to promise Zimbabweans voting rights after of t five years -- in return for which the ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas would be disarmed. During to c the proposed five-year pacification period only the settler army and police would be and armed. Mugabe, like many other petty-bourgeois nationalist politicians, was always him. drawn to reformist deals. intr

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In 1975 he avoided re-arrest by escaping to Mozambique, where he joined the ZANU military camps. Despite his old 1963 rank as ZANU Secretary-General, the army refused to accept him as their political leader. Four senior ZANU military commanders finally and issued a statement friendly to Mugabe, but which explicitly limited his role to being a comp "middleman" (their word) in communications with discredited bourgeois politicians. Yet of t there was no doubt Mugabe's star was rising. In January 1976 Mugabe flew to London, Zimb where the British Broadcasting Corporation interviewed him at length on their "Focus on pett Africa" show. This popular radio program was beamed all over Southern Afrika. Mugabe slog posed on the show as the "militant" defender of the guerrillas, attacking President "Mar Kaunda of Zambia for arresting and repressing ZANU fighters. This dramatic broadcast, The which was the self-admitted "break-through" in Mugabe's career, was, of course, and the arranged.

At that time the liberation war had undergone an important change. A new army, stop formed under Tanzanian-Mozambican directives from both ZANU and ZAPU (but actually almost totally from ZANU), had reopened the suspended liberation war on a greater scale than ever before. ZIPA (Zimbabwe Peoples Army), was also more radical than its earlied give parent bodies. New commanders had replaced the older ZANU commanders, while thousands and tra of fresh fighters were being led to conduct a more political war. ZIPA published its fron own revolutionary journal. Women fighters were not only joining the fighting (instead inte of only being ammunition porters), but in a move against male chauvinism all the training instructors were women fighters. ZIPA began organizing drives for the first tra time into areas of Zimbabwe far inland, away from the Mozambique border. The war spread as never before, on a far larger scale. Dia

In March 1976 Africa magazine reported that: "A highly confidential study carried out by Major General Walls, the Rhodesian Chief of the Security Forces, explicitly warns that Rhodesia alone cannot contain a guerrilla offensive for much longer." In many rural areas the settler forces could no longer even mount patrols. Settler bases were attacked repeatedly. The fighters could see that unconditional military victory was definitely coming. Fortified with this knowledge, the ZIPA command and the cadres rejected any imperialist deals, "talks" on compromises with imperialism, and all of the petty-bourgeois nationalist politicians who so desperately wanted to cut the revolution off. This absolutely included Mugabe and the other old ZANU politicians.

In The ZIPA command began publicly moving to form a new revolutionary party out of the fighters themselves. ZIPA started appointing its own international representatives abroad, requested that all OAU solidarity funds come directly to its camps, and reluctantly sent its own separate delegation to sit alongside the old parties, ZANU, ZAPU, ANC, at the October 1976 international negotiations at Geneva. Mugabe and his clique were frightened, frantically issuing orders to the fighters which were all

ignored. This was the most radical development of the independence struggle, although the ZIPA command was not itself a communist vanguard.

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We should be precise on how much influence the Mugabe clique had on the armyalmost none. While the ZIPA cadres had at first looked upon the old ZANU Supreme Council as still their political leadership, once they discovered that the old ZANU politicians were in favor of an imperialist deal to stop the revolution, they repudiated them. The old ZANU leaders were at first unable to even get permission to enter the military camps. Even when Josiah Tongogara, Mugabe's factional ally and the famous head of the ZANU military, got into the Mozambique camps he was unable to persuade fighters to desert the ZIPA political line. Tongogara had a long friendship with Samora Machel and other FRELIMO leaders, and they encouraged the ZIPA guerrillas to get together with him. Yet even with this pressure, after an entire month in the camps of lobbying and intrigues by Tongogara and other Mugabe clique leaders, the majority of the revolutionary army still refused to accept that leadership.

What is primary is that it is the Afrikan masses who created the armed struggle, and it is they who always wanted to reclaim their land without any imperialist compromises or neo-colonial conditions. So in the 1960s, before Nkomo or Mugabe or any of the petty-bourgeois nationalist politicians had organized any armed activity, the Zimbabwe masses repeatedly staged violent urban uprisings and general strikes. The petty-bourgeois politicians learned to use, by rote, socialist and Pan-Afrikanist slogans, but only to appease the liberation activists. The ZIPA commanders, who used "Marxist-Leninist" rhetoric just as Mugabe and Nkomo did, were not really more advanced. The important thing is that many Zimbabwe fighters wanted war to unconditional victory and socialism--that's why as long as the ZIPA commanders stuck to that program they had the support of the army. And it was within the ranks of the fighters that the first communist political consciousness was being born. That's why U.S. imperialism had to stop the war, even if it meant abandoning their settler puppets.

At that time the role of the front-line states again became pivotal. We should five some background: the five front-line states--Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola and Botswana--were the hosts for the Zimbabwe liberation forces. Military bases, training camps, HQs and civilian refugee camps all were on their territory. And it was from two bordering states--Zambia and Mozambique--that the fighters infiltrated back into Zimbabwe. FRELIMO in Mozambique had closer ties still to ZANU, whose troops it had trained and still fought beside in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe itself.

But the front-line regimes also had their own agendas. Born with distorted coloial economies linked to "Rhodesia" and South Afrika, Zambia and Mozambique lost aillions of dollars from disruption of trade ties to the settlers. Both also suffered Political-economic instability as the war spilled over into their national territories. For these reasons both conservative Zambian President Kaunda and socialist Mozambican President Samora Machel wanted a Zimbabwean settlement as quickly as possible. The "shes of the front-line states were usually orders, since both Zambia and Mozambique used their power to make the Zimbabwe movement do what they were told.

For example: In 1975 the front-line states halted the Zimbabwe armed struggle altogether. Zambian President Kaunda and South Afrikan General van den Bergh (chief of infamous Bureau of State Security) had worked out a "Rhodesian" sell-out settlement October 1974. When ZANU Chairman Herbert Chitepo complained to the OAU, Zambian afficials told ZANU they would "use muscle to crush ZANU." On March 18, 1975 Chitepo assassinated by a car bomb. Zambian police blamed the death on factional rivalry ithin the movement. On this pretext the front-line states stopped the war; arresting

and, if necessary, killing the Zimbabwe cadre who resisted.

In Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia the ZANU guerrillas were disarmed and confined Prin to their camps. In both Zambia and Tanzania all the Zimbabwe liberation offices were closed. Zambian police did mass arrests of ZANU officials, members and relatives, torturing many to extract confessions. Three ZANU military commanders who escaped into 1965 Mozambique were arrested by FRELIMO and returned to Zambian imprisonment. Cut off, most tair of the Zimbabwe guerrillas inside the country were killed in renewed counter-insurgency offensives. By late 1975 less than fifty guerrillas were still active in Zimbabwe. The tole "Rhodesian" regime was overjoyed.

But the "detente" sell-out collapsed in late 1975, as "Rhodesian" Prime Minister Ian Smith stupidly refused any watering-down of settler rule. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Mozambique's Samora Machel decided that the Zimbabwe war had to restart. They rearmed and turned loose the thousands of impatient Zimbabwe fighters, reorganizing them into the new ZIPA.

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gabe By January 1977 both Mozambican and Tanzanian governments were angry that the new stru ZIPA had become so radical, that fighters were refusing to so along with the U.S.-British negotiated deal that the front-line states wanted. Tanzania started arresting ZIPA political cadre, forbidding political-education classes in the training camp. In Mozambique an unsuspecting ZIPA command were arrested by FRELIMO. All members of the ZIPA Military Committee were arrested except its chairman, Rex Nhongo, who had secretly eneo gone over to the Mugabe faction. FRELIMO also arrested all the ZIPA Provincial Command conc ers, Base Commanders, Sector Commanders, and many General Staff members. Units were nent broken up and hundreds of ZIPA fighters executed. Once again the front-line states had etr disrupted the liberation war in order to enforce their policies on the Zimbabwe exp struggle. Zim

So the Mugabe clique, unable to voluntarily gain leadership over the guerrillas, had been given command only by FRELIMO's armed intervention. Mugabe, Machel and Tongogara have all admitted precisely this in published accounts. We must recall that Andy Young emphasized how U.S. imperialism had to get the front-line states, as the only possible option, to disarm the revolutionary fighters. U.S. imperialism's scenario turned out to be an accurate guide to events.

### III. THE C.I.A. & ZANU-PF

We can begin examining C.I.A. penetration in Zimbabwe by referring to a remarkable book: <u>Struggle For Zimbabwe</u> by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, two British and Canadir an reporters specializing in Afrika. This book is nothing less than the history of the liberation war according to Mugabe, Tongogara and their clique. First published in 1981, the second edition (printed in the U.S. by Monthly Review and in Afrika by Zimbabr we House) has an introductory endorsement by President Mugabe himself. This, then is an authorized, semi-official ZANU-PF account of the struggle. In Martin and Johnson's "acknowledgements" the authors reveal that: "Among those who gave much valuable time for interviews and reading parts of the manuscript were the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, and his colleagues... Thanks are due to the Ford Foundation which agreed to fund the final expenses for completion of the book..." Why would the Ford Foundation pay for the writing of a British book which favorably pictures "Marxist-Leninist" Robert Mugabe and his allies as the "liberators" of Zimbabwe?

There is a curious hole in this history which starts to explain the Ford Foundation's friendly interest--the C.I.A. The C.I.A. almost never appears at all in this semi-official, pro-Mugabe history of the Zimbabwe struggle. Outside of a one-line mention of C.I.A. participation in an abortive U.S. foreign aid project, the only mention of the C.I.A. is very strange. In telling about Kissinger's talks with "Rhodesian"

rime Minister Smith in September 1976, the book says:

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"The United States had theoretically withdrawn official links with Rhodesia in 1969, but the CIA, with the full knowledge of their Rhodesian counterparts, had maintained a fullscale operation in Rhodesia. Kissinger, by referring to 'our own intelligence links,' confirmed this clandestine operation, and this embarrassed the CIA who had told the President and State Department that they had withdrawn from Rhodesia." (our emphasis)

We are supposed to believe that the U.S. Government, including the White House, was innocently unaware of C.I.A. counter-insurgency operations in Zimbabwe (although the authors can't explain how Henry Kissinger then knew about it). The imperialists certainly would like us to believe such lies. It is starting to get clearer why the Ford Foundation paid for this book. And the C.I.A.'s "fullscale operation in Rhodesia"--why do the authors fail to write even one word about it? This book, endorsed by President Mugabe, makes it appear as though the C.I.A. played little or no role in the Zimbabwe struggle. That certainly is the impression we are left with.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

Both the authors and President Mugabe know full-well that the C.I.A. is a dedicated enemy of the Zimbabwe Revolution, and has long been very active there. Why are they toncealing this? The C.I.A.'s "fullscale operation" in Zimbabwe had three basic compoments: covert military aid to the Smith regime; intelligence-gathering; subversion-penetration operations against the liberation movement. The first component needs little explanation, being the familiar Bay of Pigs, El Salvador-type military operation. In Zimbabwe the C.I.A., acting directly or through the South Afrikan settler regime, furnished the tiny "Rhodesian" military (the settler security forces were smaller than the New York Police Dept.) with hundreds of key specialists in counter-insurgency war: unit commanders, pilots, helicopter mechanics, interrogation experts. This was the most openly menacing part of C.I.A. operations in Zimbabwe masses exposed the C.I.A. as a paper tiger.

The C.I.A.'s intelligence and penetration operations were and are much more suctessful. In a variety of areas the C.I.A. uses front-groups to monitor--and if possible to subvert--Zimbabwean politics. Afrikan trade-unions in Zimbabwe were co-optive instruments legally sanctioned and regulated by the settler-colonial regime. Their No. 1 task was to persuade Afrikan workers not to strike (which was illegal, of course) or take part in the liberation struggle. As pay for pacifying the Afrikan workers, their mion officials got to occupy one of the few petty-bourgeois positions open back then to Afrikans. Imperialism encouraged the Afrikan petty-bourgeoisie to open up many, many mall competing unions (like "Mom and Pop" grocery stores) to disunite and confuse workers. By independence there were 52 Zimbabwean unions with an average membership of only 1,800.

These dummy unions were actually very modern--in a bourgeois, AFL-CIO style. They mphasized, just as in the U.S., an involved grievance procedure, emphasis on "breadind-butter" issues, tactical focus on wage negotiations. This should only be expected, ince all these dummy unions were subsidized and in part used by the C.I.A. Both to get atelligence and to keep workers without any real organization. One of many instruments used by the C.I.A. was the "International Confederation of Free Trade Unions" (ICFTU), the anti-communist union organization of the NATO powers. The ICTFU is led by the U.S. WI-CIO, and has a long, documented history of collaboration as a C.I.A. instrument. An itru official admitted in Zimbabwe in 1971: "It is probably true that this country has leceived in recent years more international trade union assistance than any other

country on the Afrikan continent...There is not a union here which has not received assistance either directly or indirectly." While Afrikan workers in Zimbabwe fought their oppressors with waves of strikes, even in the face of gunfire and mass firings, their pro-Western unions opposed these and played only a negative role. This is the result of one tentacle of "fullscale operation in Rhodesia" by the C.I.A.

ZANU General intelligence-gathering about the liberation movement is done using many inarre struments, with "academic cover" being the first level. U.S. imperialism, which had low betr left Afrika primarily to the main colonial occupiers, began to build up its intelligence ght net in the mid-1950s to catch up. In 1954 the C.I.A. and American Metal Climax, the like main U.S. minerals corporation in Zimbabwe, set up the African-American Institute to fici supervise brainwashing of Afrikan students, research on Afrikan liberation, and other such tasks. That same year William O. Brown shifted from the U.S. State Department Bus reau of Intelligence to become the first head of the Boston University Afrikan Studies bour Program. In 1956 C.I.A. Deputy Director Max Millikan shifted to the directorship of the tho, C.I.A.-funded M.I.T. Center for International Affairs, a major research center on Afri-Zimb kan liberation movements. deta.

Since the C.I.A. cannot act openly in Afrika, it pushed the creation of these university Afrikan Studies Programs. Since then Afrika has been criss-crossed by U.S. "researchers," "political scientists," "doctoral candidates" trying to interview liberation cadres and "research" guerrilla movements. It is widely known where such information goes.

"sil C.I.A. funding for such intelligence-gathering had to be "laundered." For this the inte: Government turned to the minerals corporations and, most notably, the private foundafood tions. The Ford Foundation is the main funding instrument for covert C.I.A. intelligence to 1 using "private sector" personnel in Afrika. In fact, the Ford Foundation is the primary "sac: source of funds for most of the major U.S. Afrikan Studies programs. This foundation expe also funds numerous scholarship programs so that Afrikan students can be indoctrinated betti in the U.S. Extensive links to the C.I.A. have always been present: for example, Richard Bissell was on the Ford Foundation staff when he served as C.I.A. Deputy Director. Ed win Land (whose Polaroid Corporation's police services in South Afrika are well publi-80 W cized) was simultaneously a member of the Foundation Board and a member of the U.S. For State eign Intelligence Advisory Board. This shows us why the Ford Foundation was willing 🗓 fami fund an authorized, pro-Mugabe book on Zimbabwe that strongly downplayed the role of the you -C.I.A.--and explicitly white-washed general U.S. Government involvement with any such from C.I.A. activity.

The C.I.A.'s search for critical penetration into the Zimbabwe armed struggle found success. In 1977 the C.I.A. reached secret agreement to support the Mugabe/ZANU-PF par ty to become the next government. This decision became known, of course, to the C.I.A.'s local co-workers in Zimbabwe, the "Rhodesian" Special Branch (political police In consternation the "Rhodesian" intelligence men told many of their closest Amerikan friends. One of these was right-wing author Robin Moore (of <u>Green Beret fame</u>), who lived in Salisbury as "self-appointed ambassador" from the U.S. Right. Moore wrote:

"Reliable African sources are charging that the CIA is backing Robert Mugabe, although it seems odd that the U.S. would back an avowed Marxist...the link between the CIA and the Mugabe camp, working out of the United States, is said to be Karanga tribes man Edson Zvobgo. Zvobgo, a Rhodesian teacher of political science and at one time der tained for terrorist sympathies, has established university connections in the United States as a cover for his political activities."

Luckily for the C.I.A. and their Zimbabwean friends, Moore's comments were ignore

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Luckily for the C.I.A. and their Zimbabwean friends, Moore's comments were ignored as just the crazy mud-slinging of the white supremacist right-wing. Eddison Zvobgo is currently the Zimbabwean Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, a Member of Parliament, member of the ZANU Central Committee and one of Mugabe's closest allies. Zvobgo and Mugabe have been close since their early days in the nationalist movement; at the founding Gwelo Congress of ZANU in 1963, Eddison Zvobgo was elected Deputy to Mugabe as ZANU Secretary-General. Zvobgo, like almost all the other ZANU and ZAPU leaders, was arrested and imprisoned in 1964. He was, along with ZANU President Sithole (who later betrayed the revolution in prison), in the historic automobile full of ZANU leaders caught carrying dynamite into the capitol. At first glance Zvobgo might appear to be just like any other older revolutionary cadre in the Third World, like the many Vietnamese officials who underwent long imprisonment by the French in their struggle's early years.

His relationship to U.S. imperialism surfaces when we look at his elite, pettybourgeois career in the U.S. Beginning college at Pius XII University College in Lesotho, Zvobgo transferred to Tufts University in Massachusetts. Then came his return to Zimbabwe in 1963, followed by his arrest the next year. While most of the liberation detainees were held until late 1974 and early 1975, British pressure forced them to release a few early in 1971--most notably Eddison Zvobgo and his cousin, Michael Mwema (also a founding ZANU Central Committee member).

Zvobgo briefly played a role in the founding of the ANC in 1972, before leaving to Zambia to begin exile. Once in Zambia he demonstrated how useful a move his release had been. In 1972 the ZANU guerrillas were just restarting their war after the 1969-1972 "silent years" of retraining and base-building. But they were almost without support Internationally except for China. The families of the fighters in Zambia often had no food. Zvobgo, as a leader with some familiarity with the international scene, was asked to lead fund-raising and support for the fighters. He refused, saying that he had "sacrificed enough." (His cousin went even further, betraying the movement and being "spelled from ZANU.) Now, Zvobgo said, he was moving to Amerika to give his family a better life.

It was at this time that Zvobgo was recruited to work for the C.I.A. Eddison Zvob-<sup>30</sup> was an unusual ex-convict and revolutionary exile. The African Bureau of the U.S. <sup>31</sup> tate Department arranged U.S. residency papers not only for Zvobgo and his immediate <sup>4</sup> mily, but also for other adult relatives. All got INS work permits. We can assure <sup>30</sup> that prominent Third World revolutionaries do not ordinarily get such a warm welcome <sup>4</sup> Tom U.S. imperialism.

Zvobgo was instantly admitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. his has a certain significance. Fletcher is the elite training ground for U.S. imperalism in international diplomacy and affairs (with a tuition alone of over \$8,000 per <sup>Par</sup>): It has a "hawkish" orientation, as we can tell by a recent report that an equal <sup>maber</sup> of 1984 graduates will join the C.I.A. as will join the State Department. U.S. <sup>mbassador</sup> to El Salvador Thomas Pickering is a Fletcher graduate, as were the two U.S. <sup>mbassadors</sup> before him. The foreign trainees are all those being groomed for the inter-<sup>mational</sup> pro-U.S. elite. Argentina's current Economics Minister, leading his government <sup>mack</sup> to a tight U.S. relationship after the Falklands fiasco, is another Fletcher alum-<sup>mas</sup>. As is Eddison Zvobgo, supposedly an Afrikan "anti-imperialist."

<sup>Zvob</sup>go graduated from Fletcher in 1974. Promptly he was admitted to Harvard Law <sup>School</sup>. By 1975 he was Professor of Law at Lewis University in Illinois, living in an <sup>Apensive</sup> suburban house, driving an expensive new car. Quite a distance to travel in <sup>Ally</sup> three years after leaving prison in Zimbabwe. He had an influential "Uncle."

The C.I.A.'s small investment in Zvobgo paid off in 1975-76. A split in ZANU

provided an opportunity for Zvobgo to re-enter the leadership of the movement. He immediately began agitating for Robert Mugabe's elevation to ZANU President. Most importìf ant of all, as Zvobgo became active again he regularly flew back to Afrika, visiting br guerrilla camps in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. The C.I.A. had been worried about Ta the new, more radical ZIPA guerrillas. Since once in camp each fighter adopts a "war name" to protect his family and cover his background, the C.I.A. had no idea who not only the ordinary fighters were, but in many cases no idea who new commanders and politicth al commissars were. Moreover, they were uncertain as to the new ideological currents. in Zvobgo, under the cover of "chats" with U.S. State Dept. Afrika Bureau officials, transhiı mitted to the C.I.A. regular reports on the guerrillas. This was security identifica-11. tion information: real family names and background, political tendencies, friends, milical tary position and unit, and so on. Zvobgo helped arrange for Robert Mugabe and the U.S. Government to reach a secret understanding.

Even before the 1979 Lancaster House Conference in London, at which Zvobgo was a ZANU-PF delegate, he had become increasingly active pushing a pro-U.S. orientation within the liberation movement. Naturally, these neo-colonial ideas had to be packaged in a militant-sounding way. Mugabe and Zvobgo moved the party's journal, <u>Zimbabwe News</u>, to Illinois, U.S.A. This may appear like an odd place to headquarter a Zimbabwe liberation activity, but it allowed editor Zvobgo to change the politics without interference. In the January-May 1976 issue Zvobgo, in a signed editorial, appealed for U.S. imperialism to support Mugabe's ZANU-PF party. He wrote then:

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"What policy should America adopt--if it wants to (a) succeed, (b) to be respected and hopefully (c) to be loved in Southern Africa? We suggest the following--

"On Zimbabwe: Support ZANU and its armed forces in their armed struggle against the Ian Smith racist regime. Discard Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole...There are no other options available for the U.S. if it is tired of supporting losers. The current American policy of supporting settlers is going to hurt. Union Carbide, AMAX, Foote Minerals and other American corporations now sustaining the regime are going to receive short-swift treatment from a revolutionary Zimbabwean Government--on account of U.S. myopic policies."

There is only one way to interpret this surprisingly upfront message: 1. That U.S. imperialism might "<u>succeed</u>" and even be "<u>loved</u>" in Afrika by supporting ZANU-PF against the Smith regime--this says to the fighters that U.S. imperialism might become their "loved" ally, instead of an enemy. 2. That the fighters should want U.S. imperialism to back ZANU-PF against Nkomo, Muzorewa, Sithole and other Afrikan politicians--this says that superpower intervention in the affairs of the Zimbabwe people is OK if it's backing ZANU-PF. 3. That the U.S. minerals corporations will be "hurt" after liberation not be cause all exploiters will be expropriated, but only because of wrong U.S. government "myopic policies"--this says that a changed U.S. policy will protect imperialist investments. At the same time Zvobgo was telling U.S. corporations that large cash contributions to ZANU-PF would be remembered after independence. Imperialism was in command, with C.I.A. penetration reaching the political center of the peoples' movement.

### IV. CIVIL RIGHTS INSTEAD OF LIBERATION = NEO-COLONIALISM

Zimbabwe's liberation war was formally ended in November 1979, at Lancaster House in London. A neo-colonial settlement was inevitable. The purpose of the British-U.S. conference was not to free Zimbabwe, since liberation through unconditional military victory was at hand. We should remember that even as early as 1977 British Foreign Sec retary Crosland told NATO that the guerrillas would inevitably win unless there was an imperialist settlement: "... there would be no doubt over who would eventually win on the battlefield. But if the issue were settled on the battlefield it would seriously lessen the chance of bringing about a moderate African regime in Rhodesia and would open the way for more radical solutions..."

So the only purpose of the conference was to enforce a pro-imperialist deal. And the fix was in. The front-line states, having eliminated any guerrilla grouping resisting a settlement, were still demanding peace on almost any terms. Mugabe had committed himself as well, needing an international agreement to explain why ZANU-PF couldn't deliver on its war-time promises. Tongogara said: "We just have to have a settlement. We ran't go back empty-handed."

Although imperialism had lost the military war, it thus held the whip hand at the bargaining table. Mugabe's pathetic, little request for a few radical points he could use to coverup for the sell-out was sternly rejected by British Lord Carrington. The fital result was outrageous: Afrikan government by bourgeois elections, protection for all capitalist investments, all settler plantations to keep the land they actually occupy except through cash government purchase, all settler police, army, and officials to have guaranteed pensions paid by the new Afrikan government, no changes to the constitution for ten years except through unanimous Afrikan and settler vote in the Parliament.

The revolution was stopped short of victory. The Zimbabwe masses ended the oppressive settler rule, but did not get their land back, could not expropriate the imperialist holdings, could not, in fact, solve their urgent class needs. But the new Afrikan elite saw their own class prosperity coming. And the front-line states mistakenly thought that this imperialist deal meant stability and economic recovery. President Samora Machel hailed Conservative Margaret Thatcher as "the best British Prime Minister for 15 years because she had the courage to solve the Rhodesia problem. Our aims for dimbabwe were the same. It was just our tactics that differed." British imperialism and the Mozambique Government had the same "aims," only different "tactics."

The Martin and Johnson Struggle For Zimbabwe explicitly erases liberation and socialism as goals for the freedom fighters. ZANU-PF's main goal, this Mugabe-authorized account says, was bourgeois elections. They describe the Lancaster House negotiations:

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"There was only one way to end the war, and that was to agree to a new internationally acceptable constitution and to the holding of new British-supervised elections. Once an independence constitution had been agreed on there was really no way out for either side. The main principles the guerrillas had been fighting for--one man one vote elections, majority rule and independence--were all contained in it and even if the constitution was flawed on points of detail and obnoxious in some of its racial provisions, the fact remained that the main reason for going to war had been removed..."

Neo-colonial civil rights meant that the new petty-bourgeois elite would soon be "abinet ministers. Joshiah Tongogara as a youth had to leave for Zambia in search of "ducation and opportunity. There he finally gained a "good" job for an Afrikan--bar manager at a white club. We can sense his joy at Lancaster House, as this now-powerful "eneral looked forward to a bourgeois life. Before reporters he proposed that since he and "Rhodesian" Prime Minister Ian Smith came from the same home area, that they should "eam up to watch out for "their" area's interests in Parliament. In fact, Tongogara fondly recalled Smith's mother:

"Tongogara impressed Smith with his open approach, and even asked about his mother Who used to give him candy as a child when his father worked on Smith's father's farm: If I get home while the old lady is still alive,' he said, 'that would be one of the Recatest things for me--to say hello, ask her about the sweets and whether she still has

got some more for me.'"

In that same vein Mugabe and U.S. imperialism--now "loved" by ZANU-PF--traded endorsements. Andy Young in his N.Y. Times column, "Zimbabwe Holds the Key," indicated U.S. favor of Mugabe in the upcoming elections. While Young put down Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU ("Joshua Nkomo seems to be the implied, if secret, favorite of the British, the Russians, Ian D. Smith and South Afrika."), he boosted Robert Mugabe: "Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African Liberation Army is credited with most of the military success that led ultimately to control of much of the countryside...when I asked a British Foreign Office delegation, 'Which of the black leaders would you trust to run your family business in your absence?' they unanimously named Mr. Mugabe..." What a recommendation.

After his party's victory in the April 1980 elections, Mugabe had a very friendly visit to the U.S. In Harlem thousands cheered as President Mugabe, practiced at using just the right words to imply Pan-Afrikanism and radicalism, said: "Long live our oneness--long live our struggle!" But in Washington, fulfilling his end of the love-fest, Mugabe endorsed U.S. President Carter for re-election in the warmest terms: "It is this admiration we feel for you that leads me to wish you well in the race you are running. Unfortunately this race is being run in the United States. If he was running in our territory, he would be assured of victory." Mugabe and Tongogara, finally free to express themselves, ended up embracing Jimmy Carter and Ian Smith.

This neocolonial "oneness" was far more than diplomacy. Mugabe's ZANU-PF governing ment began by announcing its loyalty to two of U.S. imperialism's main policies: protecting tion of U.S. corporate investments and "detente" with the South Afrikan settler regime and Andy Young was right that "Zimbabwe Holds the Key"--today's Mozambique-apartheid regime ch accord just follows in Zimbabwe's footsteps. President Mugabe sent a message in his er be lection victory press conference:

"We cannot get them away even if we wanted to. The reality is that we have to corexist with them, and co-exist on the basis of mutual recognition of the differences that exist between us. In other words, we should pledge ourselves, if South Africa does so on its part, to noninterference in South African affairs and they to noninterference in our affairs."

What Mugabe means by "noninterference in South African affairs" is really "noninterference" in the settler-colonial oppression. ZANU-PF, when its own movement was based in other nations, always swore to do likewise for Namibia and South Afrika. In one typical 1975 interview, Kumbirai Kangai (now Secretary of Labor) said: "<u>But once</u> Zimbabwe is liberated, if we create a government which limits its concerns to the bound daries of Zimbabwe, then I think we will have sold out the whole cause. I believe it is our international obligation to continue in a concrete way to advance the struggle beyond the borders of Zimbabwe." Now Kangai has a Mercedes and the South Afrikan guerril las are barred from Zimbabwe. Washington is "loved" but the Afrikans who are trying to fight the Boers are not.

The C.I.A. is pleased with ZANU-PF as well. To take one example we have already brought up: C.I.A. contact with Zimbabwean unions has not been halted, but has intensi<sup>\*</sup> fied. Robert Mugabe's brother Albert became the first General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. But a financial scandal broke out. On December 2, 1981, Al<sup>\*</sup> bert Mugabe was found floating dead, fully dressed, in the deep end of his private swim ming pool behind his ranch house. It is normal in ZANU-PF for "socialist" trade-union leaders to live the suburban European lifestyle. But when the temporary administrator delivered his report on the ZCTU, it was embarrassing to the neo-colonial regime: The ZCTU was totally bankrupt and being evicted from its offices; Albert Mugabe had kept <sup>n0</sup> financial records, not even using checks--all funds were withdrawn by him and other

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officers in cash. The only good news was that the administrator said that the workers veren't paying their dues.

To keep the ZCTU offices together, the same old International Confederation of Free rade Unions (ICFTU) stepped in to pay the officials' salaries. Why would the "A.F.L.-T.A." pay to keep the ZCTU going? Because it is serving as a central agency for imperialist supervision of Zimbabwean workers. Recently, the African-American Labor Cen-' s rer (AALC) has been subsidizing ZCTU activities. The AALC was founded by the C.I.A. to led officially "encourage labour management co-operation to expand American capital investfice ment in the African nations." in

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It was symbolic when the Mugabe regime made the guerrillas turn in their AK-47s and alashnikov rifles. The fighters were retrained by British imperialist instructors as 1 y regular army units, and rearmed with the NATO rifles used by the former settler army. ng peoples Courts and other ties with the masses were ended; the fighters regrouped in new .e- : bases. They now are a standard capitalist army, living as parasites (soldiers earn st, mree or four times what plantation laborers earn) whether they like it or not. Their his ple now is to police their own people. Again, we recall that in 1977 Andy Young said 1g -Mat the task in Zimbabwe was "dismantling the guerrilla army and retraining it to be a police force." For imperialism. This is the final success of neo-colonial subversion of the armed struggle.

The Zimbabwe masses made revolution. Shackled with worthless, petty-bourgeois ern leadership, still they struggled forward and gave their lives to liberation. If their otec revolution was deflected, it is also true that Zimbabwean life was transformed--and will ıme. wer again be the same. Socialist ideas are openly discussed. The politics of popular gime mange has been demonstrated to all. Settler-colonialism's suffocating death-mask has s er Men smashed forever.

Many comrades here still give "solidarity" to ZANU-PF; this is the same as object-Wely covering for C.I.A.-backed counter-insurgency because of ignorance (or in some uses opportunism). Some comrades know "something is wrong" with the new Zimbabwe Rime, but are afraid to either question openly or investigate. The same phenomenon of Fomanticized and deliberately simple-minded view applies to Mozambique-apartheid re-🚛 "detente." This just weakens us, since the difficulties of the real world can only vercome, but not ignored. We all in some measure share this infection. It is whed to the fear that unless we fix our minds only on the super-positive--"heroic" Merrillas, "communist" parties, "inevitable" victories -- that we will get undermined and Nown away by our own uncertainties. Scientific socialism is just that: critical, a \*apon of the oppressed classes against the oppressing classes, a guide to practice. То thange the world we must change ourselves.



### NEW YORK, THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1980



The New York Times / George Tames

MUGABE WISHES CARTER WELL: Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe with President Carter and his wife, Rosalyn, yesterday at the White House. Mr. Mugabe wished the President well in his race for re-election. Page 3.



# Research papers. Historical analysis & Current Investigation July 1984

## SERIES ONE

### NEO-COLONIALISM VS. ZIMBABWE WOMEN

There is a conspiracy of silence by the movement about what is really happening in Zimbabwe. An implicit assumption is made that neo-colonialism (as in Zimbabwe) is a <u>half-step away</u> from imperialism, or is a stage <u>between</u> imperialism and socialism. Neo-colonialism or neo-socialism is, as Cabral pointed out, a stage in the development of imperialism. It may or may not be accompanied by concessions to the oppressed nation, either to fend off revolution by the masses or to meet the class needs of the national pettybourgeoisie. But whether any particular neo-colony does or does not grant concessions to the oppressed is a secondary aspect; <u>what is primary is that</u> <u>neo-colonialism is imperialism</u>. Those who go along with neo-colonialism must face that they are supporting modern imperialist strategy.

One most important way to demonstrate the neo-colonial nature of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe is to analyze that regime's policies and practices towards women in Afrikan society. Confronted by the new demands on the part of Zimbabwe women, confronted by angry stirrings, the ZANU-PF party and its government has responded with tactics learned from their U.S. masters. The result is a slick campaign akin to <u>MS.</u> magazine or an "Equal Opportunity Commission" here in the U.S.

The Mugabe regime's short-term strategy is a pretense of supporting women's struggles while really only modernizing colonialism's heavy exploitation of Afrikan women. This pretense is a very up-to-date campaign: seemingly sympathetic speeches by Government ministers, token women's projects, Government-sponsored women's conferences, even a "women's affairs" ministry headed by a token woman cabinet minister. The "women's affairs" ministry has a two-fold purpose: first: to pacify women's political activity, misleading Zimbabwe women into believing that the regime is on their side; second: to promote Western-style individualism and petty-bourgeois feminism, which are the class viewpoints of petty-bourgeois Zimbabwe women, as the leading politics of any women's activity.

The Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs held a twoday conference in March 1982 in Harare, where their new campaign for women's equality was first displayed--and then promptly shelved.

Relating how under existing inheritance law one widow and her children had their own home taken from them by her late husband's brother, ZANU-PF Minister of Legal Affairs Eddison Zvobgo exclaimed: "Do we need to research and study into such laws to know that they should be done away with?" The Zimbabwe women there rose up to shouts of "No!" Minister Zvobgo, who as we learned was the C.I.A.'s main agent inside ZANU and is now Mugabe's chief authority on oppressive laws against women, was pointing to the fact that Zimbabwe women cannot keep even their own property if their husband dies. In fact, both woman and minor children are often inherited <u>as property them-</u> selves by other men.

While Zvobgo's verbal thrusts seemingly promised women a sweeping away of all such patriarchal laws, that was only a deception. At the same March 1982 conference Prime Minister Mugabe spoke on the need to go slow, to do more "research," to not enact "controversial" changes. He specifically mentioned not threatening the patriarchal rights of polygamy, of selling daughters for cash, and of exclusive male custody of all children. These are all parts of neo-colonial Zimbabwe's imperialist legal code.

Few here really understand the extent of unrestrained, undisguised patriarchal oppression of Zimbabwe women. "Flag independence" for neo-colonial Zimbabwe meant full legal equality for Zimbabwe men with European settlers. But not Zimbabwe women. Under law Zimbabwe women are officially inferior and subject to men. Women are sold into marriage by their male guardians with no right of divorce unless the bride-price (lobolo) is paid back by their male relatives. No Afrikan woman can have legal custody of children. Often women lose their children (who are considered economically valuable) when polygamous husbands exercise their legal power to shift the children to the households of another wife or mistress. All the earnings and property of a woman belong only to her husband. At his death all family property goes to the eldest son, or if he is a minor, to the husband's male relatives.

This is enforced not only by heavy patriarchal customs, by imperialist culture, but by Zimbabwe's legal code, courts and police. This is why there is so much debate in Zimbabwe about whether to strike down the anti-women laws, modify them gradually, or leave them in place as permanent chains. Prime Minister Mugabe and ZANU-PF have officially come out for only gradual modification of the anti-women laws.

Eight months after the conference on women's situation, the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs hosted the well-publicized November 1982 "Women in Southern Africa: Strategies For Change" conference. This was a regional meeting of women from Azania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi. Once again Minister Zvobgo made a major speech. This time the C.I.A.'s favorite Zimbabwean advocated the "research" everyone knows is just an evasion. The only change in Zimbabwe's laws oppressing women he could point to was his Legal Age of Majority Act. This "historic" reform finally changed the legal definition of Afrikan women from "minor" to "adult," with the accompanying right to vote. This was all the Legal Age of Majority Act meant for them, however, since it left unchanged their subordinate legal status. As an example of how absurd this was, the new law gave 18-year old European and Asian women the right to marry and the right to own property. But as Minister Zvobgo admitted in his speech, Afrikan women of any age do not legally have either right. In other words, Zimbabwe's first women's rights legislation was mainly for settler women.

In his speech Minister Zvobgo defended the need for more delays in changing these laws. He told the assembled Afrikan women that no one yet understood what their legal status should be: "Only a comprehensive study can propose solutions..." Zvobgo closed his address with what was meant to be a rousing crowd-pleaser: "If we as a nation are prepared to take our women side by side with us in the transformation of our society, I can pledge my Ministry's support..." You don't have to be a genius to immediately recognize Zvobgo's possessive and patronizing attitude. While it is probable that the regime will eventually reform some existing anti-women laws (particularly as it relates to property rights, a particular sore point for petty-bourgeois women), their strategy is to preserve patriarchal oppression with only surface concessions.

Zvobgo hit on the main ZANU-PF propaganda line when he said that the government was sympathetic, but had to follow the masses, and it was the masses themselves who were the roadblock to progress: "...it would be futile and maybe even counter-productive for our legislators to rush into a change of the law before sufficient research has been conducted into what the people really want." Zvobgo said that as an example it would be meaningless to give Zimbabwe women the legal right to marry, since "a young woman who wants to get married will do so only if her male parent or guardian gives his consent. No law can stop that practice..." So Zimbabwe women are pictured by the regime as the roadblock to their own emancipation.

### PETTY-BOURGEOIS\_FEMINISM & CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE NEW ELITE

The second aspect of the "women's affairs" ministry, that of promoting the class viewpoint of petty-bourgeois women, is tied to the regime's concept of Western-style modernization. Prime Minister Mugabe and the other petty-bourgeois nationalists honestly desire to govern a "modern" nation. You can be sure that they have no desire to be obscure leaders over undeveloped rural villages. The Mugabes and Zvobgos want what New York and London have, to be part of the West. Their regime has introduced those broad social reforms that advance the class interests of the petty-bourgeoisie. Reforms such as free elementary schools and birth control clinics provide employment for educated Afrikans while building popular support. The "women's affairs" ministry is also part of this Western-style "development."

As an example of the contradictions, we can take Deputy Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs Naomi Nhiwatiwa. She has a doctorate degree, is one of the highest woman officials in the government, and has an official car, driver, and bodyguard. Yet she feels the constant pressure of patriarchy:

"Of course, I face a lot of opposition from what I call non-progressive men...I myself was brought up in the old tradition. When I was in the U.S., my mother would write and say, now, that's enough education, you only have to be concerned with your husband and your marriage. I could have said yes, I will be like that. We were brought up not to sit on a chair; you sit on the floor. Even now when I go home, I am still told to sit on the floor, and the men whom I travel with, my driver and security guard, sit on chairs." (our emphasis)

The contradictions could hardly become more vivid. A doctor and Deputy Minister, yet she still must sit at men's feet in her own family home. The contrast with her male counterparts is evident.

Mugabe's program, which has made urban employment available for educated women while letting them take part in national politics, has come as a real step forward for them. These women naturally see the "women's affairs" ministry as a progressive step, a modernizing force and a watchdog for their own interests. Petty-bourgeois women see the need for their "own" ministry because they know that their male "comrades" have always been for oppressing them. Minister Teurai Ropa Nhongo says that until she became head of "women's affairs" in 1977, ZANU-PF had always repressed revolutionary women: "Actually the Department had existed since 1963, when the Party was formed, but because of political and sexual oppression it was kept quiet."

ZANU-PF's program for women has nothing in common with women's activities within socialist revolutions, but is actually inspired by <u>petty-bour-</u> <u>geois feminism</u> as developed in the U.S. <u>Their central concept is individu-</u> <u>alistic equal rights between men and women, with the ministry to furnish the</u> <u>women's advocacy lacking in the rest of government.</u> Just like "equal opportunity" or "civil rights" bodies in the U.S.

Minister Teurai Ropa Nhongo said in a 1981 interview:

"NHONGO: The Ministry will encourage the private sector and the government to employ as many women as possible, and try to improve some statutory laws which deprive women... It's an advantage to us and an advantage to the Government because women are ready to compete with their male counterparts.

"Q.: For jobs and education?

"NHONGO: Education, jobs and everything."

A fair opportunity to "compete" with other men and women for scarce "education, jobs and everything" is the class vision of petty-bourgeois women, whether in Zimbabwe or Washington, D.C. While the Mugabe regime is none-too-comfortable with this, it concedes this as a necessary reform in gradual Westernization. This is not only modernization on a petty-bourgeois class basis, but on a totally foreign model.

The "women's affairs" ministry and other organizations of ZANU-PF women operate within the limits of the regime. The <u>N.Y. Times</u>, for example, reported with approval on this process right after independence. In the Mtepatepa area the Tate plantation had been protected during the war because the Afrikan manager and tobacco shed foremen were the leaders of the local ZANU-PF. Mrs. Tate's maid at the "big house" (who is married to the foreman) was also chairperson of the local ZANU-PF Women's Committee. She told everyone how Prime Minister Mugabe's policy of protecting settler plantations was right: "You can't just say to the boss, 'Move over!' It's not fair. It would be bad." Mugabe's women's organizations, just as the other instruments of neo-colonialism, represent the politics of a collaborationist class, a servant class to imperialism.

### GOVERNMENT REPRESSION OF WOMEN

This is why the "women's affairs" ministry cannot oppose violence against women, which is a primary aspect of imperialist culture. This was seen by the entire world on October 28, 1983, when army, police and ZANU-PF men's groups began night-time round-ups of Afrikan women in public places. What began as another of Mugabe's imititations of FRELIMO programs in Mozambique, in this case a drive to arrest all female prostitutes, zoomed out of hand. This was part of an even larger drive--"Operation Clean-Up"--to get rid of homeless squatters, undesirables and refugees. Tens of thousands were arrested or chased away by soldiers and bulldozers. In practice the sweeps became a mass back-lash by Mugabe's men, resentful of women's struggles and determined to teach Zimbabwe's women to stay in their old supposed place.

Thousands of Zimbabwe women were arrested in the random and indiscriminate round-up, which often resembled drunken "stag" parties. In one case soldiers broke into a movie theater and arrested all the Afrikan women inside. In Mutare 200 women workers at Liebig's food processing factory were arrested. Homes, bars, parks, grocery stores and other places were invaded by Mugabe's men looking for women to arrest. At "screening" sessions later women were released if they could show either a marriage license or papers of employment--in other words, if they had a master. Prostitution clearly had nothing to do with it.

From the first night the "women's affairs" ministry issued statements disassociating itself from the round-up: The ministry's first point was that the regime's intentions were correct, but it was wrong not to arrest the men who support prostitution as well; the ministry also had to admit the unjust nature of the drive: "The indiscriminate picking up of people in the streets amounts to an unpardonable violation of their human rights." <u>But the ministry was unable to either get the arrested women freed or to actually organize struggle against this repression.</u> Over 2,000 Zimbabwe women ended up being held in detention. An international scandal resulted, with Prime Minister Mugabe refusing to comment. Finally, on November 29, 1983 (a month after the raids began) Minister Eddison Zvobgo announced that "mistakes were made," and that all arrested women had been released on Mugabe's orders. The powerlessness and actual irrelevance of the "women's affairs" ministry was proven, as was the Mugabe regime's contempt for Afrikan women.

The Catholic journal <u>Moto</u>, which had been pro-government from a radical "liberation theology" perspective, reported angrily: "At least several thousand women were detained. One can gather this simply by knowing that tents had to be set up outside the large Chikurubi Prison, that hundreds were held in Mutare and in Bindura and that many hundreds of people were held in Mashumbi Pools.

"Women held, were detained under the Emergency Clause of the infamous Vagrancy Act of 1960. Under this, they had no access to courts once detained. Most of the women held, as is well-known by now, were not prostitutes...

"A pregnant woman released from Mashumbi Pools talked about conditions in the camps... The area is extremely hot, and people were often held in tin huts, although some of them were in tents. Facilities were minimal, and women with babies were not aided in caring for them. People were fed only on sadza and beans, and the drinking water was dirty. This resulted in outbreaks of diarrhea, and at least one woman is reported to have died. The woman also told us that soldiers were sexually abusing women. Already labelled as 'prostitutes' and held in compounds, they were fairly powerless against such abuse.

"While some women's organizations have approved of the operation in general while objecting to the methods used, we not only object to the method, but to the operation in general."

In a similar way, the "women's affairs" ministry has done nothing to

protect women of the Ndebele minority from Government troops during the unrest since 1982. The split between ZANU-PF and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) led to mass desertions from the army, with armed clashes between the regime and ex-ZAPU "dissidents." In this situation South Afrika formed a Matabele Brigade of exile army deserters to conduct destabilizing raids into Zimbabwe. Without going into the "why" and "how" of this war, we can say that it comes from a fight between <u>two</u> neo-colonial parties over the spoils of "flag independence." The warring cliques of petty-bourgeois nationalist politicians, who for twenty years kept the anti-colonial movement divided, have now dis-united Zimbabwe itself. Irregardless of the supposed merits of the conflict, the criminal violence against women and children by Mugabe's troops cannot be justified.

The Prime Minister himself told Parliament two years ago that an eye for an eye against "dissidents" was too mild: "We may demand two ears for one ear and two eyes for one eye." His forces have acted with unrestrained terrorism against the entire Ndebele minority (15% of Zimbabwe), killing, torturing and raping many thousands. The regime's problem is that the Ndebele people themselves in Matabeleland refuse to aid government troops. So Mugabe, as imperialist puppets everywhere, has had to make war against the masses. This is publicly admitted by the regime over and over.

According to Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi, now Health Minister but formerly Mugabe's Minister of State overseeing the armed forces: "The situation was really gravitating to the point where the local population was totally behind the dissidents... I am quite sure that some people get quite bruised before they are willing to cooperate." Torture, in other words.

This must be examined since what little reportage exists here in the U.S. about women in Zimbabwe is really only about the majority Shona ethnic grouping. Ndebele women have all the common problems of other Zimbabwe women plus another major one--surviving the terror campaign directed against the masses by the Zimbabwe Army. The massive and sadistic violence used against the people can be better understood when we remember that much of Mugabe's army is made up of former Smith regime puppet troops, and that in this campaign special tribalist units are being used. After the Lancaster House settlement of the war, one of the main concessions was to integrate the Smith military and the ZANU-PF and ZAPU militaries into one new army. So thousands of former puppet Afrikan troops for the Smith regime, who had always committed crimes and atrocities, are now working for Mugabe.

While the regime's barring of drought relief supplies for over a year for the Ndebele region, plus a five week embargo on any food and medicine sales this spring, caused great hardship, the army's killing, tortures and rapes are the major problem. One 13-year old girl, interviewed in a hospital with gunshot wounds and severe burns, told reporters: "'They asked for dissidents,' she said. 'We couldn't say anything, we didn't know anything.' She said her family was put into two huts which were set afire. The soldiers then fired 'hundreds of shots' into the huts and shot anyone who ran out, she said. Two ran out and were killed. 'I finally rolled out and pretended to be dead,' she said. Of her six family members at the village, she said, only she survived." What good does a women's conference in the capital on equal rights do for her?

Upset at spreading reports of their atrocities in the foreign press, the Mugabe regime lifted its press ban this May, permitting foreign correspondents escorted by troops to interview Ndebele villagers. At one local mission hospital a U.S. physician said that since February he had reported over 100 wounded people from army beatings and interrogation. In the previous three weeks alone he had futilely reported to the authorities about their troops raping 15 local women, with some victims as young as 13 years old. An Afrikan nurse at another clinic told of many beatings. Director of Information John Tsimba was reduced to lamely telling reporters that there had indeed been "excesses" by the army, but "You have not found evidence of genocide." Rape of Ndebele women and children by Mugabe's troops is not a crime in Zimbabwe.

The pattern of systematic rape and abuse of Zimbabwe women, set by the imperialist troops of the colonial occupation, continues under the imperialist troops of ZANU-PF neo-colonialism. It should not surprise us to learn that Prime Minister Mugabe had borrowed a unit of the British SAS (Special Air Service), the elite counterinsurgency force infamous for its terror bombings and "dirty tricks" in Belfast, to help set up his own terror campaign against the Ndebele minority. When we see government-sponsored violence against women, no matter how "socialist" and "nationalist" the criminal government proclaims itself, we should know that we are seeing the enemy. The hollowness of the "women's affairs" ministry, which cannot even oppose massive violence against Afrikan women, suits its imperialist backers just fine.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

Western reports on women's oppression in Zimbabwe tend to portray it as primarily a lingering inheritance from the past--either as "feudal"/"tribal" backwardness or as distortions imposed on Afrikan society by British colonialism. But as we have seen the oppression of women in Zimbabwe is both inherited and is very modern; it is central to the present society. The Western-structured, Europeanized sectors of Zimbabwe, the industry, mines, plantations and urban commerce, are all built on the continuing oppression of Afrikan women. As central figures of a class, and certainly as a distinct and most oppressed stratum of Zimbabwean society.

While ZANU-PF leaders like Minister Eddison Zvobgo publicly characterize Zimbabwe women as "behind and weak," the real point is that they are very strong. Strong enough to support the whole Afrikan society. 82% of Zimbabwe women live in the communal areas, the undeveloped and overcrowded reservations (called "reserves") where colonialism had confined the indigenous culture. These are subsistence farming areas: without industrialization, paved roads, sufficient water, or much of a cash economy. Half of Zimbabwe lives in communal areas, with the women, children and aged living on subsistence farming of marginal lands while many young men seek wagelabor in the urban centers. The food production that supports the communal areas' population is almost entirely done by women--women are the main farmers of Zimbabwe. This is a point often overlooked.

In 1981 the Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, a non-governmental organization not to be confused with the "women's affairs" ministry, conducted 3,000 interviews of women in 28 communal areas. The resulting report, We Carry a

<u>Heavy Load: Rural Women in Zimbabwe Speak Out</u>, sums up an important message from these women:

"From the information gathered, it is clear that the majority of women in the rural areas play a very active role as unacknowledged producers, both for family consumption and for sale. The question therefore is not how to find ways of motivating these women, as it is often expressed. It is rather the necessity of finding ways of making their productivity less arduous, and for the fruits of women's labor to be under their control so that they can more directly benefit their own lives.

"The central role that these women play in maintaining the family of the present labour force, which is also caring for the future labour force, is badly overlooked. This neglect has resulted in the increased oppression of women in the rural areas: more work with less resources, and declining rather than improving status. Women are seen as economic attachments to men; their contribution is still seen as supplementary, rather than absolutely vital, to the household's survival. "(our emphasis)

The main demand that these women have raised is simple-land to support their families and the right to control what they produce. A typical statement said: "We are all too crowded. Some of our sisters have no land at all. They want some land so that they can help themselves." Another typical comment pointedly said: "No, we don't have control over land. The land is controlled by men. I say so because we are given 2½ acres to plough, but our husbands do not allow us to plant anything except maize. So where shall we plant monkey nuts, beans and fruit that are good for our families?" Many rural women raised the demand for separate women's farmland, so that they could better support their children (many men, with the encouragement of the regime, want mostly commercial crops planted to provide some cash for alcohol, tobacco and other consumer items).

Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party refuse to even put funds into their own token projects to co-opt women. Almost nothing is done that foreign aid will not pay for. So that the Melfort Center, a project by the "Women's Affairs" ministry "to rehabilitate the female combatant, the freedom fighters," was funded by the U.S. and the Netherlands (ironically the Mugabe regime has announced programs to "rehabilitate" both prostitutes and women guerrillas). The ministry's first <u>Report on the Situation of Women in Zimbabwe</u> was funded by UNICEF. Most of the token farm cooperatives with women have always been funded by (and were set up by) Western church groups. This also serves a propaganda purpose, since raising funds for a women's project makes the regime look good to Western liberals.

In contrast the regime has spent \$65 million on the new tourist hotelconference center in Harare. Because ministerial Mercedes and sub-ministerial Peugeots were getting damaged so frequently speeding on unpaved rural roads, the regime has spent over \$1 million on an extra fleet of 4-wheel drive station wagons to be used just by top bureaucrats. Millions of dollars in government-guaranteed bank loans have gone to purchase luxury homes for Mugabe officials in the settler suburbs. The regime guarantees Mugabe officials the right to personally buy these luxury homes from departing settlers. These are the puppets who constantly raise the name of Nehanda, the woman spirit-medium who led the 1896 liberation war, to cover up for their pro-Western contempt for Zimbabwe women and the masses in general.

This refusal by neo-colonialism to support Afrikan women's communal agriculture is no accident. This communal life is the natural base for building socialist agriculture in Zimbabwe. Imperialism wishes to wipe out women's agriculture and thus wipe out the remnants of the indigenous Zimbabwe communal society. If Zimbabweans could expropriate the settler plantations which still occupy virtually all the fertile and best-watered land in the country, and extend the communal Afrikan agriculture, hunger would then be literally eliminated with one blow. Euro-colonial concepts of development obscure the fact that mass hunger and malnutrition were once unknown to Zimbabweans, who had a highly productive agricultural base when the first British invaders arrived in the 1800s. And with modern socialist communal organization and light industry, the economic crisis of the masses could be resolved. Women's economic problems are not technical but political, one of freeing the land and freeing themselves, really carrying out the promise of the revolution.

We are not saying that either the present communal areas (undeveloped and overcrowded) or the pre-colonial Afrikan society of the 1800s are utopian models. The negative aspects of the indigenous culture--such as patriarchy and an isolated backwardness--were preserved and then heightened by imperialism. The settler-colonial occupation repressed education, communal organization, effective agriculture, political struggles to modernize Afrikan culture. <u>Tribalism</u>, individualism and oppression of women were promoted. The Zimbabwe people want and need modernization, social and industrial development. But the starting point for real modernization cannot be taking U.S. and European society as the model. Democratic aspects of the communal Afrikan society, together with the knowledge gained in the liberation war, are the starting points for improving the lives of the masses.

The demand for socialism in Zimbabwe concretely means the development of a revolutionary Afrikan culture. Which is why the noncommercial, production for use by the producers women's agriculture of the communal areas is an important base for the future. While Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party talk of eventual socialism, they are openly planning to finish Westernizing and bourgeoisifying Zimbabwe society. Key to this is forcing as many as possible into European-style classes, and driving women out of agriculture.

Neo-colonialism wishes to create a rich peasant ("kulak") class of male commercial farmers to take up what land the settler plantations do not need, driving women back into unlanded and unwaged labor within the patriarchal household. This rich peasant class has no roots in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, and is modelled after one-family commercial farms in the U.S. and Europe. The same is true for the new petty-bourgeoisie of government officials and local managers for the multi-national corporations. (Most Zimbabweans cannot qualify for these privileged classes, and are being gradually shoved downward.) Even the limited industrial workforce is being pushed to reorganize on a European basis, with Mugabe proposing legislation compelling all these workers to give up their rights to share in the communal land. These classes are based on capitalism-land and resources held by private ownership, patriarchal nuclear family as the economic unit, male wage-earners with women as unwaged dependents.

Already Zimbabwe women comprise only 6% of the non-agricultural wageearners, mostly as domestics. Even including agricultural labor women are still only 10% of all wage-earners. While "equal rights" tokenism on a bourgeois basis will create a thin layer of Afrikan women officials, whitecollar workers, and professionals, there is no uncertainty that the Mugabe regime's activities are an attack on Zimbabwe women. Neo-colonialism is not a step beyond imperialism (as many believe) but a form of imperialist rule and an enemy of women's liberation.

Critics of the Government's <u>Transitional National Development Plan:</u> <u>1982/1983-1984/1985</u> point out: "<u>They propose communal farms should shift</u> <u>away from staple foods to export crops...never mentioning that this policy</u> <u>may contribute, as in other African countries, to national food shortages.</u>" The regime's program for resettlement on unused plantation lands selects Afrikans on the strict basis of readiness to engage in commercial farming. Candidates are told that they must already have cattle, carts, cultivators and seed--and be men. Cash is also necessary to pay the ZANU-PF officials their bribes and arbitrary "fines." One angry woman from Mtoko commented: "So it means that we women are not counted in any development activities being undertaken in Zimbabwe. We struggled much to win this Zimbabwe, but it seems that our Government has forgotten that and is not interested in women's development and needs."</u>

Neo-colonialism has only further brought out all the contradictions of women's situation. Revolution shook up Zimbabwe, starting the questioning and challenging of all past injustices and limitations. Some 600 Afrikan women became guerrilla fighters and army commanders. Now there is no natural place in neo-colonial Zimbabwe for many of these women. Isn't it amazing that the regime finds it necessary to "rehabilitate" (as they say) women guerrillas? One of their main programs is to retrain women revolutionaries to be office secretaries. What a comedown, to go from being a freedom fighter to typing for some businessman.

The Government admits that many revolutionary women don't fit into Mugabe's neo-colonial society. Deputy Minister Naomi Nhiwatiwa said: "When women were in the battlefield they could command men. The line of command in the military is a relatively easy one: there is the commander, you follow the line of command. Women combatants learned to take leadership, to give commands and to expect that command to be followed. Now, they are told, 'No, you sit on the floor while the men sit over there.' All this represents a lot of adjustment for the women... they were teenagers, and most of them want to get married. But if they get married, they must retrogress to where they consider themselves minors, unless they find very progressive men. You don't find a lot of male combatants looking for a female combatant as a possible wife."

Those who would no longer submit to the old patriarchal ways are openly shunned by many men. Still there is growing consciousness. One newspaper column complained that "...increased belligerency among warrior women...is becoming a pathological obsession. Whatever the subject, whatever the question, they shout 'repression of women.'" The struggle for the liberation of women in Zimbabwe has just begun.

### LIFE IN ZIMBABWE

In 1983 the Catholic "social justice" journal <u>Moto</u> did a profile on the living conditions of 208 Afrikans who lived on a typical European settler plantation near the capital, Harare. Plantation laborers make up 38% of Zimbabwe's wage-earning labor force, the largest single sector. One and one-half million Afrikans live in the plantation areas. When questioned in 1983 these Zimbabweans said that it was hard for them to see if their lives had improved since independence. Still, they considered themselves lucky compared to many.

The men work a standard 55-hour week (much more during harvest, of course) for the legal minimum plantation wage of \$50 per month. There are no pensions or other benefits. One old man who began work on the plantation as a child in the 1930s was handed a \$100 retirement payment to support him until he died. Many are hungry much of the time, depending on family size. A typical family on the plantation eats a little meat or eggs perhaps once a month. They must buy the vegetables they produce back from the plantation owner.

On this plantation the women are not allowed to grow vegetables for their families near their crowded shacks (which is permitted on some plantations). Conditions for the children are poor. Dysentery, skin infections and other illnesses are ever-present. There is no sewerage system, no latrines, no garbage pits, little water (the water is mostly reserved by the planter for his export crops). The women must carry all the dishes and clothes to be washed to a little stream one mile away; this stream is the only place to bathe in and must be shared with livestock. A free government health clinic is now advertised as available for these families, but it is a seven mile walk away, there is no transportation available, and it is seldom used. They are lucky that an elementary school, which is also now free, is close by. Secondary school (high school in our terms) in Zimbabwe is by private fee, however; no families on this plantation can afford to send their children.

The Afrikan families on this plantation know that however exploited they are, that there are many others even poorer. After all, although half of the total Zimbabwe population lives in the communal areas (the "reserves"), average household income there is only 50% of average Afrikan household income in the plantation areas. These Zimbabweans also say that conditions on a nearby plantation are much worse than theirs, since the workers there are from Malawi. Afraid that complaining might bring in police raids, the Malawi workers put up with wages far below the legal minimum. Zambian and Malawi workers, who in practice have no rights, make up a majority of Zimbabwe's plantation labor force (at least 55% by most estimates).

All this is three years after "liberation."

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